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DISCLAIMER 
 
The advisory service marketing recommendations used in this research represent the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made 
available by each advisory service.  In cases where a recommendation is vague or unclear, some 
judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular recommendation or how to 
implement the recommendation.  Given that some recommendations are subject to interpretation, 
the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given 
program may differ from that stated by the advisory service, or from that recorded by another 
subscriber.  In addition, the net advisory prices presented in this report may differ substantially 
from those computed by an advisory service or another subscriber due to differences in 
simulation assumptions, particularly with respect to the geographic location of production, cash 
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    The purpose of this research report is to evaluate the pricing performance of market 
advisory services for the 1995-2001 corn and soybean crops.  The results for 1995-2000 were 
released in earlier AgMAS research reports, while results for the 2001 crop year are new. 
 
  Certain explicit assumptions are made to produce a consistent and comparable set of 
results across the different advisory programs.  These assumptions are intended to accurately 
depict “real-world” marketing conditions facing a representative central Illinois corn and 
soybean farmer.  Several key assumptions are: i) with a few exceptions, the marketing window 
for a crop year runs from September before harvest through August after harvest, ii) on-farm or 
commercial physical storage costs, as well as interest opportunity costs, are charged to post-
harvest sales, iii) brokerage costs are subtracted for all futures and options transactions and iv) 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) marketing loan recommendations made by advisory 
programs are followed wherever feasible.  Based on these and other assumptions, the net price 
received by a subscriber to market advisory programs is calculated for the 1995-2001 corn and 
soybean crops. 
 
Market and farmer benchmarks are developed for the performance evaluations.  Two 
market benchmarks are specified in order to test the fragility of performance results to changing 
benchmark assumptions.  The 24-month market benchmark averages market prices for the entire 
24-month marketing window.  The 20-month market benchmark is computed in a similar 
fashion, except the first four months of the marketing window are omitted.  The farmer 
benchmark is based upon the USDA average price received series for corn and soybeans in 
Illinois.  The same assumptions applied to advisory program track records are used when 
computing the market and farmer benchmarks. 
 
  Four basic indicators of performance are applied to advisory program prices and revenues 
over 1995-2001.  The results provide limited evidence that advisory programs as a group 
outperform market benchmarks, particularly after considering risk.  In contrast, more evidence 
exists that advisory programs as a group outperform the farmer benchmark, even after taking risk 
into account.  Little evidence is found that advisory programs with superior performance can be 
usefully selected based on past performance.  
 
  The results raise the intriguing possibility that even though advisory services do not appear 
to “beat the market,” they nonetheless provide an opportunity for farmers to improve marketing 
performance because farmers under-perform the market.  Mirroring debates about stock 
investing, the relevant issue is whether farmers can most effectively improve marketing 
performance by pursuing “active” strategies, like those recommended by advisory services, or 
“passive” strategies, which involve routinely spreading sales across the marketing window.   iii
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  Farmers in the US consistently identify price and income risk as one of the greatest 
management challenges they face.  The roller coaster movement of corn and soybean prices over 
the last decade is ample evidence of the uncertainty and risk facing grain farmers.  Surveys 
suggest that numerous farmers view market advisory services as an important tool in managing 
price and income risk (e.g., Sogn and Kraner, 1977; Smith, 1989; Patrick and Ullerich, 1996; 
Patrick, Musser and Eckman; 1998; Schroeder et al., 1998; Norvell and Lattz, 1999; Pennings et 
al., 2001).  Furthermore, Davis and Patrick (2000) find that the use of market advisory services 
has a significant influence on the use of forward pricing by farmers. 
 
A limited number of academic studies investigate the pricing performance of market 
advisory services.
1  In the earliest study, Marquardt and McGann (1975) evaluate the accuracy of 
cash price predictions for 10 private and public outlook newsletters in corn, soybeans, wheat, 
cattle and hogs over 1970-1973.  They find that futures prices generally are a more accurate 
source of forecasts than either the private or public newsletters.  Gehrt and Good (1993) analyze 
the performance of five advisory services for corn and soybeans over the 1985 through 1989 
crop years.
2  Assuming a representative farmer follows the hedging and cash market 
recommendations for each advisory service; a net price received for each year is computed and 
compared to a benchmark price.  They generally find that corn and soybean farmers obtained a 
higher price by following the marketing recommendations of advisory services.  Martines-Filho 
(1996) examines the pre-harvest corn and soybean marketing recommendations of six market 
advisory services over 1991 through 1994.  He computes the harvest time revenue that results 
from a representative farmer following the pre-harvest futures and options hedging 
recommendations and selling 100% of production at harvest.  Average advisory service revenue 
over the four years is larger than benchmark revenue for both corn and soybeans.  Kastens and 
Schroeder (1996) examine the futures trading profits of seven to ten market advisory services for 
the 1988-1996 crop years.  They report negative gross trading profits for wheat and positive 
gross trading profits for corn and soybeans.  The authors indicate that incorporating brokerage 
commissions and subscription costs would have substantially diminished trading returns. 
 
                                                 
1 King, Lev and Nefstad (1995) examine the corn and soybean recommendations of two market advisory services 
for a single year.  The focus of their study is not pricing performance, but a demonstration of the market accounting 
program Market Tools.  Some analyses also have appeared in the popular farm press.  Marten (1984) examines the 
performance of six advisory services for corn and soybeans over 1981 through 1983.  Otte (1986) investigates the 
performance of three services for corn over the period 1980 through 1984.  Both studies indicate the average price 
generated by services exceeds a benchmark price.  Top Producer magazine has provided evaluations of advisory 
services in corn, soybeans and wheat for a number of years (e.g., Powers, 1993). 
 
2 Throughout this report, the term "crop year" refers to the marketing window for a particular crop.  This is done to 
simplify the presentation and discussion of market advisory service performance results.  A “crop year” is more than 
twelve calendar months in length and includes pre-harvest and post-harvest marketing periods.   2
  While a useful starting point, previous studies have important limitations.  First, the 
cross-section of advisory services tracked for each crop year is quite small, with the largest 
sample including only ten advisory services.  Second, the results may be subject to survivorship 
bias, a consequence of tracking only advisory services that remain in business at the end of a 
sample period.  The literature on the performance of mutual funds, hedge funds and commodity 
trading advisors provides ample evidence of the upward bias in performance results that can 
result from survivorship bias (e.g., Brown et al., 1992; Schneeweis, McCarthy and Spurgin, 
1996; Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999).  Third, the results may be subject to hindsight 
bias if advisory service recommendations were not collected on a “real-time” basis (Jaffe and 
Mahoney, 1999).  Hindsight bias is the tendency to collect or record profitable recommendations 
and ignore or minimize unprofitable recommendations after the fact. 
 
  This discussion suggests the academic literature provides farmers with a limited basis for 
evaluating the performance of market advisory services.  The Agricultural Market Advisory 
Service (AgMAS) Project was initiated in 1994 with the goal of providing unbiased and rigorous 
evaluation of market advisory services.
3, 4  The AgMAS Project has collected marketing 
recommendations for no fewer than 23 market advisory programs each crop year since the 
project was initiated.  While the sample of advisory services is non-random, it is constructed to 
be generally representative of the majority of advisory services offered to farmers.  Further, the 
sample of advisory services includes all programs tracked by the AgMAS Project over the study 
period, so pricing performance results should not be plagued by survivorship bias.  Finally, the 
AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed and records recommendations 
on a real-time basis.  This should prevent the pricing performance results from being subject to 
hindsight bias. 
 
The purpose of this research report is to evaluate the pricing performance of market 
advisory services for the 1995-2001 corn and soybean crops.  The results for 1995-2000 were 
released in earlier AgMAS research reports (e.g., Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good, 2002), while 
results for the 2001 crop year are new.  Following the literature on mutual fund and investment 
newsletter performance (e.g., Metrick, 1999; Jaffe and Mahoney, 1999), two basic questions will 
be addressed in the report: 1) Do market advisory services, on average, outperform appropriate 
benchmarks? and 2) Do market advisory services exhibit persistence in their performance from 
year-to-year?  Certain explicit assumptions are made to produce a consistent and comparable set 
of results across the different advisory programs.  These assumptions are intended to accurately 
depict “real-world” marketing conditions facing a representative central Illinois corn and 
                                                 
3 Dr. Darrel L. Good and Dr. Scott H. Irwin of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign jointly direct the 
Project.  Correspondence with the AgMAS Project should be directed to: AgMAS Project Manager, 406 Mumford 
Hall, 1301 West Gregory Drive, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801; voice: (217)333-
2792;  fax: (217)333-5538; e-mail: agmas@uiuc.edu.  The AgMAS Project also has a website that can be found at 
the following address: http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/agmas/. 
 
4 Funding for the AgMAS project is provided by the following organizations: Illinois Council on Food and 
Agricultural Research; Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, US Department of 
Agriculture; Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture; Risk Management Agency, US 
Department of Agriculture; and Initiative for Future Agriculture and Food Systems, US Department of Agriculture.   3
soybean farmer.  Several key assumptions are: i) with a few exceptions, the marketing window 
for a crop year runs from September before harvest through August after harvest, ii) on-farm or 
commercial physical storage costs, as well as interest opportunity costs, are charged to post-
harvest sales, iii) brokerage costs are subtracted for all futures and options transactions and iv) 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) marketing loan recommendations made by advisory 
programs are followed wherever feasible.  Based on these and other assumptions, the net price 
received by a subscriber to a market advisory program is calculated for the 1995-2001 corn and 
soybean crops. 
 
Four basic indicators of performance are applied to advisory program prices and revenues 
over 1995-2001.  The first indicator is the proportion of advisory programs that beat benchmark 
prices.  The second indicator is the difference between the average price of advisory programs 
and benchmarks.  The third indicator is the average price and risk of advisory programs relative 
to the average price and risk of benchmarks.  The fourth indicator is the predictability of 
advisory program performance from year-to-year.  Both market and farmer benchmarks are 
developed for the evaluations.  All benchmarks are computed using the same assumptions 
applied to advisory service track records. 
 
At the outset, it is important to point out that only seven crop years are available to 
analyze market advisory service pricing performance.  From a purely statistical standpoint, 
samples with ten or fewer observations typically are considered “sparse.”  On the surface, this 
suggests the sample may not contain enough information to draw conclusions about advisory 
service pricing performance.  There are several reasons why this may not be the case.  First, 
Anderson (1974) explored the reliability of agricultural return-risk estimates based on sparse 
data sets and found the surprising result that even as few as three or four observations can be 
very useful.  Second, even though the number of crop years is limited, at least 23 advisory 
programs are tracked for each crop year.  This has the potential to substantially increase the 
information provided by the sample.  Third, from a practical, decision-making standpoint, 
samples with seven observations often are considered adequate to reach conclusions.  The results 
of university crop yield trials represent a well-known example.  A typical presentation of the 
results includes only current year yields and two-year or three-year averages.  In many cases, 
even the two-year and three-year averages cannot be presented because of turnover in the 
varieties tested from year-to-year.
5  Despite the limitations, this type of yield trial data is widely 
used by farmers in making variety selections.  On balance, then, it seems reasonable to argue that 
the seven years of data currently available on advisory service pricing performance may be used 
to make some careful conclusions.  Caution obviously is in order given the possibility of results 
being due to random chance in a relatively small sample of crop years. 
 
  This report has been reviewed by members of the AgMAS Review Panel, which provides 
independent, peer-review of AgMAS Project research.  The members who reviewed this report 
are: T. Randall Fortenbery, Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural and Applied 
                                                 
5 The University of Illinois Variety Testing program is a well-known example of this type of yield trial. The results 
of this research program can be found at http://www.cropsci.uiuc.edu/vt/.   4
Economics at University of Wisconsin-Madison and Diana Klemme, Vice President, Director – 
Grain Division, Grain Service Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia. 
  
The next section of the report describes the procedures used to collect the data on market 
advisory service recommendations.  The second section describes the methods and assumptions 
used to calculate the returns to advisory service marketing advice.  The third section presents the 
methods and assumptions used to compute benchmark prices.  The fourth section of the report 
presents 2001 pricing results for corn and soybeans.  The fifth section presents a summary of the 
combined results for the 1995-2001 crop years.  The sixth section discusses the performance 




The market advisory services included in this evaluation do not comprise the population 
of market advisory services available to farmers.  The included services also are not a random 
sample of the population of market advisory services.  Neither approach is feasible because no 
public agency or trade group assembles a list of advisory services that could be considered the 
"population."  Furthermore, there is not a generally agreed upon definition of an agricultural 
market advisory service.  To assemble the sample of services for the AgMAS Project, criteria 
were developed to define an agricultural market advisory service and a list of services was 
assembled. 
 
Five criteria are used to determine which advisory services are included in the AgMAS 
study.  First, marketing recommendations from an advisory service must be received 
electronically in real time.  The recommendations may come in the form of satellite-delivered 
pages, Internet web pages or e-mail messages.  Services delivered electronically generally ensure 
that recommendations are made available to the AgMAS Project at the same time as farm 
subscribers.  This form of delivery also ensures that recommendations are received in “real-
time.”  This avoids the problem of recommendations being delivered after the date of 
implementation intended by an advisory service.  Such a problem could occur frequently with 
recommendations delivered via the postal service. 
 
The second criterion is that a service has to provide marketing recommendations to 
farmers rather than (or in addition to) speculators or “traders.”  Some of the services tracked by 
the AgMAS Project do provide speculative trading advice, but that advice must be clearly 
differentiated from marketing advice to farmers for the service to be included.  The terms 
"speculative" trading of futures and options and “hedging” use of futures and options are only 
used to identify whether a service is focused on speculators or farmers.  Within a clearly defined 
farm marketing program, a distinction between speculative and hedging use of futures and 
options is not necessary. 
 
The third criterion is that marketing recommendations from an advisory service must be 
in a form suitable for application to a representative farmer.  That is, the recommendations have 
to specify the percentage of the crop involved in each transaction --cash, futures or options-- and 
the price or date at which each transaction is to be implemented.  It is also helpful if advisory 
services make specific recommendations about implementation of the marketing loan program,   5
but that is not required.  Note that some advisory services evaluated by the AgMAS Project do 
not make any futures and options recommendations, so it is not necessary to make such 
recommendation to be included in the study.  Services that make futures and options hedging 
recommendations, but fail to clearly state when cash sales should be made, or the amount to be 
sold, are not considered for inclusion. 
 
The fourth criterion is that advisory services must provide “blanket” or “one-size fits all” 
marketing recommendations so there is no uncertainty about implementation.  While different 
programs may be tracked for an advisory service (e.g., a cash only program versus a futures and 
options hedging and cash program), it is not feasible to track services that provide “customized” 
recommendations for individual clients. 
 
A fifth criterion addresses the issue of whether a candidate service is a viable, 
commercial business.  This issue has arisen due to the extremely low cost and ease of 
distributing information over the Internet, either via e-mail or a website.  It is possible for an 
individual with little actual experience and no paying subscribers to start a “market advisory 
service” by using the Internet.  Hence, there is a need to exclude firms that are not viable 
commercial concerns.  At the same time, any filter in this regard should not be so restrictive that 
newer and smaller advisory services are excluded from the AgMAS study for an unreasonably 
long period of time.  This same issue is prevalent when evaluating the performance of other 
types of professional investment advisors, such as commodity trading advisors.  In these cases, it 
is not unusual to screen firms by the length of track record and amount of funds under 
management.
6  An analogous screen for market advisory services can be based on the length of 
time the service has provided recommendations and the number of paying subscribers.  The 
specific criterion used is that a candidate advisory service must have provided recommendations 
to paying subscribers for a minimum of two marketing years before the service can be included 
in the AgMAS study.  This criterion should exclude non-viable services, while at the same time 
providing a relatively low hurdle for new and legitimate market advisory services. 
 
The original sample of market advisory services was drawn from the list of Premium 
Services available from the two major agricultural satellite networks, Data Transmission 
Network (DTN) and FarmDayta, in the summer of 1994.
7  While the list of advisory services 
available from these networks was by no means exhaustive, it did have the considerable merit of 
meeting a market test.  Presumably, the services offered by the networks were those most in 
demand by farm subscribers to the networks.  In addition, the list of available services was cross-
checked with other farm publications to confirm that widely followed advisory firms were 
included in the sample.  It seems reasonable to argue that the resulting sample of services was 
generally representative of the majority of advisory services available to farmers. 
                                                 
6 For example, Managed Accounts Reports (MAR), a well-known provider of performance information for hedge 
funds and commodity trading advisors, requires that commodity trading advisors have a 12-month record of trading 
actual client accounts and a minimum of $500,000 under management to be tracked in their database.  More specific 
details can be found at MAR’s website (http://www.marhedge.com). 
 
7 When the AgMAS study began in 1994, DTN and FarmDayta were separate companies.  The two companies 
merged in 1996.   6
Additions and deletions to the sample of advisory services have occurred over time.  
Additions largely have been due to the increasing availability of market advisory services via 
alternative means of electronic delivery, in particular, websites and e-mail.  Deletions have 
occurred for a variety of reasons.  A total of 39 and 38 advisory service programs for corn and 
soybeans, respectively, have been included in the sample at some point in time.  Table 1 contains 
the complete list of advisory programs and includes a brief explanation why each program not 
included for all crop years was added or deleted from the sample.  The term “advisory program” 
is used because several advisory services have more than one distinct marketing program.  For 
example, AgLine by Doane, Brock, Pro Farmer and Stewart-Peterson Advisory Services each 
have two distinct marketing programs, Risk Management Group has three distinct marketing 
programs and AgriVisor has four distinct marketing programs.  Allendale provides two distinct 
programs for corn, but only one for soybeans. 
 
The total number of advisory programs evaluated for the 2001 crop year is 27 for corn 
and 26 for soybeans.  Three new programs were added for the 2001 crop year: Ag Financial 
Strategies, Grain Field Marketing and Northstar Commodity.  One program, Agri-Mark, was 
deleted from the sample for the 2001 crop year.  This service stopped providing specific 
recommendations regarding cash sales. 
 
Three forms of survivorship bias may be potential problems when assembling an 
advisory program database.  Survival bias significantly biases measures of performance upwards 
since "survivors" typically have higher performance than "non-survivors" (e.g., Brown et al., 
1992; Schneeweis, McCarthy and Spurgin, 1996; Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999).  The 
first and most direct form of survivorship bias occurs if only advisory programs that remain in 
business at the end of a given sample period are included in the sample.  This form of bias 
should not be present in the AgMAS database of advisory programs because all programs that 
have been tracked over the entire time period of the study are included in the sample.  The 
second form of survivorship bias occurs if discontinued advisory programs are deleted from the 
sample for the year when they are discontinued.  This is a form of survivorship bias because only 
survivors for the full crop year are tracked.  The AgMAS database of advisory programs should 
not be subject to this form of bias because programs discontinued during a crop year remain in 
the sample for that crop year.
 8  The third and most subtle form of survivorship bias occurs if data 
from prior periods are "back-filled" at the point in time when an advisory program is added to 
                                                 
8 Five programs were discontinued within the 1995 – 2001 crop years: Ag Profit by Hjort, Agri-Edge (cash only), 
Agri-Edge (hedge), Cash Grain and Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash.  Excluding these programs from the sample 
could result in a form of selection bias, particularly if discontinuation is related to poor performance.  Including a 
discontinued program for a crop year does require an assumption about marketing the cash positions remaining after 
the discontinuation date.  A similar issue has been treated extensively in the literature on the performance of 
commodity funds and commodity trading advisors (e.g., Elton, Gruber and Rentzler, 1987).  In this literature, if a 
commodity fund or trading advisor is discontinued before the end of a calendar year, some form of benchmark 
returns are substituted for the missing returns after the discontinuation date.  Following this logic, the cash positions 
that remained after the date of discontinuation were sold using the same strategy as the market benchmarks utilized 
for this study (the details of the construction of these benchmarks are given in the “Benchmark Prices” section).  In 
effect, this simply means that cash bushels after the date of discontinuation are sold in equal amounts over the 
remaining days of the crop year.  Finally, note that any futures or options positions that remain open on the date of 
discontinuation are closed on that date using settlement futures prices or options premiums.   7
the database.  This is a form of survivorship bias because data from surviving advisory programs 
are back-filled.  The AgMAS database should not be subject to this form of bias because 
recommendations are not back-filled when an advisory program is added.  Instead, 
recommendations are collected only for the crop year after a decision has been made to add an 
advisory program to the database. 
 
  Another important consideration when assembling a database on advisory program 
recommendations is hindsight bias (Jaffe and Mahoney, 1999).  This is the tendency to collect or 
record profitable recommendations and ignore or minimize unprofitable recommendations after 
the fact.  Since the AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed and records 
recommendations on a real-time basis, the database of recommendations should not be subject to 
hindsight bias.  The information is received electronically, via DTN, website or e-mail.  For the 
programs that provide multiple daily updates, information is recorded for all updates.  In this 
way, the actions of a farmer-subscriber are simulated in real-time. 
 
When recording recommendations of each advisory program, specific attention is paid to 
which year’s crop is being sold, (e.g., 2001 crop year), the amount of the commodity to be sold, 
which futures or options contract is to be used (where applicable) and any price targets that are 
mentioned (e.g., sell cash corn when March 2002 futures reaches $2.40).  If a price target is 
given and not immediately filled, such as a stop order in the futures market, the recommendation 
is noted until the order is either filled or canceled.  Recommendations for farm marketing 
programs are not screened for "speculative" versus "hedging" uses of futures and options.  
Consequently, all futures and options trades presented to farmers as a part of marketing 
recommendations are included. 
 
As noted above, some advisory services offer two or more distinct marketing programs.  
This typically takes the form of one set of advice for marketers who are willing to use futures 
and options (although futures and options are not always used) and a separate set of advice for 
farmers who only wish to make cash sales.
9  In this situation, both strategies are recorded and 
treated as distinct strategies to be evaluated.  Some programs also differentiate advice based on 
the availability of on-farm storage. In the past, when a service clearly differentiated strategies 
based on the availability of on-farm versus off-farm (commercial) storage, only the off-farm 
storage strategy was tracked.  Starting with the 2000 corn and soybean crops, if a service clearly 




Several procedures are used to check the recorded recommendations for accuracy and 
completeness.  Whenever possible, recorded recommendations are crosschecked against later 
status reports provided by the relevant advisory program.  Also, at the completion of the crop 
                                                 
9 Some of the programs that are depicted as “cash only” have some futures-related activity, due to the use of hedge-
to-arrive contracts, basis contracts and/or options. 
 
10 It turns out that only one program in 2000 and no program in 2001 met this requirement for differentiating on-
farm and off-farm strategies.  Consequently, except for one program in 2000, performance results for on-farm and 
off-farm storage costs are based on the same set of recommendations.   8
year, it is confirmed whether cash sales total exactly 100%, all futures positions are offset and all 
options positions are offset or expire. 
 
The final set of recommendations attributed to each advisory program represents the best 
efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made 
available by each advisory program.  In cases where a recommendation is considered vague or 
unclear, some judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular 
recommendation or how to implement the recommendation.  Given that some recommendations 
are subject to interpretation, the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of 
recommendations for a given program may differ from that stated by the advisory program, or 
from that recorded by another subscriber. 
 
Calculating the Returns to Marketing Advice 
 
At the end of the marketing period, all of the (filled) recommendations are aligned in 
chronological order.  The advice for a given crop year is considered to be complete for each 
advisory program when cumulative cash sales of the commodity reach 100%, all futures 
positions covering the crop are offset, all option positions covering the crop are either offset or 
expire and the advisory program discontinues giving advice for that crop year.  In order to 
produce a consistent and comparable set of results across the different advisory programs, certain 
explicit assumptions are made.  The assumptions are intended to accurately depict “real-world” 
marketing conditions facing a representative central Illinois corn and soybean farmer.  Based on 
these assumptions, the returns to each recommendation are then calculated in order to arrive at a 
weighted average net price that would be received by a farmer who precisely follows the 
marketing advice (as recorded by the AgMAS Project).  It should be interpreted as the harvest-
equivalent net price received by a farmer because post-harvest sales are adjusted for physical 
storage and interest opportunity costs. 
 
The discussion about marketing assumptions in the following sections centers on the 
2001 crop year.  It is important to note that some assumptions have changed over time. Specific 
information on assumptions for the 1995-2000 crop years can be found in earlier AgMAS 
pricing reports (e.g., Martines-Filho, Irwin and Good, 2000).  Assumed values for key variables 
used in the simulation of advisory service performance over the 1995-2001 crop years can be 




  The simulation is designed to reflect conditions facing a representative central Illinois 
corn and soybean farmer.  Whenever possible, data are collected for the Central Crop Reporting 
District in Illinois as defined by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA).  The eleven counties (DeWitt, Logan, McLean, Marshall, 
Macon, Mason, Menard, Peoria, Stark, Tazewell and Woodford) that make up this District are 
highlighted in Figure 1. 
 
Caution should be used when applying the results to other areas of the US, because yields 
and basis patterns may be quite different from those of central Illinois.  Differences in yields and   9
basis patterns could have a substantial impact on prices computed for farmers or advisory 
services in another area.  The resulting change could be either up or down relative to AgMAS 
advisory prices and benchmarks, depending on local conditions.  Appendix B to this report, 
entitled “A Cautionary Note on the Use of AgMAS Net Advisory Prices and Benchmarks,” 




The time period over which a farmer normally makes pricing decisions for a particular 
crop is termed the “marketing window.”  It also can be referred to as the pricing “decision-
horizon” or “timeline” of a farmer.  A marketing window does not necessarily equal the time 
period of observed market activity.  The reason is that not taking action (e.g., not hedging pre-
harvest) is one type of decision that can be made during a marketing window. 
 
In the present context, the objective is to define the normal marketing window of a 
representative farmer who subscribes to the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project.  
Good, Hieronymus and Hinton (1980) provide a useful starting point.  They define the marketing 
window for an Illinois grain farmer as the period extending from the initial production planning 
time until the end of the storage season.  First production decisions in Illinois normally occur in 
October through November of the year preceding planting (e.g., fall tillage and application of 
fertilizer), while the storage season typically extends through July or August of the year 
following harvest.  This results in a marketing window between 21 and 23 months in length.  
Chafin and Hoepner (2002) reach a similar conclusion in their text on commodity marketing:  
 
In building an integrated marketing plan, crop producers must keep in mind the 
fact that pricing decisions on a single crop span a two-year period: the growing 
year and the storage year.  The first stage of a crop “marketing year” begins in 
November as production plans are being made for the new crop and continues 
throughout the growing season until the end of harvest.  During the second stage 
of the “marketing year,” pricing of the harvested (old) crop begins at the end of 
the 12-month “growing” year and continues for the next 12-month storage year.  
Thus, the pricing of a single crop spans 730 days-the “growing year” plus the 
“storage year.” (p. 326) 
 
The actual pricing pattern of advisory programs included in the AgMAS study provides 
further information for defining the relevant marketing window.  As noted earlier, observed 
market positions cannot directly reveal the intended pricing window of a representative farmer 
following advisory program recommendations.  However, averages over time and advisors 
should be suggestive as to the typical starting and ending points used to make recommendations 
for a crop.  Figure 2 presents the average “marketing profile” of advisory programs in corn and 
soybeans over the 1995-2000 crop years.
11  The marketing profiles show the average amount of 
                                                 
11 A detailed explanation of the construction of the marketing profiles and results for individual advisory programs 
and crop years can be found in Martines-Filho et al. (2003a, 2003b).  Note that these reports do not contain 
marketing profiles for the 2001 crop year.  The AgMAS Project will compute the 2001 profiles at a later date.   10
corn and soybean crops priced (sold) by advisory programs, on a cumulative basis, each day over 
the two-year period beginning in September of the year before harvest and ending in August of 
the year after harvest.  The profiles suggest that a farmer following the recommendations of 
market advisory programs included in the AgMAS study, on average, will begin making 
significant marketing decisions (pricing more than one percent) in September of the year before 
harvest and will not complete marketing until August of the year after harvest.
12 
 
Overall, this discussion indicates it is reasonable to assume a 24-month marketing 
window for a representative farmer subscribing to advisory programs.  In the case of the 2001 
crop, the marketing window is then defined as the two-year period beginning September 1, 2000 
and ending on August 31, 2002.  Two further issues need to be discussed with respect to the 
market window.  The first issue is exceptions to the specific definition.  For example, one 
program in corn started its first hedging position for the 2001 crop year in the middle of July 
2000.  One other advisory service had a relatively small amount (10%) of cash corn and 
soybeans unsold in its programs as of August 31, 2002.  These bushels were sold in the spot cash 
market by October 23, 2002.  Given that the marketing window is defined as the “normal” 
window, it is argued that a representative farmer would approach the marketing window with 
some flexibility, particularly for recommendations that do not extend too far outside the limits of 
the marketing window.  Since the transactions in question for the 2001 crop do not extend much 
outside the limits of the marketing window, they are included in the relevant advisory program’s 
track record.
13  The second issue is the definition of business days within the marketing window.  
This issue arises because different entities in the agricultural sector have different policies with 
respect to holidays.  For the purposes of this study, an “official” business day within the 
marketing window is defined as a business day where the Chicago Board of Trade is open and 
cash prices are reported by the Illinois Department of Ag Market News.  Finally, note that 





The price assigned to each cash sale recommendation is the central Illinois closing, or 
overnight, bid.  The data are collected and reported by the Illinois Department of Ag Market 
News.
14  The central Illinois price is the mid-point of the range of bids by elevators in the North 
                                                 
12 It is important to emphasize that the marketing profiles in Figure 2 represent the average of all advisory programs 
across six crop years (1995-2000).  The averages mask substantial variation in marketing profiles across advisory 
programs for a given crop year and, in some cases, across crop years for the same advisory program.  For example, 
the range (maximum minus minimum) in net amount priced on an individual day, across all programs and crop 
years, is 327% for corn and 292% for soybeans. 
 
13 It is acknowledged that recommendations outside of the two-year marketing window could exceed the flexibility 
of a representative farmer. For example, it seems unreasonable to assume a representative farmer would hold stocks 
more than a year after the end of the marketing window.  Because there are no hard-and-fast rules for making such 
decisions, future exceptions will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
 
14 The daily prices can be found in The Wall Street Journal and at the following website: 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/GX_GR113.txt.   11
Central and South Central Price Reporting Districts, as defined by the Illinois Department of Ag 
Market News.  The North and South Central Illinois Price Reporting Districts are highlighted in 
Figure 3.  Prices in this 35-county area best reflect prices for the assumed geographic location of 
the representative central Illinois farmer (Central Illinois Crop Reporting District). 
 
Pre-harvest cash forward contract prices for fall delivery are also needed.  Pre-harvest 
bids collected by the Illinois Department of Ag Market News are used when available.  The 
central Illinois pre-harvest price is the mid-point of the daily range of pre-harvest bids by 
elevators in the North Central and South Central Price Reporting Districts, again, as defined by 
the Illinois Department of Ag Market News.  Pre-harvest forward prices are available from this 
source for the 2001 corn and soybeans crops during February 1, 2001 to August 31, 2001. 
 
Since the marketing window for the 2001 corn and soybean crops begins in September 
2000 and the Illinois Department of Ag Market News did not begin to report actual cash forward 
bids until February 1, 2001, pre-harvest prices need to be estimated for the first few months of 
the marketing window.  For a date between September 1, 2000 and January 31, 2001, a two-step 
estimation procedure is adopted.  First, the forward basis for the period in question is estimated 
by the average forward basis for the first five days the Illinois Department of Ag Market News 
reports actual forward contract bids (February 1-7, 2001)
 .
15  Second, the estimated forward basis 
is added to the settlement price of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 2001 December corn 
futures contract or 2001 November soybean futures contract between September 1, 2000 and 
January 31, 2001.  This estimation procedure is expected to be a reasonably accurate reflection 
of actual forward prices for the early period of the marketing window, as the actual price of the 
harvest futures contract is used and only the forward basis is estimated.  In addition, the 
estimation procedure is typically applied to a relatively small number of transactions.  The 
average net amount sold before February 1
st over 1995-2000 is only 13% for corn and 10% for 




Some market advisory programs recommended the use of post-harvest forward contracts 
to sell part of the 2001 corn and soybean crops.  The Illinois Department of Ag Market News 
reported post-harvest bids for January 2002 delivery from September 4, 2001 to November 30, 
2001.  Post-harvest bids also were reported for March 2002 delivery from December 3, 2001 to 
February 1, 2002.  These central Illinois bids are used wherever applicable.  For the 2001 crop 
year, forward bids are available to match all advisory program recommendations. 
                                                 
15 The average forward basis (cash forward prices for fall delivery minus December 2001 corn or November 2001 
soybeans futures prices) over February 1-7, 2001 was -$0.3050 per bushel for corn and -$0.3135 per bushel for 
soybeans.  A weekly version of the basis data is published at the following website: 
http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/marketing/basis/index.asp. 
 
16 Nonetheless, several studies suggest that the pre-harvest forward basis systematically widens as the distance from 
harvest increases (Harris and Miller, 1981; Elam and Woodworth, 1989; Brorsen, Coombs and Anderson, 1995; 
Townsend and Brorsen, 2000).  If this behavior characterizes the forward basis in Illinois, it is reflected in the actual 
forward bids available from February 1, 2001 until harvest.  However, the trend, if any, cannot be reflected in the 
forward bids estimated before February 1
st because of the fixed forward basis assumption for this period.  Research 
is ongoing at the AgMAS Project to investigate the behavior of pre-harvest forward bids in Illinois.   12
In the future, if the positions recommended by advisory programs either do not match the 
delivery periods reported by the Illinois Department of Ag Market News or are made after the 
Illinois Department of Ag Market News stops reporting post-harvest forward contract prices, the 
following procedure will be used to estimate the post-harvest forward contract prices needed in 
the analysis.  First, three elevators in central Illinois agreed to supply data on spot and forward 
contract prices on the dates when advisors made such recommendations.  Each of these elevators 
is in a different county in the Central Illinois Crop Reporting District (Logan, McClean, DeWitt).  
Second, the spread between each elevator’s forward price and spot price will be calculated for 
the relevant date.  Third, the forward spread will be averaged across the three elevators for the 
same date.  Fourth, the average forward spread from the three elevators will be added to the 
central Illinois cash price (discussed at the beginning of the section) to arrive at an estimated 
post-harvest forward contract price for central Illinois.  This procedure was used in a few cases 
for the 1998 and 1999 crop years. 
 
The fill prices for futures and options transactions generally are the prices reported by the 
programs.  In cases where a program did not report a specific fill price, the settlement price for 






Since most of the advisory program recommendations are given in terms of the 
proportion of total production (e.g., “sell 5% of 2001 crop today”), some assumption must be 
made about the amount of production to be marketed.  For the purposes of this study, if the per-
acre yield is assumed to be 100 bushels, then a recommendation to sell 5% of the corn crop 
translates into selling 5 bushels.  When all of the advice for the marketing period has been 
carried out, the final per-bushel selling price is the average price for each transaction weighted 
by the amount marketed in each transaction. 
 
The above procedure implicitly assumes that the “lumpiness” of futures and/or options 
contracts is not an issue.  Lumpiness is caused by the fact that futures contracts are for specific 
amounts, such as 5,000 bushels per CBOT corn futures contract.  For large-scale farmers, it is 
unlikely that this assumption adversely affects the accuracy of the results.  This may not be the 






                                                 
17 Liquidity costs reflect the fact that non-floor traders must buy at the ask price and sell at the bid price.  The 
difference between the bid and ask prices, termed the bid-ask spread, is the return earned by floor traders for 
“making the market.” 
 
18 The practical importance of “lumpiness” problems even for small farms may be limited, due to the availability of 
“mini-contracts” at the Chicago Board of Trade.  These futures and options contracts are specified in 1,000-bushel 
increments.   13
Yields and Harvest Definition 
 
When making hedging or forward contracting decisions prior to harvest, the actual yield 
is unknown.  Hence, an assumption regarding the amount of expected production per acre is 
necessary to accurately reflect the returns to marketing advice.  Prior to harvest, the best estimate 
of the current year’s expected yield is likely to be a function of yield in previous years.  In this 
study, the assumed yield prior to harvest is the calculated trend yield, while the actual reported 
yield is used from the harvest period forward.  The expected yield for 2001 is based upon a log-
linear regression trend model of actual yields from 1972 through 2000 for the Central Illinois 
Crop Reporting District.  Previous research suggests this type of trend model provides a 
reasonable fit to corn and soybean yield data (Fackler, Young and Carlson, 1993; Zanini, 2001). 
 
In central Illinois, the expected 2001 yield for corn is calculated to be 152.4 bushels per 
acre.  Therefore, recommendations regarding the marketing quantity made prior to harvest are 
based on yields of 152.4 bushels per acre.  For example, a recommendation to forward contract 
20% of expected 2001 production translates into a recommendation to contract 30.5 bushels per 
acre (20% of 152.4).  The actual reported corn yield in central Illinois in 2001 is 157 bushels per 
acre.  The same approach is used for soybean evaluations.  The calculated 2001 trend yield for 
soybeans in central Illinois is 48.8 bushels per acre and the actual yield in 2001 is 48 bushels per 
acre. 
 
It is assumed that after harvest begins, farmers can make reasonably accurate projections 
of realized yields.  Therefore, recommendations made after the start of harvest are assumed to be 
based on actual yields instead of expected yields.  Since harvest does not occur during the same 
exact period each year, data on harvest progress are needed to establish the relevant harvest 
window, and in particular, the date that harvest begins.  Harvest progress data are reported by 
NASS for the central Illinois Crop Reporting District; however, the reports typically are not 
made available soon enough to identify precisely the beginning of harvest.  Consequently, the 
exact “location” of the harvest window cannot be identified based upon available data.  The 
following alternative procedure is used to estimate the harvest window each year.  First, the 
business day nearest to 50% completion of harvest is defined as the mid-point of harvest.  
Second, the entire harvest period is defined as a five-week window, beginning twelve business 
days before the mid-point of harvest, and ending twelve business days after the mid-point of 
harvest (a total of 25 business days, or five weeks).  In most years, the five-week window 
includes at least 80% of the harvest. 
 
  Since NASS harvest progress reports are made weekly, the exact date of the harvest mid-
point is not known.  However, it is possible to estimate the date of the mid-point using the 
weekly progress numbers of the two reports that encompass 50% harvest progress.  For example, 
the NASS estimate of corn harvest progress in central Illinois is 40% on September 30, 2001.  
Harvest progress is estimated to be 67% in the next report on October 7, 2001.  A daily progress 
estimate for this week can be constructed by taking the difference of these estimates and dividing 
the result by seven; in this example, harvest progressed at rate of approximately 3.86% per day.  
Counting forward from 40% at a rate of 3.86% per day, the business day closest to 50% progress 
is October 3, 2001.  This mid-point is used to construct the harvest window for corn by counting   14
backwards and forwards twelve business days.  The same procedure is used to determine the 
harvest window for soybeans. 
 
For 2001, the harvest period for corn is defined as September 17, 2001 through October 
19, 2001.  For soybeans, the harvest period is September 14, 2001 through October 18, 2001.  
Therefore, recommendations for corn made after September 16
th are applied on the basis of the 
actual yield of 157 bushels per acre.  For soybeans, recommendations made after September 13
th 
are applied on the basis of the actual yield of 48 bushels per acre. 
 
The issue of changing yield expectations typically is not dealt with in the 
recommendations of the advisory programs.  For the purpose of this study, the actual harvest 
yield must exactly equal total cash sales of the crop at the end of the marketing time frame.  
Hence, an adjustment in yield assumptions from expected to actual levels must be applied to 
cash transactions at some point in time.  In this analysis, an adjustment is made in the amount of 
the first cash sale made after the beginning of the harvest period.  For example, if a program 
advises forward contracting 50% of the corn crop prior to harvest, this translates into sales of 
76.2 bushels per acre (50% of 152.4).  However, when the actual yield is applied to the analysis, 
sales-to-date of 76.2 bushels per acre imply that only 48.54% of the actual crop has been 
contracted.  In order to compensate, the amount of the next cash sale is adjusted to align the 
amount sold.  In this example, if the next cash sale recommendation is for a 10% increment of 
the 2001 crop, making the total recommended sales 60% of the crop, the recommendation is 
adjusted to 11.46% of the actual yield (18 bushels), so that the total crop sold to date is 60% of 
157 bushels per acre (76.2 + 18 = 94.2 = 0.6*157).  After this initial adjustment, subsequent 
recommendations are taken as percentages of the 157 bushels per acre actual yield, so that sales 
of 100% of the crop equal sales of 157 bushels per acre. 
 
While the amount of cash sales is adjusted to reflect the change in yield information, a 
similar adjustment is not made for futures or options positions that are already in place.  For 
example, assume that a short futures hedge is placed in the December 2001 corn futures contract 
for 25% of the 2001 crop prior to harvest.  Since the amount hedged is based on the trend yield 
assumption of 152.4 bushels per acre, the futures position is 38.1 bushels per acre (25% of 
152.4).  After the yield assumption is changed, this amount represents a short hedge of 24.3% 
(38.1/157).  The amount of the futures position is not adjusted to move the position to 25% of the 
new yield figure.  However, any futures (or options) positions recommended after the beginning 
of harvest are implemented as a percentage of the actual yield. 
 
  If actual yield is substantially below trend, and forward pricing obligations are based on 
trend yields, a farmer may have difficulty meeting such obligations.  This raises the issue of 
updating yield expectations in “short” crop years to minimize the chance of defaulting on 
forward pricing obligations.  While not yet encountered in the AgMAS evaluations of corn and 
soybeans, this situation has arisen in the evaluation of wheat (Jirik, Irwin, Good, Jackson and 
Martines-Filho, 2000). 
 
  As in wheat, a relatively simple procedure will be used to update yield expectations in 
any future corn or soybean short crop years.  First, trend yield will be used as the expected yield 
until the August USDA Crop Production Report is released, typically around August 10
th.    15
Second, if the USDA corn or soybean yield estimate for the Central Illinois Crop Reporting 
District is 20% (or more) lower than trend yield, a “reasonable” farmer is assumed to change 
yield expectations to the lower USDA estimate.  Third, as with normal crop years, the 
adjustment to actual yield is assumed to occur on the first day of harvest. 
 
The 20% threshold is intentionally relatively large for at least three reasons.  First, it is 
desirable to make adjustments to the trend yield expectation on a limited number of occasions.  
Given the large variability in annual yields, a small threshold could result in frequent 
adjustments.  Second, it is not uncommon for early yield estimates to deviate significantly from 
the final estimate.  A small threshold could result in unnecessary adjustments prior to harvest.  




Brokerage costs are incurred when farmers open or close positions in futures and options 
markets.  For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that brokerage costs are $50 per contract 
for round-turn futures transactions and $30 per contract to enter or exit an options position.  
Further, it is assumed that CBOT corn and soybean futures and options contracts are used, which 
have a contract size of 5,000 bushels.  Therefore, per-bushel brokerage costs are one cent per 
bushel for a round-turn futures transaction and 0.6¢ per bushel for each options transaction. 
 
LDP and Marketing Assistance Loan Payments 
 
While the 1996 “Freedom-to-Farm” Act did away with government set-aside and target 
price programs, price protection for farmers in program crops such as corn and soybeans was not 
eliminated entirely.  Minimum prices are established through a “loan” program.  Specifically, if 
market prices are below the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan rate for corn or 
soybeans, farmers can receive payments from the US government that make up the difference 
between the loan rate and the lower market price.
 19  There is considerable flexibility in the way 
the loan program can be implemented by farmers.  This flexibility presents the opportunity for 
advisory programs to make specific recommendations for the implementation of the loan 
program.  Additionally, the prices of both corn and soybeans were below the loan rate during 
significant periods of time in the 2001-2002 marketing year, so that use of the loan program was 
an important part of marketing strategies.  As a result, net advisory program prices may be 
substantially impacted by the way the provisions of the loan program are implemented.  Finally, 
all of the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS project for the 2001 crop year make specific 
recommendations regarding the timing and method of implementing the loan program for the 
entire corn and soybean crops. 
 
                                                 
19 For a complete description of the programs discussed in this section, see the following Farm Service Agency fact 
sheets: Nonrecourse Marketing Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments, March 1998; Feed Grains, March 
1998; and Soybeans and Minor Oilseeds, July 1998.  These can be found at 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/pubfacts.htm.   16
Before describing the decision rules, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the loan 
program mechanics.  Then, the rules developed to implement the loan program in the absence of 




   There are two mechanisms for implementing the price protection benefits of the loan 
program.  The first mechanism is the loan deficiency payment (LDP) program.  LDPs are 
computed as the difference between the loan rate for a given county and the posted county price 
(PCP) for a particular day.  PCPs are computed by the USDA and change each day in order to 
reflect the average market price that exists in the county.  For example, if the county loan rate for 
corn is $2.00 per bushel and the PCP for a given day is $1.50 per bushel, then the LDP is $0.50 
per bushel.  If the PCP increases to $1.60 per bushel, the LDP will decrease to $0.40 per bushel.  




LDPs are made available to farmers over the period beginning with corn or soybean 
harvest and ending May 31
st of the calendar year following harvest.  Farmers have flexibility 
with regard to taking the LDP, because they may simply elect to take the payment when the crop 
is sold in a spot market transaction (before the end of May in the particular marketing year), or 
choose to take the LDP before the crop is delivered and sold.  Note that LDPs cannot be taken 
after a crop has been delivered and title has changed hands. 
 
The second mechanism is the non-recourse marketing assistance loan program.  A loan 
cannot be taken on any portion of the crop for which an LDP has been received.  Under this 
program, farmers may store the crop (on the farm or commercially), maintain beneficial interest, 
and receive a loan from the CCC using the stored crop as collateral.  The loan rate is the 
established rate in the county where the crop is stored and the interest rate is established at the 
time of loan entry.  Corn and soybean crops can be placed under loan anytime after the crop is 
stored through May 31
st of the following calendar year.  The loan matures on the last day of the 
ninth month following the month in which the loan was made. 
 
Farmers may settle outstanding loans in two ways: i) repaying the loan during the 9-
month loan period, or ii) forfeiting the crop to the CCC at maturity of the loan.  Under the first 
alternative, the loan repayment rate is the lower of the county loan rate plus accrued interest or 
the marketing loan repayment rate, which is the PCP.  If the PCP is below the county loan rate, 
the economic incentive is to repay the loan at the posted county price.  The difference between 
the loan rate and the repayment rate is a marketing loan gain (MLG).  If the PCP is higher than 
the loan rate, but lower than the loan rate plus accrued interest, the incentive is also to repay the 
loan at the PCP.  In this case only, interest is charged on the difference between the PCP and the 
loan rate.  If the PCP is higher than the loan rate plus accrued interest, the incentive is to repay 
the loan at the loan rate plus interest.  In this latter case, interest is based on the loan rate. 
 
                                                 
20 Technically, the USDA computes LDPs for the current date using PCPs for the previous day.   17
Under the second alternative, the farmer stores the crop to loan maturity and then 
transfers title to the CCC.  The farmer retains the proceeds from the initial loan.  This was 
generally not an attractive alternative in the 2001 marketing year since the PCP was often below 
the cash price of corn and soybeans.  Repaying the loan at the PCP and selling the crop at the 
higher cash price was economically superior to forfeiture. 
 
The non-recourse loan program establishes the county loan rate as a minimum price for 
the farmer, as does the LDP program.  For the 2001 crop, the sum of LDPs plus marketing loan 
gains was subject to a payment limitation of $150,000 per person.  Forfeiture on the loans 
provided the mechanism for receiving a minimum of the loan rate on bushels in excess of the 
payment limitation. 
 
The average loan rates for the 2001 corn and soybean crops across the eleven counties in 
the Central Illinois Crop Reporting District are $1.95 and $5.41 per bushel, respectively.  Spot 
cash prices fell below these loan rates for almost all of the 2001 post-harvest period for corn and 
for soybeans.  This is reflected in Figure 4, which shows corn and soybean LDP or MLG rates 
for central Illinois during the 2001 post-harvest period.
21, 22  For corn and soybeans, LDPs or 
MLGs are relatively high during harvest, varying from $0.10 to $0.23 per bushel for corn and 
from $0.80 to $1.37 per bushel for soybeans.  Then fall to zero or near zero by the end of 2001 
crop year.  As cash corn and soybean prices increase during the summer of 2002, corn and 
soybeans MLGs decrease to zero at the beginning of July 2002. 
 
Decision Rules for Programs with a Complete Set of Loan Recommendations 
 
If an advisory program makes a complete set of loan recommendations, the specific 
advice is implemented wherever feasible.  However, specific decision rules are still needed 
regarding pre-harvest forward contracts because it is possible for an advisory program to 
recommend taking the LDP on those sales before it is actually harvested and available for 
delivery in central Illinois.  To begin, it is assumed that amounts sold for harvest delivery with 
pre-harvest forward contracts are delivered first during harvest.  Since LDPs must be taken when 
title to the grain changes hands, LDPs are assigned as these “forward contract” quantities are 
harvested and delivered.  This necessitates assumptions regarding the timing and speed of 
harvest.  Earlier it was noted that a five-week harvest window is used to define harvest.  This 
window is centered on the day nearest to the mid-point of harvest progress as reported by NASS.  
Various assumptions could be implemented regarding harvest progress during this window.  
Lacking more precise data, a reasonable assumption is that harvest progress for an individual 
representative farm is a linear function of time. 
 
                                                 
21 LDP and MLG data were obtained from the interactive LDP database at the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD) at the Iowa State University ( http://www.card.iastate.edu/). 
 
22 The time period for each chart begins on the first day of harvest, as determined for this study, and ends on August 
31, 2001.  The first day of corn harvest is assumed to be September 17, 2001.  The first day of soybean harvest is 
assumed to be September 14, 2001.   18
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the information used to assign LDPs to pre-harvest forward 
contracts.  The second column shows the amount harvested assuming a linear model. The third 
column shows the LDP available on each date of the harvest window and the fourth column 
presents the average LDP through each harvest date.  An example will help illustrate use of the 
tables.  Assume that an advisory program recommends, at some point before harvest, that a 
farmer forward contract 50% of expected soybean production.  This translates into 24.4 bushels 
per acre when the percentage is applied to expected production (0.50*48.8 = 24.4).  Next, 
convert the bushels per acre to a percentage of actual production, which is 50.8% (24.4/48 = 
0.508).  To determine the LDP payment on the 50.8% of actual production forward contracted, 
simply read down Table 3 to October 2, 2001, which is the date when 50.8% of harvest is 
assumed to be complete.  The average LDP up to that date (September 14, 2001- October 2, 
2001) is $0.91 per bushel; the last column of Table 3.  This is the LDP amount assigned to the 
forward contract bushels. 
 
Note that LDPs for any sales (spot, forward contracts, futures or options) recommended 
during harvest are taken only after all forward contract obligations are fulfilled.  Grain industry 
practices may actually offer more flexibility in establishing LDPs than is assumed here.  In 
addition, so long as prices remain below the loan rate, crops placed under loan by an advisory 
program do not accumulate interest opportunity costs because proceeds from the loan can be 
used to offset interest costs that otherwise would accumulate. 
 
Decision Rules for Programs with a Partial Set of Loan Recommendations 
 Or No Loan Recommendations 
 
If an advisory program makes a partial set of loan recommendations, the available advice 
is implemented wherever feasible.  In the absence of specific recommendations, it is assumed 
that crops priced before May 31, 2002 are not placed under loan.  Those crops receive program 
benefits through LDPs.  After May 31, 2002, eligible crops (unpriced crops for which program 
benefits have not yet been collected) are assumed to be under loan until priced. 
 
In the absence of specific recommendations, rules for assigning LDPs and MLGs are 
developed under the assumption that loan benefits are established when the crop is priced or as 
soon after pricing that is allowed under the rules of the program.  This principle is consistent 
with the intent of the loan program to fix a minimum price when pricing decisions are made.  
Two rules are most important in the implementation of this principle.  First, LDPs on pre-harvest 
sales (forward contracts, futures or options) are established as the crop is harvested.  Second, if 
the LDP or MLG is zero on the pricing date, or the first date of eligibility to receive a loan 
benefit, those values are assigned on the first date when a positive value is observed, assuming a 
beneficial interest in that portion of the crop has been maintained.  Specific rules for particular 
marketing tools and situations follow: 
 
1)  Pre-harvest forward contracts.  The same decision rules are applied as discussed in the 
previous section.  Specifically, it is assumed that amounts sold for harvest delivery with 
pre-harvest forward contracts are delivered first during harvest, although not all buyers 
require that forward contract bushels be delivered first.  LDPs, if positive, are assigned as 
these “forward contract” quantities are harvested and delivered.  This necessitates   19
assumptions regarding the timing and speed of harvest.  A linear model of harvest progress 
is assumed in the five-week harvest window.  The specific information used to assign 
LDPs to pre-harvest forward contracts is again found in Tables 2 and 3.  As a final point, 
note that LDPs for any other sales (spot, futures or options) recommended during harvest 
are taken only after all pre-harvest forward pricing obligations are fulfilled. 
 
2)  Pre-harvest short futures.  The use of futures contracts to price during the pre-harvest 
seasons is treated in the same manner as pre-harvest forward contracts.  LDPs are assigned 
on open futures positions as the crop is harvested, or as soon as a positive LDP is available, 
if the futures position is still in place and cash sales have not yet been made.  These are 
assigned after forward contracts have been satisfied.  If the underlying crop is sold before 
there is a positive LDP, then that portion of the crop receives a zero LDP.  During the 
harvest window, if the futures position is offset before a positive LDP is available and the 
crop has not yet been sold in the cash market, that portion of the crop is eligible for loan 
benefits on the next pricing recommendation. 
 
3)  Pre-harvest put option purchases.  Long put option positions, which establish a minimum 
futures price, are treated in the same manner as pre-harvest short futures. 
 
4)  Post-harvest forward contracts.  The main issue with respect to post-harvest forward 
contracts is when to assign the LDPs or MLGs.  Those can be established on the date the 
contract is initiated, on the delivery date of the contract, or anytime in between.  Following 
the general principle outlined earlier, LDPs and MLGs for post-harvest contracts are 
assigned on the date the contract is initiated or the first day with positive benefits prior to 
delivery on the contract. 
 
5)  Post-harvest short futures.  As with post-harvest forward contracts, the main issue with 
post-harvest short futures positions is when to assign loan benefits.  These are assigned 
when the short futures position is initiated or as soon as a positive benefit is available if the 
futures position is still in place and cash sales have not been made.  If the underlying crop 
is sold before a positive LDP is available, that portion of the crop receives a zero LDP.  If 
the short futures position is offset before a positive LDP is available and the cash crop has 
not yet been sold, that portion of the crop is eligible for loan benefits on the next pricing 
recommendation. 
 
6)  Post-harvest long put positions.  Long put option positions established after the crop is 
harvested are treated in the same manner as post-harvest short futures. 
 
7)  Spot sales before May 31, 2002.  If a spot cash sale of corn or soybeans is recommended 
before May 31, 2002, it is assumed that the LDP, if positive, is established that same day. 
 
8)  Loan program after May 31, 2002.  Since LDPs are not available after May 31, 2002, it is 
assumed that any corn or soybeans in storage and not priced as of this date, for which loan 
benefits have not been established, are entered in the loan program on that date.  This is a 
reasonable assumption since spot prices are below the loan rate for soybeans and near the 
loan rate for corn in central Illinois on May 31, 2002 and a prudent farmer would take   20
advantage of the price protection offered by the loan program.
23  When the crops are 
subsequently priced (cash sale, forward contract, short futures, or long put option), the 
marketing loan gain, if positive, is assigned on that day.  Forfeiture is not an issue for these 
bushels because all cash sales were made before the end of the nine-month loan period.  
Note also that the $150,000 payment limitation is not considered in the analysis, as 




An important element in assessing returns to an advisory program is the economic cost 
associated with storing grain instead of selling grain immediately at harvest.  The cost of storing 
grain after harvest consists of two components: physical storage costs and the opportunity cost 
incurred by foregoing sales when the crop is harvested.  Physical storage costs depend on the 
type of storage available and the horizon used by a farmer to make storage decisions.  From a 
representative farmer’s perspective, there are four relevant physical storage scenarios: i) on-farm 
storage using a short-run decision-horizon, ii) off-farm (commercial) storage using a short-run 
decision-horizon, iii) on-farm storage using a long-run decision-horizon and iv) off-farm 
(commercial) storage using a long-run decision-horizon.  Short-run in this context is defined to 
be one storage season, usually the ten-month period after the harvest of a particular crop.  Long-
run is defined to be any decision-horizon longer than one storage season.  In each of the previous 
scenarios, the physical storage charge should be the relevant marginal cost of physical storage 
(Williams and Wright, 1991).  In contrast, opportunity cost should be the same regardless of the 
type of physical storage used or whether a short- or long-run decision-horizon is considered. 
 
Early AgMAS pricing reports consider only one scenario: commercial storage using a 
short-run decision-horizon.  Starting with the 2000 crop year, net advisory prices and 
benchmarks are computed using physical storage costs applicable to each of the four storage 
scenarios.  In all cases, storage and interest charges are assigned beginning October 22, 2001 for 
corn and October 19, 2001 for soybeans, the first dates after the end of the respective 2001 
harvest windows.  It should be noted that the cost of drying corn to 15% moisture and the cost of 
drying soybeans to storable moisture are not included in the calculations.  This cost is incurred 
whether the grain is stored or sold at harvest, or whether the grain is stored on-farm or off-farm.  
Therefore, this cost is irrelevant to the analysis and excluded. 
 
The first scenario considered is on-farm storage and a short-run decision-horizon.  
Because pre-existing storage facilities are assumed to be available on-farm, the marginal cost of 
physical storage equals the on-farm variable cost of physical storage.  Estimates of the on-farm 
variable cost of physical storage are drawn from a recent study conducted at Kansas State 
University (Dhuyvetter, Hamman and Harner, 2000).  The estimates assume storage occurs in a 
25,000 bushel round metal bin, the “medium-sized” storage capacity examined in the Kansas 
State study.  The first component of on-farm physical storage is a flat charge of 6.7¢ per bushel 
for conveyance, aeration, insecticide and repairs.  The flat charge is applied to both corn and 
                                                 
23 It is recognized that, in practice, not all farmers follow this procedure.  Actual loan entries in May have been 
small in most years.   21
soybeans and reflects the fact that most physical costs of on-farm storage are “one-time” in 
nature.  That is, once the decision is made to store, most costs are pre-determined and do not 
vary with the length of storage. 
 
The second component of on-farm physical storage is shrinkage.  Corn shrinkage is 
assumed in the Kansas State study to start at one-percent per bushel for the first month of storage 
and increase at a rate of one-tenth of one percent for each month stored thereafter.  For example, 
if corn is stored six months, the total shrinkage is assumed to be 1.5% per bushel.  Agricultural 
engineering specialists at the University of Illinois and Purdue University indicated that the on-
farm shrink schedule for corn used in the Kansas State study is reasonable.  In addition, the 
schedule is consistent with published research about shrinkage of corn stored on-farm 
(Hurburgh, Bern, Wilcke and Anderson, 1983).  Given that the harvest-time cash price of corn in 
central Illinois for 2001 is $1.87 per bushel, the shrink charge assigned to corn stored on-farm 
for one-month is 1.87¢ per bushel ($1.87*0.01*100).  The shrink charge is increased 0.19¢ per 
bushel ($1.87*0.001*100) for each additional month of storage.
24 
 
Since the Kansas State study did not estimate shrinkage costs for soybeans, the same 
agricultural engineering specialists noted above were consulted for a reasonable estimate.  This 
turned out to be a constant 0.25% per bushel shrink factor.  Given that the harvest-time cash 
price of soybeans in central Illinois for 2001 is $4.33 per bushel, the flat shrink charge assigned 
to soybeans is 1.08¢ per bushel ($4.33*0.0025*100).
 25 
 
As noted earlier, storage costs include the physical cost of storage and interest 
opportunity costs.  Interest cost is computed using the 2001 harvest cash price and an annual 
interest rate of 7.4%.  Specifically, the interest charge for storing grain on-farm is computed as 
the harvest price times the interest rate compounded daily from the end of harvest to the date of 
sale.
26  The interest rate is the average rate for all other farm operating loans for Seventh Federal 
Reserve District agricultural banks in the fourth quarter of 2001 as reported in the Agricultural 
Finance Databook, which is published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.  
Interest rates for the fourth quarter are assumed to most accurately reflect actual opportunity 
costs on agricultural loans related to storage. 
 
The second scenario considered is storage off-farm at commercial facilities and a short-
run decision-horizon.  The marginal cost of physical storage in this case is the sum of 
commercial storage, drying and shrinkage charges.  As in the past, storage costs at commercial 
elevators in 2001 are drawn from an informal telephone survey of nine central Illinois 
                                                 
24 On-farm shrink charges are not applied to corn sold via a pre-harvest forward contract or harvest spot sale. 
 
25 On-farm shrink charges are not applied to soybeans sold via a pre-harvest forward contract or harvest spot sale. 
 
26 The daily interest rate, r, is computed as follows: 
 
1/365 r (1.074) 1 0.000196 =− =  or 0.0196% per day.   22
elevators.
27  Based on this information, physical commercial storage charges are assumed to be a 
flat 13¢ per bushel from the end of harvest through December 31.  After January 1, physical 
storage charges are assumed to be 2¢ per month (per bushel), with this charge pro-rated to the 
day when the cash sale is made.  The drying charge to reduce corn moisture from 15% to 14% is 
a flat 2¢ per bushel, while the charge for shrinkage is 1.3% per bushel.
28  The cost of commercial 
shrinkage is based on the harvest price (no shrinkage is assumed for soybeans in commercial 
storage).  Given that the harvest-time cash price of corn in central Illinois for 2001 is $1.87 per 
bushel, the charge for volume reduction is 2.43¢ per bushel ($1.87*0.013*100).  Therefore, the 
flat shrink and drying charge assigned to all stored corn is 4.43¢ per bushel.
29  Interest 
opportunity cost is computed using the same procedures and assumptions as outlined above for 
on-farm storage. 
 
The third and fourth scenarios shift to a long-run decision-horizon, where the on-farm 
scenario is applicable to a farmer considering the construction of new on-farm storage facilities 
and the commercial scenario is applicable to a farmer that plans on using commercial storage 
facilities over the long-run.  Since all costs are variable in the long-run, the relevant marginal 
physical storage cost in both of these scenarios is the total cost.  Dhuyvetter, Hamman and 
Harner (2000) estimate the on-farm fixed cost of physical storage for a 25,000 bushel round, 
metal bin to be 14.6¢ per year.  This fixed cost can be added to the on-farm variable cost 
estimate discussed earlier to compute the total physical cost of on-farm storage.  Presumably, 
commercial physical storage charges paid by farmers reflect total variable and fixed costs of 
storage at commercial facilities.  Consequently, the commercial storage costs discussed earlier in 
the context of short-run decisions also represent long-run commercial physical costs. 
 
A comparison of the estimated costs of storage for corn and soybeans in the 2001 crop 
year is found in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  The first item of note is that the on-farm variable 
cost of physical storage changes little for corn as the storage length increases and is constant for 
soybeans as the storage length increases.  The reason is the previously mentioned “one-time” 
nature of most physical costs of on-farm storage.  As shown in Figure 5, this results in a “non-
linear” relationship between on-farm variable costs of storage per month and the length of 
storage.  For example, the on-farm variable cost for corn stored two months after harvest is about 
                                                 
27 Commercial storage costs, as measured by the telephone survey, have not changed over the seven years of the 
AgMAS study (1995-2001).  It appears that commercial elevator storage charges have been stable for a substantial 
period of time.  A 1982 survey of Illinois elevators by Hill, Kunda and Rehtmeyer (1983) revealed an average flat 
charge for storage of corn and soybeans from harvest through January of 12.9¢ per bushel and 14.2¢ per bushel, 
respectively.  The average monthly storage charge after January was 2.1¢ per bushel for corn and 2.4¢ per bushel 
for soybeans.  The average drying charge for corn was 2.3¢ per bushel. The majority of the surveyed elevators were 
located in central Illinois.  These costs are similar to those used by the AgMAS study for the 1995 through 2001 
crop years. 
 
28 The commercial drying charge is not applied to corn that is sold via a pre-harvest forward contract or harvest spot 
sale.  Also, note that on-farm variable costs of storage do not include the cost of drying corn from 15% down to 
14% moisture.  This charge is assumed to only apply to post-harvest storage at commercial facilities. 
 
29 The commercial shrink charge is not applied to corn that is sold via a pre-harvest forward contract or harvest spot 
sale.   23
4.5¢ per month.  This can be compared to the on-farm variable cost of corn stored six months 
after harvest of about 1.6¢ per month.  The second item of note is the much lower level of on-
farm variable costs versus commercial storage costs.  Of course, this is not surprising given that 
variable on-farm storage costs do not include fixed costs, while commercial storage costs 
presumably reflect total variable and fixed storage costs at commercial facilities.  The third item 
of note is the similar level of total on-farm costs (variable plus fixed) and total commercial costs 
for all but the shortest and longest storage lengths.  Figure 5 illustrates this finding on a per 
month basis.  This result is not surprising assuming reasonably competitive conditions in the 
market for storage.  If total on-farm storage costs were substantially less than total commercial 
costs, this would encourage a rapid expansion of on-farm storage and vice versa.  In fact, the 
proportion of on-farm versus off-farm storage capacity in Illinois has been roughly equal for a 
number of years.
30  This is consistent with a basic equilibrium in the storage market where total 
on-farm costs and commercial costs are about the same. 
 
Given the information presented in Tables 4 and 5, it is possible to compute net advisory 
prices and benchmarks under each of the four storage scenarios described at the beginning of this 
section.  It turns out that only two sets of storage costs are necessary to represent all four 
scenarios.  Most obviously, on-farm storage costs in the short-run are estimated by on-farm 
variable storage costs (fourth column in Tables 4 and 5).  Commercial storage costs in the short-
run and long-run can be estimated by commercial storage costs (last column in Tables 4 and 5). 
Based on the equilibrium argument made above, on-farm storage costs in the long-run can also 
be estimated based on commercial storage costs.  Therefore, in the remainder of this report, 
reference will be made only to on-farm variable storage costs and commercial storage costs. 
 
The calculation of storage charges may be impacted by an advisory program’s loan 
recommendations and/or the decision rules discussed in the previous section.  Specifically, 
during the period corn or soybeans are placed under loan, interest costs are not accumulated, as 
the proceeds from the loan can be used to offset interest opportunity costs that otherwise would 
accumulate.  This most commonly occurs after May 31, 2002, when it is assumed that all un-
priced grain, for which loan benefits have not been collected, is placed under loan until priced.
31  
If a crop is priced (forward contracts, futures or options) while under loan but stored beyond the 
time of pricing, interest opportunity costs are accumulated from the day of pricing until the time 
storage ceases (since it is assumed the loan is repaid on the date of pricing). 
 
                                                 
30 Based on estimates reported in USDA December stocks reports, on-farm and off-farm storage averaged 53 and 
47% of total storage capacity in Illinois over 1995-2001.  There is no discernable trend in the proportions and they 
vary little from year-to-year. 
 
31 Since cash prices during the June 1, 2002 through August 31, 2002 period are both below and above CCC loan 
rates, different procedures are used for computing interest opportunity costs on redemption dates where the cash 
price is below the loan rate and vice versa.  For redemption dates when the cash price is below the relevant CCC 
loan rate, no interest opportunity cost is charged.  This reflects the fact that interest is not charged on CCC loans for 
redemption days where the cash price is below the loan rate.  For redemption dates when the cash price is above the 
relevant CCC loan rate, the CCC loan must be re-paid with interest.  Interest opportunity cost in this case is 
computing using annual CCC interest rates, which are 3.375%, 3.25% and 3.00% for June, July and August 2002, 
respectively.   24
It could be argued that interest opportunity costs should be charged based on the LDP 
available at harvest but not taken by an advisory program.  This adjustment is not made because 
it would not substantially impact the results due to the small interest opportunity costs involved. 
 
A final issue related to storage costs is the use of different strategies based on the 
availability of on-farm storage.  Specifically, as noted earlier in the “Data Collection” section, 
advisory programs may issue one set of recommendations assuming on-farm storage is available 
and another set of recommendations assuming only commercial storage is available.  From a 
practical standpoint, the alternative strategies must be differentiated before grain is placed in on-
farm or commercial facilities.  After harvest, when grain has already been placed in on-farm or 
commercial storage facilities, such advice is of little practical value to most farmers.  Hence, if a 
program clearly differentiates on-farm and commercial storage strategies at or before harvest of 
the 2001 crop, the on-farm recommendations are used in computing the net advisory price under 
on-farm variable costs and the commercial recommendations are used in computing the net 
advisory price under commercial costs.  In this case, the net advisory price for a program under 
the two alternative storage cost assumptions will vary due to the difference in costs and 
underlying strategies.  If a service does not clearly differentiate on-farm and commercial storage 
strategies during harvest of the 2001 crop, the same recommendations are used in computing net 
advisory prices under on-farm variable and commercial storage costs.  In this case, the net 
advisory price for a program under the two alternative storage cost assumptions will vary only 





The essential concept underlying performance evaluation of market advisory programs is 
fairly simple: the comparison of the net prices generated by advisory programs with prices that 
could have been obtained by a farmer through one or more appropriate alternative strategies 
(Sharpe, Alexander and Bailey, 1999, p. 829).  The comparison strategies are commonly referred 
to as benchmarks because they serve as objective standards of performance, much like a 
yardstick provides an objective measurement of distance.  Within this broad framework, two 
basic types of performance evaluation can be applied to market advisory programs.  The first 
type is based on comparison to “peer-group” benchmarks, whereby net advisory prices are 
compared to each other or the average price across all advisory programs.  The second type is 
based on comparison to “external” benchmarks, whereby net advisory prices are compared to 
prices from strategies that do not depend upon market advisory program behavior.  In financial 
markets, it is commonplace to compare investment performance to external benchmarks, such as 
the Dow-Jones Industrials Index, S&P 500 Index and Wilshire 5000 Index. 
 
The AgMAS study focuses on performance evaluation using external benchmarks.  
While peer-group evaluation provides useful information about the rank of advisory programs, it 
cannot answer the question of whether performance of advisory programs as a group or an 
                                                 
32 No program in 2001 met the requirement for differentiating on-farm and off-farm strategies.  Consequently, 
performance results for all programs under on-farm and off-farm storage costs are based on the same set of 
recommendations.   25
individual advisory program is “superior” or “inferior” in an absolute economic sense.  To 
answer this question, external benchmarks must be specified based on theories of market pricing. 
 
The first class of external benchmarks is based on the theory of efficient markets.  This 
theory assumes that market participants are rational and that competition instantaneously 
eliminates all profitable arbitrage opportunities.  In its strongest form, efficient market theory 
predicts that market prices always fully reflect available public and private information (Fama, 
1970).  The practical implication is that no trading strategy can consistently beat the return 
offered by the market (e.g., Brorsen and Anderson, 1994; Brorsen and Irwin, 1996; Zulauf and 
Irwin, 1998).  Hence, the return offered by the market becomes the relevant benchmark.  In the 
context of the AgMAS study, a market benchmark should measure the average price offered by 
the market over the marketing window of a representative farmer who follows advisory program 
recommendations.  The average price is computed in order to reflect the returns to a naïve, “no-
information” strategy of marketing equal amounts of grain each day during the marketing 
window.  The difference between advisory prices and the market benchmark measures the value 
of advisory service information.  The theory of efficient markets predicts this difference, on 
average, will equal zero.
33 
 
If all market participants are rational in the way efficient market theory assumes, then the 
only interesting external benchmarks are market benchmarks.  However, there is growing 
evidence that many market participants may not be fully rational in the efficient market sense.  
Hirshleifer (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the judgment and decision biases that 
appear to affect securities market investors, such as framing effects, mental accounting, 
anchoring and overconfidence.  He also provides an exhaustive review of empirical studies that 
attempt to measure the potential impact of such biases on securities prices and investment 
returns.  As an example, Barber and Odean (2000) find that individual stock investors under-
perform the market by an average of one-and-a-half percentage points per year, an economically 
significant amount, particularly when viewed over long investment horizons.  They argue that a 
combination of overconfidence and excessive trading explains this finding.  Brorsen and 
Anderson (2001) provide an illuminating discussion of how judgment and decision biases may 
impact farm marketing.  Finally, new “behavioral” theories of market pricing have been 
developed based on the assumption that market participants are subject to judgment and decision 
biases (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
 
Behavioral market theory suggests that the average return actually achieved by many 
market participants may be less than that predicted by efficient market theory, due to the 
judgment and decision biases that plague most participants.  As a result, the average return 
actually received by market participants becomes an appropriate external benchmark.  In the 
context of the AgMAS study, a behavioral benchmark should measure the average price actually 
received by farmers for a crop.   The difference between net advisory prices and a farmer 
                                                 
33 Weaker versions of the theory of efficient markets predicts advisory services may profit to the degree they have 
superior access to information and/or superior analytical ability (e.g., Zulauf and Irwin, 1998).  While logically 
appealing, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to specify market benchmarks based on weaker versions of the 
theory because it requires knowledge of the average access to information and analytical ability of market 
participants.   26
benchmark should then measure the value of market advisory service information relative to the 
information used by farmers.  Behavioral market theory does not predict a specific value for this 
difference.  It may be positive, negative or zero, depending on the impact of judgment and 
decision biases on advisory programs versus farmers.  Finally, it is important to emphasize that 
the farmer benchmark should be based on the pricing performance of farmers who do not follow 
the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project, otherwise, the value of market advisory 
service information relative to the information used by farmers cannot be “cleanly” disentangled. 
 
It is important to re-iterate that market and farmer benchmarks convey quite different 
information about the performance of market advisory programs, even though both are forms of 
a relative benchmark.  This should be carefully considered when making performance 
comparisons based on the two types of benchmarks.  In addition, there are some desirable 
properties from a practical perspective that both types of benchmarks should possess: i) they 
should be relatively simple to understand and to calculate; ii) they should represent the returns to 
a marketing strategy that can be implemented by farmers; and iii) they should be directly 




As pointed out in the previous section, a market benchmark is designed to measure the 
average price offered by the market to farmers.  The appropriate time period for computing the 
average price is the marketing window of a farmer who follows the recommendations of the 
advisory programs included in the AgMAS study.  This window was defined earlier (see the 
“Marketing Window” section) as the 24-month period that begins on September 1
st of the year 
before harvest and ends on August 31
st of the year after harvest.  A 24-month market benchmark 
is simply computed as the average price over the two-year marketing window.  It should be 
noted that this specification of a market benchmark is substantially different than common 
practice of using the average harvest price as a market benchmark.  The analysis found later in 
this section implies that using the average price during a relatively short time period, such as 
harvest, may introduce excessive year-to-year variation in the benchmark. 
 
Figure 6 presents average marketing profiles for market benchmarks and advisory 
programs in corn and soybeans over the 1995-2000 crop years.  For comparison purposes, 
average marketing profiles for 24- and 20-month market benchmarks are included.  The 20-
month benchmark simply deletes the first four months of the 24-month marketing window from 
the computations of the average market price.  As a result, this benchmark is based on the 
average price over the period that begins on January 1 of the year of harvest and ends on August 
31 of the year after harvest.  For both corn and soybeans, the market benchmarks appear to 
provide a surprisingly good “fit” to the average profile of the advisory programs.  More 
specifically, if a simple linear trend regression is fit to the average profile of the advisory 
programs (not shown), the estimated trend line is remarkably close to the 24-month benchmark 
for corn and the 20-month benchmark for soybeans. 
 
The results discussed in the previous paragraph suggest there is some uncertainty about 
specification of the most appropriate market benchmark for corn and soybean performance 
evaluations.  Leamer (1983) argues persuasively (and famously) that in this type of situation it is   27
crucial to understand the “fragility” of results when key assumptions are changed.  
Consequently, both a 24-month and a 20-month market benchmark will be used in comparisons 
to net advisory prices.  Cash forward prices for central Illinois are used during the pre-harvest 
period, while daily spot prices for central Illinois are used for the post-harvest period.  The same 
forward and spot price series applied to advisory program recommendations are used to 
construct both market benchmarks.  Details on the forward and cash price series can be found in 
the earlier “Prices” section of this report. 
 
Three adjustments are made to the daily cash prices to make the 24-month and 20-month 
average cash price benchmarks consistent with the calculated net advisory prices for each 
marketing program.  The first is to take a weighted-average price, to account for changing yield 
expectations, instead of taking the simple average of daily prices.  This adjustment is consistent 
with the procedure described previously in the "Yields and Harvest Definition" section.  The 
daily weighting factors for pre-harvest prices are based on the calculated trend yield, while the 
weighting of the post-harvest prices is based on the actual reported yield for central Illinois.  The 
second adjustment is to compute post-harvest cash prices on a harvest equivalent basis, which is 
done by subtracting on-farm variable or commercial storage costs (physical storage, shrinkage 
and interest) from post-harvest spot cash prices.  The daily storage charges are calculated in the 
same manner as those for net advisory prices.  The third adjustment is made with respect to the 
loan program. In the context of evaluating advisory program recommendations, it was argued 
earlier that a “prudent” or “rational” farmer would take advantage of the price protection offered 
by the loan program, even in the absence of specific advice from an advisory program.  This 
same logic suggests that a “prudent” or “rational” farmer will take advantage of the price 
protection offered by the loan program when following the benchmark average price strategy.  
Based on this argument, the 24-month and 20-month average cash price benchmarks are adjusted 
by the addition of LDPs and MLGs.  Bushels marketed in the pre-harvest period according to the 
benchmark strategy are treated as forward contracts, with the LDPs assigned at harvest.  Bushels 
marketed each day in the post-harvest period are awarded the LDP or MLG in existence for that 
particular day.  Finally, just as in the case with comparable advisory program recommendations, 
it is assumed that all un-priced grain on May 31, 2002 is placed under loan.  Interest opportunity 
costs are not charged to the benchmark after this date if cash prices on the date of loan 
redemption are below the CCC loan rate.
34  
 
While the 24- and 20-month market benchmark prices can obviously differ for a given 
crop year, averages of the two benchmark prices across crop years are not expected to differ 
substantially.  First, the difference in the marketing windows for the two benchmarks is 
relatively small, as the 20-month benchmark reduces the 24-month marketing window by only 
about 17%.  Second, given a sufficiently large sample of crop years and efficient corn and 
soybean markets (cash, futures and options), the law of one price implies that annual averages of 
different average price benchmarks should be equal when stated on a harvest equivalent basis 
(Brorsen and Anderson, 1994).  Of course, if corn and soybean markets are inefficient, the 
equivalence would not hold. In particular, if pre-harvest prices contain a “drought premium” as 
                                                 
34 As with advisory programs, different procedures are used for computing interest opportunity costs on days when 
the cash price is below the loan rate and vice versa.  Refer to footnote 31 for specific details on the computations.   28
some argue (e.g., Wisner, Baldwin and Blue, 1998), then the 24-month benchmark price may be 




In contrast to averages, the variation of 24- and 20-month market benchmark prices 
across crop years is expected to differ.  The reason for the difference is the well-known result in 
statistics that the sampling variation of the mean (average) is inversely related to the sample size 
used to compute the average (e.g., Griffiths, Hill and Judge, 1993, p.82).  Since the sample of 
daily prices used in computing the 24-month benchmark is larger than the sample for the 20-




A practical concern with the market benchmarks is that a farmer may not be able to 
implement the benchmark strategies since they involve marketing a small portion of the crop 
every day.  There are two reasons to believe this concern is not overly serious.  First, a number 
of companies have developed and offer grain “index” contracts that allow farmers to receive the 
average market price over a pre-specified time interval.  An extensive discussion of these new 
contracts can be found in the AgMAS Research Report by Hagedorn et al. (2003).  Second, a 
strategy of routinely selling at less frequent intervals closely approximates the market benchmark 
prices.  For example, a farmer might consider alternative “tracking” strategies of marketing only 
once a month or once every other month over the 24-month window.
37  Using mid-month prices, 
a tracking strategy of marketing only once a month (24 times) generates average prices over 
1995-2001 that are quite close to 24-month market benchmark prices.  The average difference is 
only three cents per bushel for corn and two cents per bushel for soybeans, and the maximum 
difference for any particular crop year is eight cents per bushel in corn and five cents per bushel 
in soybeans.  A tracking strategy of marketing once every other month (12 times) also generates 
average prices over 1995-2001 that are quite close to 24-month market benchmark prices.  The 
average difference is only three cents per bushel for corn and five cents per bushel for soybeans. 
 
                                                 
35 It is typically argued that the drought premium is most pronounced during the spring months before harvest.  If 
this is the case, then the 20-month benchmark price should, on average, exceed the 24-month benchmark price. 
 
36 The sample size effect can be estimated in advance, given that the standard error of the sample mean (average) 
price is  T σ , where σ  is the standard deviation of daily prices and T is the sample size.  For the 24-month 
market benchmark, the sample size is about 500 business days, whereas the sample size for the 20-month market 
benchmark is about 420 business days.  Hence, for a given standard deviation of daily prices, σ , the standard errors 
will differ by a factor equal to 14 2 015 0 0 − , which implies the variation in the 20-month benchmark should be 
about nine percent larger than the variation in the 24-month benchmark.  This difference is what should be observed 
over a large number of repeated random samples of prices generated in an efficient market.  The actual differences 
in the variation of the two benchmarks over 1995-2001 are larger, 27% for corn, 16% for soybeans and 18% for 
50/50 revenue.  The larger differences simply may be due to random effects in a relatively small sample of crop 
years or the underlying assumption about price behavior (market efficiency) being incorrect. 
 
37 The “tracking” strategies terminology is adapted from the finance literature, where “tracking” errors arise as 
investment managers attempt to replicate the returns of a target benchmark portfolio (e.g., Roll, 1992; Frino and 
Gallagher, 2001).    29
The average difference results for the benchmark tracking strategies should not be a 
surprise given the previous argument about averages of different benchmark prices in efficient 
markets.  More surprising is the result that the variation of the tracking strategies across crop 
years is only two to four cents per bushel (four to nine percent) more than the 24-month 
benchmark over 1995-2001.  This is surprising because the tracking strategies are based on 
dramatically smaller samples, 12 or 24 observations compared to about 500 observations for the 
24-month benchmark, but have only a marginally higher variation across crop years.  The most 
likely explanation is that corn and soybean price patterns were dominated by downward trends 
over the 1995-2001 crop years, and the tracking strategies “captured” this effect almost as well 
as the 24-month benchmark because transactions for the tracking strategies were equally spaced 
across the entire marketing window.  Further research is needed to fully understand the behavior 




As noted earlier, a farmer benchmark is designed to measure the average price received 
by farmers for a crop.  This type of benchmark should reflect the actual behavior of farmers in 
marketing grain, and include all of the transactions (e.g., cash, forward, futures and options) that 
farmers employ in this regard.  In addition, the farmer benchmark should be based on the pricing 
performance of farmers who do not follow the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS 
Project.  In theory, such a farmer benchmark should not be difficult to calculate.  First, a 
representative sample of grain farmers in the relevant geographic area who do not follow the 
programs in the AgMAS Project would be drawn (randomly).  Next, the average price received 
by each farmer would be computed (using the same assumptions as in the computation of net 
advisory prices and market benchmarks).  Last, the farmer benchmark would be computed as the 
weighted-average price received by all farmers in the sample, with the weights equal to the 
sample proportion of the crop produced by each farmer. 
 
In practice, the detailed type of data needed to construct a valid farmer benchmark is not 
available, so an approximation must be used.  The only known approximation is the USDA 
average price received series.  In Illinois, this series is based on information collected in monthly 
mail and telephone surveys of about 200 grain dealers, processors and elevators that actively 
purchase grain from farmers (Harden, 2003).  The survey is conducted by the Illinois 
Agricultural Statistics Service, the state office for the National Agricultural Statistics Service of 
the USDA.
38  Surveyed firms report total quantities and gross value for grain purchased directly 
from farmers (USDA, NASS, 2002).  Total quantities are reported on a dry, or shrunk, basis at 
the standard moisture content for the commodity.  Total gross value is the value of bushels 
purchased from farmers after deducting price discounts and adding premiums for quality factors 
and moisture content and adding premiums for direct delivery to mill, processor, river terminal 
or rail terminal.  Check-off fees and charges for drying, cleaning, storing or grading are not 
deducted.  The general principle used to determine the timing of transactions is the month when 
grain is purchased, that is, when cash changes hand between the firm and farmers.  Hence, cash 
sales, forward contracts and deferred payment contracts are reported for the month of delivery.  
                                                 
38 The website for the Illinois Agricultural Statistics Service is http://www.agstats.state.il.us/website/welcome.htm.   30
Basis, minimum price, option and hedge-to-arrive contracts also are reported for the month of 
delivery.  Alternatively, delayed pricing contracts are reported in the month when the grain is 
priced, which typically occurs after delivery.  The average price received estimate for a month is 
the total gross value across all surveyed firms divided by total quantities summed across all 
surveyed firms.  This estimate may incorporate statistical adjustments that reflect size 
differences across reporting firms and other factors. 
 
The USDA price received series has both strengths and weaknesses with respect to 
measuring the average price received by (unadvised) farmers.  On the positive side, the USDA 
series reflects the actual pattern of cash grain marketing transactions by farmers, and thus, 
incorporates the marketing windows and timing strategies actually used by farmers; includes 
forward contract transactions for both the pre-harvest and post-harvest periods, with the 
transactions recorded at the forward price, not the spot price at the time of delivery; and grain 
sales are adjusted to industry standards for moisture.  On the negative side, the USDA series is 
only available in the form of a state average; includes cash transactions for different grades and 
quality of grain sold by farmers; does not include futures and options trading profits/losses of 
farmers; reflects a mix of old and new crop sales by farmers; and is based on the pricing 
behavior of both unadvised and advised farmers. 
 
Fortunately, none of the problems mentioned above appear to be prohibitive with respect 
to the use of the USDA series as a measure of the average price received by farmers.  Consider 
first the state average nature of the series.  It is straightforward to adjust the USDA series to an 
alternative geographic location, since spatial basis patterns are relatively stable.  This type of 
adjustment turns out not to be necessary for AgMAS performance evaluations because central 
Illinois prices closely mirror the average price for the entire state of Illinois.  Based on an 
analysis of weekly prices, the average cash price for central Illinois over January 1995 - 
December 2001 differs from the state average price by about one-half cent and one cent, 
respectively, for corn and soybeans (state average lower for both corn and soybeans).  The 
correlation of weekly prices for central Illinois and the state is 0.96 for corn and 0.99 for 
soybeans.  Hence, from a statistical standpoint, central Illinois and state average prices are nearly 
equivalent. 
 
While it is not possible to adjust the USDA series to a constant grade and quality, to 
reflect futures and options trading profits/losses of farmers or to only reflect new crop sales, 
because the data simply are not available, the resulting biases probably are small and some may 
work in opposite directions.  Examining the grade and quality issue first, it is well known that 
some fraction of the corn crop is discounted relative to the standard number two yellow corn 
grade.  This is also true for the soybean crop relative to the standard number one yellow soybean 
grade, but likely to a smaller extent than corn.  As a result, the USDA average price received 
reflects a weighted-average of both undiscounted and discounted grain sales.  The weights are 
unknown, but the direction of the bias relative to average prices for the standard grade is clearly 
downward.  In other words, when compared to the average price at the standard grade, the 
USDA average price received should be adjusted upwards to reflect the impact of discounts. 
 
A key question, of course, is the magnitude of the grade and quality bias discussed above.  
An extensive search of the literature was conducted and no previous study was uncovered that   31
directly measured the proportion of corn and soybeans sold at a discount or the average 
magnitude of price discounts in central Illinois (or other Midwestern US areas).  The Federal 
Grain Inspection Service of the US Department of Agriculture (FGIS) was contacted and staff 
indicated that FGIS does not have an historical series of this type.  One older study was located 
that contained some information on the issue.  Hill, Kunda and Rehtmeyer (1983) reported the 
results of a 1982 survey of grain elevator operators in Illinois.  One question in this survey asked 
elevator operators to estimate the percentage of corn and soybean receipts at country elevators 
that typically exceed grade factors.  Unfortunately, the results were not netted across grade 
factors, so it is not possible to estimate the typical proportion of the crop sold at a discount (if a 
lot is over one grade limit it will have a higher than average chance of being over the grade limit 
for other factors).  In addition, the average magnitude that grade factors were exceeded is not 
reported, so it is impossible to estimate the dollar value of the average discount.  Nonetheless, 
the results provide some perspective on the quality issue.  For corn delivered in the fall, the 
percentage typically above a grade factor ranged from 0.2 to 7.5% of deliveries.  For soybeans 
delivered in the fall, the percentages were about the same, except for foreign material, where 
over 30% of the bushels delivered typically exceeded the grade factor.  When winter and 
summer delivery was considered, the percentages increased somewhat for corn and decreased for 
soybeans.  Other than foreign material for soybeans, this evidence suggests that less than 10% of 
the corn and soybean crops in the early 1980s were sold at a discount to the standard grade. 
 
To provide more recent evidence on quality, the nine central Illinois elevators surveyed 
annually for commercial storage costs were queried in December 2001 about the average quality 
of corn and soybean crops.  The most frequent response from the elevator managers in this 
informal survey was that less than one percent of corn and soybeans is sold at a discount relative 
to the standard grade.  The range was from zero to less than five percent.  The largest estimate of 
the average dollar value of discounts was two to three cents per bushel.  These figures provide 
enough information to make a very rough estimate of maximum quality bias in the USDA 
average price received series.  Using the maximum proportion of five percent and the maximum 
average discount value of three cents from the informal survey, the downward bias relative to the 
standard grade would be only 0.15¢ per bushel (0.05*3).  Furthermore, if the average discount is 
three cents, then one-third of the crop would have to be sold at a discount to induce a downward 
bias even as large as one cent (0.33*3 = 1).  In sum, while the evidence is limited and sketchy, it 
does suggest that any downward quality bias in the USDA average price received series, at least 
for corn and soybeans in central Illinois, is quite small. 
 
Now, consider the potential bias from omission of futures and options profits/losses.  If a 
farmer uses futures and options exclusively for “pure” hedging purposes, they will consistently 
take short positions at about the same points in the marketing window each year.
39  Unless 
futures prices are biased upwards or downwards, this type of hedging will not result in large 
profits or losses, as the price changes from upward and downward price trends should roughly 
                                                 
39 “Pure” hedging assumes that futures and options markets are efficient and that the only motivation for hedging is 
to minimize risk. 
   32
offset over time.
40  If a farmer uses futures and options to engage in “selective” hedging, they 
may have large profits or losses related to the timing of trading.  While no direct evidence on the 
profits or losses of farmers is available in this context, there is convincing evidence that small 
traders in general consistently lose money in futures and options markets.
41  It seems reasonable 
to assume that farmers engaged in selective hedging are similar to other small traders, and hence, 
selective farmer hedging in futures and options markets results in aggregate trading losses.
42  
Given that, in aggregate, pure hedging is expected to yield zero profits on average and selective 
hedging is expected to yield losses on average, the net effect of the two types of futures and 
options trading by farmers should be negative.  In this case, when compared to average prices at 
the standard grade, the USDA average price received should be adjusted downward to reflect the 
impact of net trading losses. 
 
As before, the key question is the potential magnitude of the bias from omission of 
futures and options losses.  The key piece of evidence in this regard is the limited scale of farmer 
trading in futures and options markets.  Surveys have consistently reported that relatively few 
farmers directly use futures and options contracts on a regular basis (e.g., Patrick, Musser and 
Eckman, 1998).  Given this information, it is reasonable to argue that the magnitude of farmers’ 
net losses from futures and options trading, in aggregate, should be small.  As a result, the 
upward bias in the USDA average price received from the omission of futures and options net 
losses should be small. 
 
Next, consider the potential bias from mixing old crop and new crop sales during the 12-
month marketing year used to compute the USDA average price received.  The first step is to 
determine the potential magnitude of the problem.  Fortunately, bounds for the “shifting” of old 
crop sales into the next marketing year can be computed by dividing ending stocks for a 
marketing year by crop production for the same marketing year (e.g., September 1, 2000 soybean 
stocks divided by 1999 soybean production).  Over the 1995/1996 through 2001/2002 marketing 
years, on-farm ending stocks in Illinois averaged four percent of statewide corn production and 
three percent of statewide soybean production.  These percentages are the lower bounds on 
shifting because farmers presumably own on-farm stocks and sales of these stocks will be shifted 
to the next marketing year.  Over the 1995/1996 through 2001/2002 marketing years, total 
ending stocks (on-farm and off-farm) in Illinois averaged 13% of statewide corn production and 
8% of statewide soybean production.  These percentages are the upper bounds on shifting; 
assuming farmers own all of the stocks in off-farm storage facilities.  Clearly, this assumption is 
unrealistic, as commercials own some, if not most, of the stocks in off-farm facilities at the end 
                                                 
40 The question of bias in futures prices has a long and contentious history in the economics literature.  If a bias 
exists in corn and soybean futures prices, the available evidence suggests the magnitude is small from an economic 
perspective.  This evidence generally is based on long samples of futures prices.  Over short sample periods, futures 
prices can have sharp upward or downward trends.  Probably the most dramatic example is the upward trend in 
grain futures prices between 1972 and 1975.  See Zulauf and Irwin (1998) for a thorough discussion and additional 
references. 
 
41 A classic paper in the literature on who wins and loses in futures and options markets is Hartzmark (1987). 
 
42 The argument here is that selective hedging by farmers, in aggregate, results in trading losses.  This does not 
preclude the possibility that some individual farmers consistently earn trading profits through selective hedging.   33
of a marketing year.  The bottom-line is that shifting of old crop sales into the next marketing 
year, on average, is somewhere between 4 and 13% of corn production and 3 and 8% of soybean 
production.  This suggests the magnitude of shifting from one crop year to the next probably is 
not large. 
 
The second step is to determine the impact shifting old crop sales will have on the USDA 
average price received.  Consider the simplest case where old crop sales in the next marketing 
year are made at spot prices for the new crop and the same proportion is shifted every year.  The 
same price received would result as in the no shifting case.  Only to the degree that the 
proportion shifted varies from year-to-year will the average price received differ from the no-
shifting case.  The proportion does vary from year-to-year, but not by a substantial amount.  For 
example, on-farm ending stocks in Illinois varied from only two to six percent of corn 
production over the 1995/1996 through 2001/2002 marketing years.  The impact of this 
variability on average price received will depend on farmers’ ability to time shifts to take 
advantage of favorable spreads between old crop and new crop prices.  If farmers as a group 
have timing ability in this context, then the USDA average price received will be biased upwards 
relative to the average price at the standard grade.  However, given the difficulty of predicting 
old crop-new crop price spreads (Lence and Hayenga, 2001) and the small absolute magnitude of 
actual shifting of sales, it seems reasonable to argue that the bias in average price received from 
shifting old crop sales across marketing years is quite small. 
 
The last issue to consider is that the USDA average price received series reflects the 
pricing behavior of unadvised and advised farmers, where advised refers to the programs tracked 
by the AgMAS Project.  As pointed out earlier, this means it may not be possible to “cleanly” 
disentangle the value of market advisory service information relative to the information used by 
farmers, as the USDA series already reflects the impact of market advisory program information 
to some degree.  A recent national survey of advisory service subscribers by the AgMAS Project 
provides some perspective on the dimensions of this problem (Pennings et al., 2001).  While 
only 11% of the survey respondents said they followed market advisory service 
recommendations closely, two-thirds indicated they followed the recommendations loosely.  
Further, when asked to rate the impact of advisory service recommendations on their marketing, 
subscribers gave an average rating of six on a nine-point scale, with a one indicating no impact at 
all and a nine indicating great impact.  To the extent that farmers subscribe to market advisory 
services, these results suggest that the average price received by farmers for a crop is influenced 
by the marketing advice of advisory services. 
 
This discussion suggests that a key unknown is the proportion of farmers that subscribe 
to advisory services.  Unfortunately, this information is proprietary, so it is not possible to 
provide exact figures for the programs tracked by the AgMAS Project.  Several studies have 
reported survey evidence on the use of advisory services, marketing newsletters and marketing 
consultants (defined generically), with estimates ranging widely from 21.1 percent of Illinois 
farmers (Norvell and Lattz, 1998) to 66 percent of farmers nationwide (Smith, 1989).   It is 
uncertain what these estimates imply for the proportion of farmers that subscribe to the programs 
tracked by the AgMAS Project.  On one hand, the programs tracked by the AgMAS Project are 
among the most popular and widely-followed.  On the other hand, the same programs clearly are 
a subset of all advisory services, marketing newsletters and marketing consultants offered to   34
farmers.  While the available evidence is sketchy and uncertain, it nonetheless does suggest that 
a non-trivial proportion of Illinois farmers likely subscribe to the advisory programs tracked by 
the AgMAS Project.  It therefore can be reasonably concluded that the average price received by 
Illinois farmers for corn and soybeans is impacted to some degree by the information provided 
by these same programs.  The direction of the resulting bias depends on the pricing performance 
of unadvised versus advised farmers.  Patrick, Musser and Eckman (1998) survey large-scale 
Midwestern grain farmers and find that farmers using marketing consultants generally received 
higher prices than those that did not.  While this evidence cannot be generalized to all farmers 
because of the skewed size distribution of the sample, it does nevertheless seem to be a plausible 
outcome.  If it is accepted that advised farmers outperform unadvised farmers, then the USDA 
average price received series will be biased upward relative to the price received by unadvised 
farmers.  Regrettably, there is nothing that can be done about this problem without other sources 
of data on farmer pricing performance.  The USDA average price received is probably best 
viewed as an estimate of the upper bound for the average price received by unadvised farmers. 
 
To summarize, the evidence and arguments discussed above suggest that the net 
systematic bias in the USDA average price received due to spatial, quality, futures/options and 
old/new crop factors is small, at least for corn and soybeans in central Illinois.  It is difficult to 
construct a scenario where the overall level of bias from these factors would materially effect 
performance evaluation of market advisory programs.  A more difficult problem is presented by 
the mixture of unadvised and advised farmers that the USDA average price received reflects.  
This “mixing” likely biases the USDA price received series upward relative to the price received 
by unadvised farmers.  Given the limited evidence on the extent that Illinois farmers use the 
programs tracked by the AgMAS Project and the precise impact of their recommendations, it is 
difficult to assess the magnitude of the bias.  Overall, the USDA average price received should 
be viewed as only an approximation of the “true” average price received by unadvised farmers.  
For this reason, comparison of advisory program pricing performance to a USDA average price 
received benchmark is not likely to be as precise as that offered by the market benchmarks. 
 
Several adjustments are made to the USDA average price received data for the state of 
Illinois in order to make the computed farmer benchmark consistent with net advisory prices.  To 
begin, mid-month on-farm or commercial storage charges are applied to the monthly average 
price received in the 12-month marketing year (September through August).  Next, the annual 
weighted-average price received is computed using the percentage of the crop marketed in each 
calendar month as the weights.  Finally, actual state average LDPs and MLG’s are added for the 
1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 crops.
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Given the uncertainties involved in measuring the average price received by farmers, it 
would be useful to specify alternative farmer benchmarks.  Unfortunately, as the discussion in 
this section has detailed, there simply is no alternative measure that reflects the actual marketing 
behavior of farmers.  The inability to provide information on the sensitivity of performance 
                                                 
43 State average LDPs and MLG’s for Illinois were collected from on-line Farm Service Agency reports at: 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/psd/reports.htm.   35
comparisons to alternative farmer benchmarks is a limitation of the analysis and should be kept 
in mind when viewing the results. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to consider arguments about the expected difference in averages 
and variation between the farmer benchmark and the market benchmarks.  If corn and soybean 
markets are efficient and farmers are rational, then the average price across crop years for the 
farmer and market benchmarks should be similar.  Under these assumptions, the variation in 
farmer benchmark prices across crop years could be smaller or larger than the variation in 
market benchmark prices, depending on the length of the marketing window used by farmers and 
the exact nature of the marketing strategies implemented by farmers. 
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the average marketing window or the 
pricing pattern of farmers using USDA monthly marketing weights.  For perspective, average 
monthly USDA marketing weights for corn and soybeans in Illinois over 1995-2000 are 
presented in Figure 7.  These weights reflect the pattern of grain purchases by commercial 
facilities from farmers over the 12-month marketing year.  Grain purchases, as defined by the 
USDA, do not necessarily reflect the pricing pattern of farmers due to the use of forward pricing 
instruments.  There is ample survey evidence that many farmers use pre-harvest forward 
contracts to price a portion of their crops, and that post-harvest forward contracts are commonly 
used, particularly for January delivery (e.g., Patrick, Musser and Eckman, 1998; Coble et al., 
1999; Pennings et al., 2001).  The evidence on the magnitude of forward contracting by farmers 
is more limited. 
 
Two surveys provide the best evidence that is available on the magnitude of forward 
contracting, as a large number of farmers are randomly sampled.  The first, by Coble et al. 
(1999), asked farmers in four states a number of questions regarding risk management, including 
the percent of crop production in 1998 priced before harvest.  Based on the responses reported in 
the study, it can be estimated that farmers in Indiana and Nebraska (the closest states to Illinois) 
priced an average of 15.7% of corn and 14.0% of soybeans pre-harvest.  The second is the 2001 
Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS) by the USDA.  This national survey asked 
farmers about their use of marketing contracts for the 2001 crop (USDA/NASS, 2003).  It was 
reported that farmers in the Corn Belt region (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and Ohio) 
marketed 10.1% of corn and 9.0% of soybeans through marketing contracts that included 
forward contracts, price setting based on grade and yield formulas and pre-harvest pooling 
arrangements.  Given the broad definition of marketing contracts, the USDA estimates are upper 
bounds on the amount of forward pricing for the 2001 corn and soybean crops.  The estimates 
from the two studies suggest that the magnitude of forward pricing is modest, but nonetheless, 
large enough to make the USDA monthly marketing weights potentially misleading indicators of 
the true pricing pattern of farmers.  It is also important to emphasize that the estimates discussed 
here pertain to only two crop years and there may be considerable variation in the magnitude of 
forward pricing across other crop years.  For example, Coble et al. (1999) also asked farmers 
how much of their 1999 production they expected to price before harvest.  The responses   36
indicate that farmers in Indiana and Nebraska expected to price an average of 26.9% of corn and 
23.1% of soybeans pre-harvest in 1999.
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A further difficulty is that almost no concrete evidence exists on the exact length of the 
typical marketing window of farmers.  The two studies discussed above only investigated the 
magnitude of forward pricing, not the timing of such decisions.  Without evidence to the 
contrary, it seems reasonable to argue that many farmers use a marketing window not unlike the 
24-month and 20-month windows assumed for the market benchmarks, but the amount of pre-
harvest forward pricing is far less than is assumed for the market benchmarks.  The two surveys 
suggest that pre-harvest forward pricing by farmers typically is in the range of 10 to 20%, 
compared to an average of 53 and 43% for 24-month and 20-month benchmarks, respectively, 
over 1995-2001.  All else equal, this would lead to the expectation that the variation of farmer 
benchmark prices would exceed that for the market benchmarks. 
 
Under rationality, it is still possible for the variation of farmer benchmark prices to be 
smaller than for market benchmarks if farmers employ market-timing strategies that successfully 
reduce price variation.  Alternatively, if farmers are subject to the same judgment and decision 
biases as appears to be the case for participants in other markets, then it would be reasonable to 
expect the farmer benchmark to have a lower average price and higher variation than the market 
benchmarks.  Which of the above scenarios is correct can only be determined empirically. 
 
Net Advisory Prices and Benchmarks for 2001 
 
Net advisory prices and benchmarks for the 2001 corn and soybean crops are presented in 
Tables 6 through 11.  These results are new and add to the sample of net advisory prices and 
benchmarks previously available for analysis.  For a specific example of how marketing 
recommendations are translated into a final net advisory price that incorporates the simulation 
assumptions, see Jackson, Irwin and Good (1996).  It is important to emphasize that all of the net 
advisory prices and benchmarks presented in Tables 6 through 11 are stated on a harvest 
equivalent basis using either on-farm variable or commercial storage costs. 
 
Net advisory prices and benchmarks for corn in 2001 assuming on-farm variable storage 
costs are presented in Table 6.  In addition, this table shows the components of the advisory 
prices and benchmarks.  The 2001 average net advisory price for all 27 corn programs is $2.09 
per bushel under the assumption of on-farm variable costs.  It is computed as the unadjusted cash 
sales price ($2.04 per bushel) minus storage charges ($0.11 per bushel) plus futures and options 
gain ($0.03 per bushel) minus brokerage costs ($0.01 per bushel) plus LDP/MLG gain ($0.16 per 
bushel).  The range of net advisory prices for corn in 2001 assuming on-farm variable storage 
costs is $1.78 to $2.68 per bushel.  Corresponding benchmark prices range from $2.02 per bushel 
(20-month average market benchmark) to $2.07 per bushel (24-month average market 
benchmark and farmer benchmark). 
 
                                                 
44 While dated, Paul, Heifner and Helmuth (1976) report survey estimates of forward contract usage that vary 
sharply across crop years.
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Net advisory prices and benchmarks for soybeans in 2001 assuming on-farm variable 
storage costs are presented in Table 7.  The 2001 average net advisory price for all 26 soybean 
programs is $5.50 per bushel under the assumption of on-farm variable costs.  It is computed as 
the unadjusted cash sales price ($4.35 per bushel) minus storage charges ($0.11 per bushel) plus 
futures and options gain ($0.02 per bushel) minus brokerage costs ($0.02 per bushel) plus 
LDP/MLG gain ($1.25 per bushel).  The range of net advisory prices for soybeans in 2001 
assuming on-farm variable storage costs is $4.92 to $5.85 per bushel.  Corresponding benchmark 
prices range from $5.27 per bushel (20-month average market benchmark) to $5.63 per bushel 
(farmer benchmark). 
 
Since many Corn Belt farmers grow both corn and soybeans, it also is useful to examine 
a combination of the results for the corn and soybean marketing programs.  In order to do this, 
gross revenue is calculated for a central Illinois farmer who follows both the corn and soybean 
marketing advice of a given program.  It is assumed that the representative farmer splits acreage 
equally (50/50) between corn and soybeans and achieves corn and soybean yields equal to the 
actual yield for the area in 2001.  The 50/50 advisory revenues are computed on a per acre basis 
and compared with the revenue a central Illinois farmer could have received based on benchmark 
prices for both corn and soybeans.  Advisory revenue per acre is calculated only for those 
programs that offer both corn and soybean marketing advice. 
 
Advisory program revenues and benchmarks in 2001 assuming on-farm variable storage 
costs are presented in Table 8.  The average revenue achieved by following both the corn and 
soybean programs offered by an advisory program is $296 per acre.  The range of 50/50 advisory 
revenue in 2001 assuming on-farm variable storage costs is $278 to $351 per acre.  
Corresponding benchmark revenues range from $285 per acre (20-month average market 
benchmark) to $297 per acre (farmer benchmark). 
 
For comparison purposes, the annual subscription cost of each advisory program also is 
listed in the last column of Table 8.  Subscription costs average $353 per program, a level that 
does not appear to be large relative to total farm revenue, whether a large or small farm is 
considered.  For a 2,000 acre farm, subscription costs average less than one-tenth of one percent 
of total advisory revenue.  For a 500 acre farm, subscription costs average about two-tenths of 
one percent of total advisory revenue. 
 
Net advisory prices and benchmarks for corn in 2001 assuming commercial storage costs 
are presented in Table 9.  The 2001 average net advisory price for all 27 corn programs is $1.99 
per bushel under the assumption of commercial storage costs.  It is computed as the unadjusted 
cash sales price ($2.04 per bushel) minus storage charges ($0.23 per bushel) plus futures and 
options gain ($0.03 per bushel) minus brokerage costs ($0.01 per bushel) plus LDP/MLG gain 
($0.16 per bushel).  The range of net advisory prices for corn in 2001 assuming commercial 
storage costs is $1.61 to $2.48 per bushel.  Corresponding benchmark prices range from $1.94 
per bushel (20-month average market benchmark) to $2.00 per bushel (24-month average market 
benchmark). 
 
Net advisory prices and benchmarks for soybeans in 2001 assuming commercial storage 
costs are presented in Table 10.  The 2001 average net advisory price for all 26 soybean   38
programs is $5.45 per bushel under the assumption of commercial storage costs.  It is computed 
as the unadjusted cash sales price ($4.35 per bushel) minus storage charges ($0.16 per bushel) 
plus futures and options gain ($0.02 per bushel) minus brokerage costs ($0.02 per bushel) plus 
LDP/MLG gain ($1.25 per bushel).  The range of net advisory prices for soybeans in 2001 
assuming commercial storage costs is $4.89 to $5.82 per bushel.  Corresponding benchmark 
prices range from $5.21 per bushel (20-month average market benchmark) to $5.55 per bushel 
(farmer benchmark). 
 
Advisory program revenues and benchmarks in 2001 assuming commercial storage costs 
are presented in Table 11.  The average revenue achieved by following both the corn and 
soybean programs offered by an advisory program is $287 per acre when commercial storage 
costs are assumed.  The range of 50/50 advisory revenue in 2001 assuming commercial storage 
costs is $264 to $334 per acre.  Corresponding benchmark revenues range from $277 per acre 
(20-month average market benchmark) to $286 per acre (farmer benchmark). 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show the pattern of corn prices for the 2001 crop year based on on-farm 
variable and commercial storage costs, respectively.  The top chart shows daily cash prices from 
September 1, 2000 through August 31, 2002.  The pre-harvest prices are the cash forward 
contract prices for harvest delivery.  The middle chart is a repeat of the top chart with daily LDP 
or MLG added to the daily price.  For the pre-harvest period, the LDP is the average LDP 
available at harvest time.  The third chart offers a different perspective, in that post-harvest daily 
cash prices are adjusted for cumulative storage costs (interest, physical storage and shrinkage 
charges).  The chart illustrates the pattern of harvest equivalent prices plus LDP or MLG. 
 
Pre-harvest corn prices for the 2001 crop year are above the CCC loan rate most of the 
time.  Prices decline into harvest as average yields and total production exceed expectations, but 
make a significant post-harvest recovery in August 2002 when prices reach $2.50 per bushel.  
The price pattern for the 2001 crop year is typical of a large crop year followed by a year of 
weather-reduced production. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show the pattern of soybean prices for the 2001 crop year based on on-
farm variable and commercial storage costs, respectively.  The three charts are the same as for 
corn, depicting daily cash prices, cash prices plus LDP/MLG and cash prices plus LDP/MLG 
minus storage charges.  Soybean prices for the 2001 crop follow a similar pattern to that for 
corn.  Cash prices are more volatile in the pre-harvest period, maintaining below the CCC loan 
rate all the pre-harvest and most of the post-harvest seasons.  Prices rallied beginning in May 
2002 and peaked at $5.90 per bushel in the middle of July.  That is the only time the cash price is 
above the loan rate in the entire crop year.  The price pattern for the 2001 crop year reflects dual 
harvest periods, the US in the fall months and South America in the spring months, and the 
impact of weather-reduced US production in 2002.  The largest LDPs/MLGs occur during the 
harvest season of the 2001 crop. 
 
Net Advisory Prices and Benchmarks for 1995-2001 
 
Net advisory prices, revenue and benchmarks for the 2000-2001 crop years, assuming on-
farm variable storage costs, are reported in Tables 12 through 14.  Results are not presented for   39
earlier crop years because the AgMAS Project first computed net advisory prices and 
benchmarks under on-farm variable storage costs for the 2000 crop year.  Net advisory prices, 
revenue and benchmarks for the 1995-2001 crop years, assuming commercial storage costs, are 
reported in Tables 15 through 17.  In both sets of results, please note that some of the market 
advisory programs included in the tables are not evaluated for all crop years.  Finally, in order to 
obtain a consistent set of net advisory prices and benchmarks for the entire sample period, the 
following discussion focuses on the net advisory prices, revenue and benchmarks where 
commercial storage costs are assumed. 
 
Table 15 shows the average advisory price for corn ranges between $1.99 per bushel in 
2001 and $3.03 per bushel in 1995 (based on commercial storage costs).  Range statistics reveal 
that net advisory prices for corn vary substantially within individual crop years.  The most 
dramatic example is 1995, where the minimum is $2.29 per bushel and the maximum is $3.90 
per bushel.  Even in years with less market price volatility, it is not unusual for the range of 
prices across advisory programs to be near a dollar per bushel.  The three alternative benchmark 
prices for corn are shown at the bottom of Table 15.  The variation in benchmark prices from 
year-to-year is similar to that of average net advisory prices.  However, there can be substantial 
differences in benchmark prices for a particular crop year.  For example, the 24-month market 
benchmark in 1998 is $2.24 per bushel, while the farmer benchmark is only $1.97 per bushel.  
These data suggest performance results for corn may be sensitive to the selected benchmark.    
 
As reported in Table 16, the average advisory price for soybeans ranged from $5.44 per 
bushel in 2000 to $7.27 per bushel in 1996 (based on commercial storage costs).  Similar to corn, 
the range of individual net advisory prices within a crop year is substantial.  The most dramatic 
example is 1999, where the range in advisory prices approaches $2.50 per bushel.  The three 
alternative benchmark prices for soybeans are shown at the bottom of Table 16.  The variation in 
soybean benchmark prices from year-to-year is similar to that of average net advisory prices.  
Once again, there can be substantial differences in benchmark prices for a particular crop year. 
 
Table 17 contains the combined corn and soybeans revenue results (based on commercial 
storage costs).  The lowest average advisory revenue, $287 per acre, occurred in 2001, while the 
highest average advisory revenue, $369 per acre, occurred in 1996.  Given the results for corn 
and soybeans, the large range of individual advisory revenues within a crop year is not 
surprising.  Nonetheless, it is startling to see the possible economic impact of following the best 
versus the worst performer in a given crop year.  For example, in three of the seven crop years 
(1995, 1999 and 2000) the range in advisory revenue exceeds $100 per acre. 
 
For the reader’s convenience, Tables 18 through 20 report the most recent two-year 
averages (2000-2001), three-year averages (1999-2001), four-year averages (1998-2001), five-
year averages (1997-2001), six-year averages (1996-2001) and seven-year averages (1995-2001) 
of net advisory prices, revenues and benchmarks (based on commercial storage costs).
45   The 
averages are computed in these tables only for the advisory programs active in each of the 
                                                 
45 Terms like “two-year average” are used to refer to averages of net advisory prices over multiple crop years. 
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indicated crop years.  The reported averages may reflect survivorship bias as a result of this 
assumption, which should be considered when viewing the averages.
46  Finally, note that the 
average, minimum and maximum reported for each column in the Tables 18 through 20  are 
computed across the advisory program averages in each column. 
 
Information on the sources of the differences between net advisory prices and 
benchmarks in corn and soybeans is found in Table 21.  Panel A shows average net advisory 
prices and benchmarks broken out by component.  Panel B presents the average difference in the 
components between advisory programs and the benchmarks.  All of the averages in the table 
assume commercial storage costs.  In cases where the average net advisory price is above the 
average benchmark price (e.g., net advisory price in corn versus the farmer benchmark) the 
difference is largely explained by the higher net cash sales price of advisory programs.  The 
average net futures and options gain of advisory programs is relatively small, as is the difference 
in LDP/MLGs between advisors and the benchmarks. 
 
Performance Evaluation Results for 1995-2001 
 
  Four basic indicators of performance are applied to advisory program prices and revenues 
over 1995-2001.  The first indicator is the proportion of advisory programs that beat benchmark 
prices.  A valuable feature of this directional indicator is that it is not influenced by extremely 
high or low advisory prices.  The second indicator is the difference between the average price of 
advisory programs and benchmarks.  This indicator is useful because it takes into account both 
the direction and magnitude of differences from benchmark prices.  The third indicator is the 
average price and risk of advisory programs relative to the average price and risk of the 
benchmarks.  Evaluations based on this indicator are important because risk is incorporated into 
the performance comparisons.  The fourth indicator is the predictability of advisory program 
performance from year-to-year.  This indicator provides information on the value of past pricing 
performance in predicting future performance. 
 
Before considering the performance evaluation results, two important issues need to be 
discussed.  First, the results presented in this section of the report address the performance of 
market advisory programs as a group.  In other words, average pricing performance across all 
programs is considered.  This is a different issue than the pricing performance of a particular 
advisory program.
47  Simply put, it is inappropriate to make performance inferences for an 
individual advisory program based on aggregate results.  Second, farmers subscribe to market 
                                                 
46 A measure of survivorship bias can be computed by subtracting multiple-year averages based on all programs 
active in each crop year of a particular sample (“grand” average) from the averages presented in Tables 18 through 
20 (“survivor” average).  The differences vary between 0 and -2¢ per bushel for corn, 0 and -5¢ per bushel for 
soybeans and $0 and -$2 per acre for advisory revenue, with negative numbers indicating survivorship bias (grand 
average less than survivor average).  The comparisons suggest survivorship bias is small or negligible in the overall 
averages in Tables 18 through 20. 
 
47 For example, one possibility is that advisory programs as a group fail to beat market benchmarks, yet at the same 
time some programs have “exceptional” performance.  Testing whether performance is exceptional for a particular 
advisory program requires different statistical tests than the ones used here (Marcus, 1990).   41
advisory programs for a variety of reasons.  For example, Pennings et al. (2001) survey farmer-
subscribers and find that the two highest rated uses of market advisory programs are marketing 
information and market analysis.  While the quality of marketing information and market 
analysis is likely to be positively correlated with the returns to marketing recommendations, this 
does not necessarily have to be the case.  It is possible that advisory programs provide valuable 
information and analysis to farmer-subscribers, yet fail to exhibit superior pricing performance. 
 
Directional Performance  
 
The first, and simplest, indicator of pricing performance is the proportion of advisory 
programs that beat the market or farmer benchmarks.  Positive performance is indicated if the 
proportion of advisory programs beating a benchmark exceeds 50%, the proportion one would 
observe if advisory performance is random, like flipping a fair coin.  A noteworthy feature of 
this “directional” indicator is that it is not influenced by extremely high or low advisory prices or 
revenue. 
 
The proportion of advisory programs in corn, soybeans and 50/50 advisory revenue 
above the benchmarks over 1995-2001 is presented in Table 22.  Note that average proportions 
for 1995-2001 are computed over the full set of advisory programs, and therefore, do not 
necessarily equal the average of the individual crop year proportions.  This “grand” average 
equally weights each of the net advisory prices or revenues in the sample, whereas an average of 
the individual crop year averages would equally weight the crop years.  The first average is 
preferred for the present purpose as it implies an equal probability of selecting an individual 
advisory program across the entire sample.
48 
 
Considering corn first (Panel A: Table 22), there is some variation in the proportion of 
net advisory prices above the two market benchmarks for individual crop years, particularly 
1998, but the patterns are similar overall.  There also does not appear to be any discernable trend 
in the proportions for either benchmark over the seven crop years.  The average proportion for 
1995-2001 is 49% versus the 24-month benchmark and 60% versus the 20-month benchmark, 
indicating a zero to marginal chance of advisory prices in corn beating market benchmark prices.  
In contrast, the proportion of net advisory prices above the farmer benchmark exceeds 50% each 
crop year.  The average proportion above the farmer benchmark over 1995-2001 is 73%.  This is 
substantially higher than the average proportions versus the market benchmarks and indicates a 
sizeable chance of market advisory programs generating net prices higher than the farmer 
benchmark. 
 
Moving to soybeans (Panel B: Table 22), there is more variation in the proportion of net 
advisory prices above the two market benchmarks for individual crop years.  Particularly sharp 
differences are observed in 1998 and 1999, where the spread between the proportions is between 
26 and 45 percentage points.  No clear trend is apparent for the proportions versus either market 
                                                 
48 The different forms of averaging will produce equal estimates only if a time-series cross-section data set is 
“balanced.”  That is, the number of programs is the same for each crop year and there are no missing observations.  
This clearly is not the case here.  It turns out that, after rounding, the two different methods of averaging produce 
the same estimates of the average proportion.   42
benchmark.  Despite these differences for individual crop years, the average proportions for 
1995-2001, 63% versus the 24-month benchmark and 74% versus the 20-month benchmark, both 
indicate a better than average chance of advisory prices beating market benchmark prices in 
soybeans.  The proportions above the farmer benchmark are all above 50%, except the 2001 crop 
when only 27% of the programs were able to beat the farmer benchmark.  The average 
proportion above the farmer benchmark over 1995-2001 is 67%.  This indicates a reasonable 
chance of market advisory programs generating net prices in soybeans higher than the farmer 
benchmark. 
 
Given the combined nature of 50/50 advisory revenue, it is not surprising that revenue 
proportions (Panel C: Table 22) typically are between those of corn and soybeans.  The average 
proportion for 1995-2001 is 56% versus the 24-month benchmark and 70% versus the 20-month 
benchmark, indicating a marginal to better than average chance of advisory revenue beating 
market benchmark revenue.  The proportion of advisory revenues above the farmer benchmark 
exceeds 50% each crop year, except for 2001, and averages 71% over 1995-2001.  This indicates 
a sizable chance of advisory revenue beating farmer benchmark revenue.  It is interesting to note 
that 100% of the advisory programs in 1998 generated revenue that exceeded the farmer 
benchmark, despite the fact that less than 100% did so in corn and soybeans.  This simply 
reflects a situation where some programs had gains above the farm benchmark in one commodity 
that more than offset the losses below the benchmark in the other commodity. 
 
Overall, the directional performance results over 1995-2001 suggest several key findings.  
First, advisory programs in corn do not consistently beat market benchmarks, but they do 
consistently beat the farmer benchmark.  Second, advisory programs in soybeans tend to beat 
both market and farmer benchmarks.  Third, in terms of 50/50 revenue, advisory programs only 
marginally beat market benchmarks, but consistently beat the farmer benchmark.  So, the results 
provide mixed performance evidence with respect to market benchmarks and consistently 
positive evidence with respect to the farmer benchmark. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the directional pricing performance results for market 
advisory programs to that of other investment professionals.  Malkiel (1999) reports a typical 
estimate of the proportion of active mutual funds managers that beat the stock market.  
Specifically, he shows that only 33% of active mutual fund managers generate returns higher 
than the S&P 500 stock index over 1974-1998.  By comparison, market advisory programs 
perform better, with about half of the programs beating the market in corn and about two-thirds 
beating the market in soybeans.  This divergence may simply reflect a unique time period in corn 
and soybean markets, relatively less efficient commodity markets, the skill of advisory programs, 
or a return to risk. 
 
Average Price Performance  
 
The second indicator of pricing performance is the difference between the average price 
of advisory programs and the market or farmer benchmarks.  This indicator takes into account 
both the direction and magnitude of differences from the benchmarks.  The results found in 
Tables 23 and 24 basically tell the same story as those based on the proportion beating the 
benchmarks.  Average differences from market benchmarks for corn over 1995-2001 (panel A:   43
Table 23) are small, ranging from zero to three cents per bushel.
49,50  At 10¢ cents per bushel, the 
average difference from the farmer benchmark for corn is larger.  Average differences for 
soybeans over 1995-2001 (panel B: Table 20) are even larger for both types of benchmarks, 
ranging from 11 to 18¢ per bushel versus market benchmarks and 17¢ per bushel versus the 
farmer benchmark.  Average differences for 50/50 advisory revenue range from three to seven 
dollars per acre for market benchmarks over 1995-2001 (Table 24).  The average revenue 
difference versus the farmer benchmark is $12 per acre.  Note that the average differences can 
mask considerable variability across the benchmarks within a crop year and across crop years.  A 
dramatic example of this occurred in 1998 for soybeans (Panel B: Table 23), where the average 
difference from the 24-month market benchmark is –4¢ per bushel, while the average difference 
from the farmer benchmark is +64¢ per bushel. 
 
It should be pointed out that average differences versus the farmer benchmark appear to 
be non-trivial from an economic decision-making perspective.  For example, the average 
advisory return relative to the farmer benchmark ($12 per acre) is nearly four percent of average 
farmer benchmark revenue.  This represents a substantial increase in net farm income (defined as 
returns to farm operator management, labor and capital), typically about $50 per acre for grain 
farms in Illinois (Lattz, Cagley and Raab, 2002).  The comparison does not account for yearly 
subscription costs, which is not a major problem because subscription costs are quite small 
relative to revenue.  As noted earlier, subscription costs are less than one-tenth of one percent of 
average farmer benchmark revenue for a 2,000 acre farm and about two-tenths of one percent for 
a 500 acre farm.  A more serious issue is fully accounting for the cost of implementing, 
monitoring and managing the marketing strategies recommended by advisory programs.  Such 
costs are difficult to measure, but may well be substantial (Tomek and Peterson, 2001).  
 
At this juncture, the findings should be considered only suggestive.  The reason is that 
the statistical significance of the results has not been investigated.  In other words, are the returns 
to marketing advice simply the result of random chance or do they reflect truly positive pricing 
performance?  A number of different statistical tests can be used to determine the significance of 
observed differences in sample means.  In the present context, it is critical to recognize that there 
is a “natural” pairing in the sample data that can be used to increase the power of statistical tests 
(Snedecor and Cochran, 1989).  More specifically, net advisory prices and benchmark prices for 
                                                 
49 Differences are calculated as advisory price minus benchmark price.  So, a positive difference indicates an 
advisory price above the benchmark price and vice versa. 
 
50 To facilitate direct comparisons across corn, soybeans and 50/50 revenue, average differences for 1995-2001 also 
are computed on a percentage basis: 
 
  Average Difference Between Advisory Programs and Benchmark 
  24-Month Market  20-Month Market  Farmer 
Corn -0.1%  +1.7%  +4.8% 
Soybeans +2.0%  +3.2%  +3.3% 
50/50 Revenue  +0.9%  +2.4%  +4.1% 
 
It is interesting to note that the percentage difference versus the farmer benchmark is larger for corn than soybeans, 
just the reverse of the results on a cents per bushel basis.   44
the same crop year are paired, in the sense that the same crop year receives different 
“treatments” from advisory programs and benchmarks.  The treatments correspond to the 
differing marketing strategies used by advisory programs and benchmarks.  Given that the 
sample data are paired, the appropriate test of the null hypothesis of zero difference between the 
mean of net advisory and benchmark prices is the paired t-test.  
 
Application of the paired t-test to average pricing performance is complicated by the fact 
that net prices across programs are positively related.  This type of statistical test assumes that 
sample differences are generated independently (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989, pp. 101).
51  It 
should come as no surprise that this assumption is violated for market advisory programs.  Many 
of the programs appear to use similar methods of analysis and all make heavy use of similar 
supply and demand information (primarily from the USDA).  Furthermore, alternative programs 
offered by the same advisory service are likely to generate similar pricing results.  Statisticians 
call this an “implicit factor” problem. 
 
Correlation coefficients estimated across net advisory prices most directly provide 
evidence on the magnitude of the dependence problem.  However, the sample is not large enough 
to independently estimate all possible pair-wise correlations.
52  Useful evidence can be generated 
by estimating “market model” regressions for each commodity.  This entails simply regressing 
net advisory prices (or revenue) for a given program on a market benchmark.  If net advisory 
prices share a common “market factor” the explanatory power of the regressions will be high.  In 
order to maximize the number of time-series observations available for each program, the sample 
for this analysis is limited to the 15 programs active in all seven crop years.  The explanatory 
power of the market model regressions turns out to be quite substantial, with an average 
2 R  of 




The high level of dependence across net advisory prices and revenue basically creates an 
information problem in the sample.  Take the case of corn.  There are 179 computed net advisory 
prices across all programs and crop years.  However, the 179 net advisory prices are not 
independent, due to the strong positive correlation across programs.  The key question is the 
amount of independent information contained in the sample of 179 net advisory prices.  It is not 
possible to precisely estimate the true number of independent observations, but it is certainly far 
less than 179.  Similar logic holds for soybeans and 50/50 advisory revenue. 
 
The bottom-line from this discussion is that an assumption of independence for advisory 
prices and revenue will overstate the reliability of sample estimates.  This in turn will bias 
statistical tests towards a conclusion that pricing performance is significantly positive.  The 
                                                 
51 See Appendix C for presentation of the statistical model underlying this discussion. 
 
52 Assume 25 advisory programs are included in each crop year over 1995-2001.  Then, a total of 300 pair-wise 
correlation coefficients would have to be estimated.  However, the sample only contains 175 observations.  There 
simply is not enough information (degrees of freedom) to estimate each correlation independently. 
 
53 The full set of regression results is available from the authors upon request.   45
approach taken here to deal with the problem is “conservative.”  Specifically, statistical tests 
assume the minimum possible number of independent observations in the sample.  This 
minimum is six observations, one for each crop year.  The tests are conservative since 
conclusions are based on the minimal possible assumption about the amount of information in 
the sample.  If test results based on this conservative assumption indicate statistical significance, 
then a high degree of confidence can be placed on conclusions.  The cost of this approach is an 
increased probability that positive pricing performance is mistakenly attributed to chance. 
 
Implementing the conservative testing approach is straightforward.
54  First, the average 
net advisory price or revenue is computed across all programs active in a crop year, and it is 
considered the return for an “average” advisory program.  Second, the averaging process is 
repeated for each of the crop years to form a sample of seven observations for the average 
advisory program.  These averages can be found in Tables 15 through 17 under the “Descriptive 
Statistics” heading.  Third, benchmark prices are subtracted from each of the average advisory 
prices or revenues.  Fourth, a paired t-test is applied to the seven difference observations to 
determine if average price performance is statistically significant. 
 
Differences from the benchmarks each crop year and statistical test results for an average 
advisory program are presented in Table 25.  Note that the average differences reported in Table 
25 are nearly identical to those reported in Tables 23 and 24.  This outcome is not surprising.  
The average differences in Table 25 assume an equal weighting of the seven crop years, while 
the average differences in Tables 23 and 24 assume an equal weighting of each net advisory 
price or revenue in the sample.  The two types of averages differ only because the number of 
advisory programs changes across crop years.  Since this change is quite small across crop years, 
the difference in the two types of averages is negligible. 
 
The impact of the conservative approach to testing the significance of average differences 
is reflected in the standard error estimates.  This statistic measures the “typical” error, without 
regard to sign, in estimating the average difference between advisory programs and a particular 
benchmark (Mirer, 1995, p. 238).
55  For example, the standard error estimate for the average 
difference in soybeans versus the 24-month market benchmark indicates that the typical error in 
estimating the true difference, without regard to sign, is five cents per bushel.  A measure of 
reliability is needed because a sample is being used to make an inference about the “true” 
population difference, and the sample will not perfectly reflect the characteristics of the 
population.  This is the essence of the role of random chance in estimation.  The key point in this 
regard is that standard error estimates vary inversely with sample size.
56  As a result, standard 
                                                 
54 This test was first proposed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) and it has been widely applied in studies of stock 
market returns. 
 
55 In more formal terms, “typical” means one can be 95% confident the true value of the difference will be contained 
in an interval about two standard errors above and below the average difference estimate. 
 
56 The standard error of the average difference is estimated as ˆd T σ , where  ˆd σ  is the standard deviation of 
differences across crop years and T is the sample size (seven in this case).   46
error estimates (typical estimation errors) will be much larger if it is assumed that seven 
independent observations are available as opposed to, say, 179 independent observations. 
 
With this background, the statistical test results in Table 25 can be considered.  The 
relevant information in the sample for testing statistical significance is summarized by the t-
statistic, which is just the ratio of the average difference estimate to the standard error estimate.  
The two-tail p-value indicates the probability of observing a value of the t-statistic (or higher in 
absolute value) across many random samples.  It is usually argued that p-values must be equal to 
or smaller than 0.05 to confidently conclude that average differences do not equal zero (Griffiths, 
Hill and Judge, 1993, p. 134).  Stated differently, there should be less than a 1 out of 20 chance 
that the wrong conclusion is reached.  In corn, the p-values for average differences versus both 
market benchmarks are substantially larger than 0.05, so it can be concluded that average 
differences are insignificantly different from zero.  Just the opposite conclusion is reached versus 
the farmer benchmark.  The p-value of 0.02 indicates the average difference of 10¢ per bushel in 
corn is highly significant.  In soybeans, the p-values for average differences versus both market 
benchmarks are smaller than 0.05, so it can be concluded that average differences are 
significantly different from zero.  In contrast to the results for corn, the average difference of 18¢ 
per bushel in soybeans versus the farmer benchmark is insignificantly different from zero, 
although the p-value indicates the difference is marginally significant.  Test results for 50/50 
advisory revenue show mixed results.  With the market benchmarks, results show statistical 
significance for the average difference from the 20-month benchmark, but not from the 24-month 
benchmark.  The average difference of $12 per acre versus the farmer benchmark is significantly 
different from zero.  Overall, the test results with respect to market benchmarks indicate no 
evidence of statistically significant average price performance in corn, consistent evidence of 
significant performance in soybeans and mixed evidence for 50/50 advisory revenue.  The test 
results with respect to the farmer benchmark indicate statistically significant performance in 
corn, marginally significant performance in soybeans and significant performance for 50/50 
advisory revenue. 
 
When viewing statistical test results, it is always important to assess whether the nature 
of the sample information or the comparisons bias the results in one direction or the other.  There 
is in fact a systematic trend in corn and soybean price movements during the sample period that 
has an important impact on the tests results.  Figure 12 shows the average pattern of corn and 
soybean prices over the 24-month marketing window for the 1995-2001 crop years.  These charts 
are based on the same harvest equivalent forward and spot cash prices (including LDP/MLGs) 
used to compute net advisory prices and the market benchmarks.  The downward trend in corn 
and soybean prices over the 24-month window is substantial, with pre-harvest highs in corn and 
soybean prices about 60¢ and 80¢ per bushel, respectively, higher than post-harvest lows.  A 
marketing strategy that systematically priced more heavily in the pre-harvest period relative to 
the post-harvest period would have generated much higher returns than a strategy that did not. 
 
Now consider the average marketing profiles for corn and soybeans shown in Figure 13.  
The market benchmark and advisory program profiles were presented earlier in Figure 6 and the 
USDA marketing weights were presented in Figure 7.  As noted earlier in the “Farmer 
Benchmark” section, USDA marketing weights represent grain purchases, which are not 
necessarily the same as pricing weights due to farmers’ use of forward contracts.  Only a   47
hypothetical marketing profile for farmers is presented (labeled “Farmers ?”) as a result.  It is 
based on a similar marketing window as the market benchmarks and advisory programs, but 
reflects substantially less pricing in the pre-harvest period.
57  In light of the downward price 
trends, the marketing profiles make it is easy to understand why market benchmarks and 
advisory programs generated higher average prices than the farmer benchmark over the last six 
crop years. 
 
The key question is whether the price trends and marketing patterns of the last seven 
years provide a reliable picture of the future.  Scenario analysis is helpful in illustrating the range 
of possible outcomes.  Consider first a scenario where future upward price trends offset the 
downward price movements of the last seven crop years and advisors and farmers do not 
significantly change their marketing behavior.  Future performance results under this scenario 
will be just the opposite of those for the last seven crop years because farmers will benefit 
relatively more than advisors from the upward price trends.  Of course, it is possible for advisory 
programs to outperform farmers in an environment of rising prices if they time strategy changes 
better than farmers.  Consider an alternative scenario where downward price trends continue to 
be the norm and advisors and farmers do not significantly change their marketing behavior.  
Future performance results basically will be the same as those observed over the 1995-2001 
sample period.  Farmers could equal the performance of advisors under a downward price trend 
scenario if they systematically increase pre-harvest pricing.  These scenarios show that future 
performance differences could range from complete reversal to no change, depending on future 
price trends. 
 
In sum, pricing performance depends on a complex set of variables that include corn and 
soybean price behavior, advisory program strategies and the marketing behavior of farmers.  It is 
on open question whether the behavior of these variables in the last seven crop years provides a 
reliable guide for the future.  The persistence of downward price trends generally observed over 
1995-2001 is an especially hotly debated issue.  While the results clearly provide some evidence 
on the pricing performance of advisory programs, there is simply no replacement for a larger 
sample of crop years when attempting to reach firm conclusions.  In particular, more 
observations are needed on crop years with rising prices.  Longer-term evidence on the 
performance of farmers versus the market would also be helpful. 
 
Average Price and Risk Performance 
 
Comparison of average advisory prices or revenues to benchmarks is an important 
indicator of performance.  However, average price or revenue comparisons may not provide a 
complete picture of performance.  For example, two advisory programs can generate the same 
average advisory price, but the risk of the programs may differ substantially.  The difference in 
                                                 
57 The amount priced by farmers in the pre-harvest period is assumed to be about 18%, near the upper end of the 
10% to 20% range suggested by the Coble et al. (1999) and USDA ARMS (2003) surveys.  Readers should note 
that the marketing profile for farmers is subjectively determined, and therefore, should be viewed cautiously.  In the 
section on farmer benchmark prices, it was noted that almost no concrete evidence exists on the exact length of the 
typical marketing window of farmers or the precise pattern of forward pricing.   48
risk may be the result of using different pricing tools (cash, forward, futures or options), different 
timing of sales and variation in the implementation of marketing strategies. 
 
A number of theoretical frameworks have been developed to analyze decision-making 
under risk.  One of the simplest and most popular is the mean-variance (EV) model, which uses 
variance as a measure of risk.  The basic idea in this case is to look at risk as the chance farmers 
will fail to achieve the net price they expect based on following an advisory program.  This 
approach to quantifying risk does not measure the possibility of loss alone.  Risk is seen as 
uncertainty: the likelihood that what is expected will fail to happen, whether the outcome is 
better or worse than expected.  So an unexpected return on the upside or the downside – a net 
price of $2.50 or $1.50 per bushel when a net price of $2.00 per bushel is expected – counts in 
determining the risk of an advisory program.  Thus, an advisory program whose net price does 
not depart much from its expected (mean) price is said to carry little risk.  In contrast, an 
advisory program whose net price is quite volatile from year-to-year, often departing from 
expected net price, is said to be quite risky. 
 
To apply the EV model to a particular decision, either distributions of outcomes must be 
normal or decision-makers must have quadratic utility functions (Hardaker, Huirne and 
Anderson, 1997, p.141).  If either or both of these conditions hold, then risky choices can be 
divided into efficient and inefficient sets based on the famous EV efficiency rule: if the mean of 
choice A is greater than or equal to the mean of choice B and the variance of A is less than or 
equal to the variance of B, with at least one strict inequality holding, then A is preferred to B by 
all risk-averse decision makers.  Since quadratic utility has the unlikely characteristic that 
absolute risk aversion increases with the level of the outcome, application of the EV model 
usually is based upon an assumption of normally distributed outcomes.  This presents a potential 
problem in the case of market advisory programs that employ options strategies.  Such strategies 
are designed to create non-normal price distributions by truncating undesirable prices, either on 
the downside or the upside, or both.  Fortunately, simulation analysis suggests that the EV model 
produces reasonably accurate results even in cases where options strategies are employed 
(Hanson and Ladd, 1991; Ladd and Hanson, 1991; Garcia, Adam and Hauser, 1994). 
 
The basic data needed for assessing market advisory pricing performance in an EV 
framework are presented in Table 26.  For each of the 15 advisory programs tracked in all seven 
crop years of the AgMAS study, the seven-year average net advisory price or revenue and 
standard deviation of net advisory price or revenue is reported.  The average price and standard 
deviation of the three benchmarks also are reported.  Standard deviation is substituted for 
variance as the measure of risk because it easier to understand.
 58  Performance results are the 
same whether standard deviation or variance is used to measure risk (Hardaker, Huirne and 
Anderson, 1997, p.143), hence the use of the simpler measure.  Standard deviation estimates can 
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where T is the number of crop years in the sample, yt is the advisory program’s net price for the t
th crop year and  y  
is the average net advisory price over the T crop years.    49
be thought of as the “typical” variation in net advisory prices from year-to-year.  The larger the 
standard deviation for an advisory program, the less likely a farmer is to get exactly the net price 
expected, though it is possible by chance to get a higher price instead of a lower one for any 
particular time period. 
 
The sample of advisory programs for the EV analysis is limited to those which are 
tracked all seven crop years in order to maximize the number of observations available to 
estimate risk (standard deviation).
59  Even with this restriction, seven observations would appear 
to be a relatively small sample for estimating the risks of market advisory programs.  However, 
as noted in the introduction, Anderson (1974) explored the reliability of agricultural return-risk 
estimates based on limited data and found the surprising result that even as few as three or four 
observations can be very useful.  Nonetheless, the standard deviations reported in Table 26 may 
be somewhat inaccurate estimators of the true risks of advisory programs.  With that in mind, the 
standard deviations suggest that the risk of advisory programs varies substantially.  In corn, the 
standard deviations range from a low of $0.20 per bushel to a high of $0.75 per bushel.  In 
soybeans, the standard deviations range from a low of $0.50 per bushel to a high of $0.96 per 
bushel.  Finally, revenue standard deviations for the 15 programs range from a low of $17 per 
acre to a high of $53 per acre.  Standard deviations of the benchmark prices tend to be near the 
average standard deviation of the 15 advisory programs for corn, soybeans and 50/50 advisory 
revenue. 
 
The average price and risk (standard deviation) for individual advisory programs and the 
benchmarks are plotted in Figures 14 through 16.  Panel A in each of the figures is divided into 
four quadrants based on the average price (or revenue) and standard deviation of the 24-month 
market benchmark, while panel B is divided into four quadrants based on the average price (or 
revenue) and standard deviation of the farmer benchmark.  Advisory programs in the upper left 
quadrant of each chart have a higher average price (or revenue) and less risk than the benchmark, 
which is the most desirable outcome from a farmer’s perspective.  According to the EV 
efficiency rule introduced earlier, advisory programs in this quadrant are said to “dominate” the 
24-month market benchmark or the farmer benchmark.  Advisory programs in the lower right 
quadrant have a lower price and more risk than the benchmark, which is the least desirable 
outcome from a farmer’s perspective.  The 24-month market benchmark or the farmer 
benchmark dominates an advisory program located in this quadrant.  The two remaining 
quadrants reflect a higher price and more risk than the benchmarks or a lower price and less risk 
                                                 
59 The restriction means that only advisory programs active all seven crop years are included in the average price 
and risk evaluation.  As a result, there is the potential for survivorship bias in the average price and risk 
comparisons to the benchmarks.  Survivorship bias in the average estimates appears to be negligible, with the 
average corn and soybean net advisory price for the 15 programs (“survivor” average) equal to and one cent more, 
respectively, than the average price computed across all advisory programs active in the 1995-2001 sample period 
(“grand” average).  This suggests that non-surviving advisory programs exited the sample for a variety of reasons, 
not just poor performance.  It is difficult to assess the degree of survivorship bias in advisory program standard 
deviation estimates with the limited number of crop years available.  However, the average estimate comparisons 
suggest the magnitude of the bias in standard deviation estimates is likely to be small.   50
than the benchmarks.  A farmer may prefer an advisory program to the benchmark in either of 
these two quadrants, but this depends on personal preference for risk relative to average price.
60 
 
The data plotted in panel A of Figure 14 show that only 1 of the 15 advisory programs in 
corn dominates the 24-month market benchmark (upper left quadrant).  Six advisory programs 
are dominated by the 24-month market benchmark (lower right quadrant).  In contrast, panel B in 
Figure 14 indicates stronger performance, with 9 of the 15 advisory programs in corn dominating 
the farmer benchmark (upper left quadrant).  Only one program in corn is dominated by the 
farmer benchmark (lower right quadrant). 
 
The data plotted in panel A of Figure 15 indicate that 4 of the 15 advisory programs in 
soybeans dominate the 24-month market benchmark (upper left quadrant), while only three 
advisory programs are dominated by this market benchmark (lower right quadrant).  Panel B in 
Figure 15 again suggests stronger performance, with 10 of the 15 advisory programs dominating 
the farmer benchmark (upper left quadrant).  Only one program in soybeans is dominated by the 
farmer benchmark (lower right quadrant). 
 
Similar patterns are evident for 50/50 advisory revenue.  Panel A of Figure 16 shows that 
in terms of revenue only 2 of the 15 advisory programs dominates the 24-month market 
benchmark (upper left quadrant), while 6 of the 15 are dominated by this market benchmark 
(lower right quadrant).  Panel B in Figure 16 shows that 6 of the 15 programs dominate the 
farmer benchmark (upper left quadrant) and no program is dominated by the farmer benchmark 
(lower right quadrant). 
 
A key motivation for this analysis is to determine whether consideration of risk alters 
performance conclusions based only upon average price.  This is most easily assessed by 
comparing the proportion of advisory programs that beat the benchmarks in terms of price in 
Table 22 with the proportion of programs that dominate the benchmarks in terms of average 
price and risk (upper left quadrant proportions in Figures 14-16).  For corn, 49% of the advisory 
programs beat the 24-month market benchmark based on price alone over 1995-2001.  This 
drops to 7% when risk is considered.  The same proportions for the farmer benchmark in corn 
drop from 73 to 60%.  For soybeans, 63% of the advisory programs beat the 24-month market 
benchmark based on price alone over 1995-2001, while only 27% do so when risk is considered.  
The proportion for the farmer benchmark in soybeans is unchanged, at 67%, when risk is 
considered.  For 50/50 advisory revenue, 56% of the advisory programs beat the 24-month 
market benchmark based on revenue alone over 1995-2001 and only 13% doing so when risk is 
considered.  The proportions for the farmer benchmark in terms of advisory revenue decrease 
from 71 to 40%.  Overall, the results indicate that consideration of risk tends to weaken 
conclusions about the performance of advisory programs. 
 
                                                 
60 Dominance comparisons can also be made between individual advisory programs.  To do this, quadrants would 
be drawn based on the position of the “base” advisory program.  Dominance comparisons then follow the same 
rules as used for benchmark dominance comparisons.  It is possible for an individual program to be dominated by a 
benchmark, yet at the same time dominate other advisory programs.   51
  Two other issues with respect to risk need to be considered.  The first is the sensitivity of 
EV comparisons to the alternative market benchmarks.  Comparing the results for the 24-month 
and 20-month market benchmarks, the proportion of programs in the upper-left quadrant 
increases from 7 to 40% for corn (panel A: Figure 14), from 27 to 60% for soybeans (panel A: 
Figure 15) and from 13 to 40% for 50/50 advisory revenue (panel A: Figure 16).  These 
comparisons suggest EV performance results are somewhat sensitive to changing the market 
benchmark specification.  Nonetheless, the qualitative implications of the EV comparisons are 
similar for the two market benchmarks.  The second issue is the statistical significance of EV 
performance differences.  Paralleling the argument in the previous section, it is possible that 
positive performance of advisory programs in an EV context is due to random chance.  Bradley 
and Blackwood (1989) have developed a simultaneous statistical test of the equivalence of 
means and variances for paired data.  With only seven observations to estimate both the mean 
and variance (or standard deviation), the power of this particular test to detect positive 
performance may be relatively low.  In addition, the test is fairly technical in nature.  Application 
of the test therefore is left to future research. 
 
Finally, the mean-variance evaluation presented in this section can be extended to 
portfolios of advisory programs.  For example, a soybean portfolio might consist of 50% 
marketed by advisory program #1 and 50% marketed by advisory program #2.  The potential 
improvement in performance by following a combination of programs depends on the degree 
that net advisory prices or revenues are uncorrelated.  A recent AgMAS Research Report by 
Stark et al. (2003) analyzes the potential risk reduction among market advisory programs for 
corn and soybeans.  Under the assumption that programs are equally-weighted and randomly-
selected (naïve diversification), results from this study show that increasing the number of 
programs reduces portfolio expected risk, but the marginal decrease in risk from adding a new 
program decreases rapidly with portfolio size.  The risk reduction benefit from this type of 
diversification among advisory programs is relatively small because advisory prices, on average, 
are highly correlated.  A one service portfolio has only a 20%, 16% and 32% higher standard 
deviation than the minimum risk portfolio for corn, soybeans and 50 /50 revenue, respectively.  
Most risk reduction benefits are achieved with small portfolios.  For instance, a four service 
portfolio has only 5%, 4% and 9% higher risk than the minimum risk portfolio for corn, 
soybeans and 50/50 revenue, respectively.  Based on these results, there does not appear to be 
strong justification for farmers adopting portfolios with a large number of advisory programs. 
 
For a more complete analysis of the possible benefits from diversification among 
advisory programs, it is necessary to evaluate portfolios constructed using modern portfolio 
theory (MPT).  Under this approach, an efficient set of optimal portfolios of market advisory 
programs is constructed by minimizing portfolio variance for each level of expected price or 
revenue.  The resulting optimal portfolios generally will not be equally-weighted across 
programs.  It is possible for an optimal portfolio of advisory programs to generate higher prices 
and less risk than a benchmark, even if individual advisory programs that make up the portfolio 
do not.  The main difficulty in generating optimal portfolios is obtaining accurate estimates of 
the means, variance and correlations for individual programs from the available data.  
Application of MPT to market advisory programs represents an interesting area of future 
research. 
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Predictability of Performance 
 
Even if, as a group, advisory programs generate positive marketing returns, there is a 
wide range in performance for any given year.  For example, soybean net advisory prices for 
1995 vary from $5.66 per bushel to $7.94 per bushel (see Table 16).  While this example is one 
of the most dramatic, the variation across advisors in other cases is substantial.  This raises the 
important question of the predictability of advisory program performance from year-to-year.  In 
other words, is past performance indicative of future performance?  Three types of predictability 
tests are used to answer this question: i) the predictability of “winner” and “loser” categories 
across crop years, ii) the correlation of advisory program ranks across crop years and iii) the 
differences between prices for “top” and “bottom” performing advisory programs across crop 
years.  The testing procedures have been widely applied in studies of financial investment 
performance (e.g., Elton, Gruber and Rentzler, 1987; Irwin, Zulauf and Ward, 1994; Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Malkiel, 1995). 
 
The first test of predictability is based on placing advisory programs into “winner” and 
“loser” categories across adjacent crop years.  This non-parametric test is robust to outliers, 
which is important when analyzing predictability across all advisory programs.  For a given 
commodity, the first step in this testing procedure is to form the sample of all advisory programs 
that are active in adjacent crop years.  The second step is to rank each advisory program in the 
first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1997) based on net advisory price.  For example, the program with 
the highest net advisory price is ranked number one and the program with the lowest net 
advisory price is assigned a rank equal to the total number of programs for that commodity in the 
given crop year.  Then the programs are sorted in descending rank order.  The third step is to 
form two groups of programs in the first year of the pair: winners are those programs in the top 
half of the rankings and losers are programs in the bottom half.  The fourth step is to rank each 
advisory program in the second year of the pair (e.g., t +1 = 1998) based on net advisory price 
and once again form winner and loser groups of programs.  The fifth step is to compute the 
following counts for the advisory programs in the pair of crop years: winner t-winner t+1, 
winner t-loser t+1, loser t-winner t+1, loser t-loser t+1.  If advisory program performance is 
unpredictable, approximately the same counts will be found in each of the four combinations.  




Results of the winner and loser predictability test are shown in Table 27.  Winner and 
loser counts for individual crop years indicate a modest difference, at best, in the chance of a 
winner or loser in one period being a winner or loser in the subsequent period.  As an example, 
consider the results for corn in 1997 and 1998.  Of the eleven winners (top half) in 1997, six are 
winners in 1998 and five are losers (bottom half).  Of the twelve losers in 1997, five are winners 
in 1998 and seven are losers.  In other words, the conditional probability of a winner from 1997 
repeating in 1998 is 55% (6/11) and the conditional probability of a loser from 1997 repeating in 
                                                 
61 Fisher’s Exact Test is the appropriate statistical test because both row and column totals are pre-determined in the 
2 x 2 contingency table formed on the basis of winner and loser counts. 
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1998 is 56% (7/12).  Averaged across all comparisons, the conditional probability of a winner 
(loser) repeating is 54% (57%) for corn, 58% (60%) for soybeans and 55% (57%) for 50/50 
revenue.  These probabilities are only slighter higher than what would result from flipping a coin 
(randomness).  There is only one case (50/50 revenue, 1999 vs. 2000) where individual year 
counts are significantly different from the equal distribution expected under an assumption of no 
predictability.  Even in this case, caution should be used when considering the reported p-value, 
because it is likely overstated due to the observed dependence across advisory programs.
62  
Overall, these results imply that the performance of winning and losing advisory programs is not 
predictable through time. 
 
While predictability may be limited or non-existent across all advisory programs, it is 
possible for sub-groups of advisory programs to exhibit predictability.  Specifically, 
predictability may be found only at the extremes of performance.  That is, only top-performing 
programs in one year may tend to perform well in the next year, or only poor-performing 
programs may perform poorly in the next year, or both.  This is the motivation for the second test 
of predictability, which is based on the correlation between ranks of all advisory programs active 
in adjacent pairs of crop years.  For a given commodity, the first step in this testing procedure is 
to once again form the sample of all advisory programs that are active in both adjacent crop 
years.  The second step is to rank each advisory program in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 
1997) based on net advisory price.  Then the programs are sorted in descending rank order.  The 
third step is to sort and rank the sample of programs in the second year of the pair (e.g., t + 1  = 
1998).  The fourth step is to compute the correlation coefficient between ranks for the two 
adjacent crop years.  If advisory program performance is unpredictable, the estimated correlation 
will be near zero.  Assuming the standard error of the correlation coefficient is approximately 
equal to 1 T , the appropriate statistical test is a Z-test. 
 
Results of the rank correlation predictability test are presented in Table 28.  Rank 
correlation coefficients for corn range from of -0.12 to 0.53.  Statistically significant correlations 
are found for three of the six comparisons in corn.  The range of rank correlation coefficients for 
soybeans, 0.03 to 0.65, is similar to the range for corn.  However, statistically significant 
correlations are found for only one of the six comparisons in soybeans.  Rank correlation 
coefficients for 50/50 revenue have the widest range, from -0.17 to 0.72.  Statistically significant 
correlations are found for two of the six revenue comparisons.  Once again, caution should be 
used when considering the reported p-values, as they likely overstate the significance of the rank 
correlation estimates due to the dependence across advisory programs.  Average rank correlation 
coefficients across the six comparisons are nearly identical for corn, soybeans and 50/50 
advisory revenue.  With values of either 0.27 or 0.28, the average rank correlations suggest 
marginal predictability in the pricing performance of top- and bottom-performing market 
advisory programs. 
 
                                                 
62 Fisher’s Exact Test assumes sample observations are independent.  As discussed in the section on average price 
performance, this clearly is not the case, and therefore, the p-values for such tests likely overstate the true 
significance of the results.  Pooled test results for 1995-2001 are not reported for the same reason.   54
The rank correlation tests results suggest it is useful to determine the magnitude of 
predictability in top- and bottom-performing advisory programs.  Hence, the third test of 
predictability is based on the difference between net advisory prices for top- and bottom-
performing advisory programs across adjacent crop years.  For a given commodity, the first step 
in this testing procedure is to sort programs by net advisory price in the first year of the pair and 
group programs by quantiles (thirds and fourths).  The second step is to compute the average net 
advisory price for the quantiles in the second year of the pair.  Note that the same programs make 
up the quantiles in the first and second year of the pair.  For example, the average price of the top 
fourth quantile formed in 1995 is computed for 1996.  The third step is to compute the difference 
in average price for the top- and bottom-performing quantiles.  If performance for the top- and 
bottom-performing quantiles is the same, the difference will equal zero.  The appropriate 
statistical test in this case is a paired t-test of the difference in the means of the top- and bottom-
performing quantiles.  There are a total of six comparisons (1995 vs. 1996, 1996 vs. 1997, 1997 
vs. 1998, 1998 vs. 1999, 1999 vs. 2000 and 2000 vs. 2001), so there are five degrees of freedom 
for the t-test.  Since differences are computed for an “average” advisory program in top- and 
bottom-performing quantiles, dependence across individual advisory programs is not an issue, 
and p-values for the t-test are unbiased.  Carpenter and Lynch (1999) recommend this test 
because it is well-specified and among the most powerful in their comparison of several 
predictability tests for mutual funds. 
 
Results for the t-test of predictability are shown in Table 29.  The first column under each 
commodity heading shows the average price of the different quantiles in the first year of the 
comparisons (six in total).  The average price for the first year is “in-sample” because this is the 
formation year for the quantiles.  The second column under each heading reports the average 
price of the same quantiles in the second year of the comparisons.  The average price for the 
second year is “out-of-sample” because this is the year after formation of the quantiles.  In all 
cases, the average price or revenue of the top quantile relative to the bottom quantile declines 
substantially from the first to the second year of the comparisons.  Nonetheless, the average 
difference between top- and bottom-performing quantiles for the second year of the pair is 
consistently positive.  For example, programs in the top third beat the bottom third in the second 
year by an average of 11¢ per bushel in corn, 25¢ per bushel in soybeans and $11 per acre for 
revenue.  Average differences are statistically different from zero for corn when a five percent 
level of significance is applied.  However, the results for soybeans and 50/50 revenue are 
marginally significant.  Average prices for the top quantile out-of-sample also exceed benchmark 
prices for the same period (1996-2001).  Top third returns beat the 24-month market benchmark 
by an average of 3¢ per bushel in corn, 23¢ per bushel in soybeans and $8 per acre for 50/50 
revenue.  Top fourth returns beat the 24-month market benchmark by an average of 6¢ per 
bushel in corn, 28¢ per bushel in soybeans and $10 per acre for 50/50 revenue. 
 
The quantile results provide some evidence that the performance of top- and bottom-
performing market advisory programs can be predicted across adjacent crop years.  However, the 
evidence is not sufficient to conclude that performance predictability is useful from an economic 
standpoint, due to the overlapping nature of the marketing windows for each crop year.  To see 
the point, consider the case of a farmer who uses 1995 performance results to select a top-
performing advisory program.  Since the 1995 marketing window ends on August 31, 1996, 
halfway through the 1996 marketing window and one day before the beginning of the 1997   55
marketing window, the farmer could not implement their selection of an advisory program until 
the 1997 crop year.  Performance would have to persist across three crop years, 1995, 1996 and 
1997, for a farmer to benefit from the predictability. 
 
Quantile results for non-overlapping crop years are shown in Table 30.  The testing 
procedure is the same as before, except there are only five comparisons (1995 vs. 1997, 1996 vs. 
1998, 1997 vs. 1999, 1998 vs. 2000 and 1999 vs 2001) and four degrees of freedom for the 
paired t-test.  The results are strikingly different than the previous results for overlapping crop 
years.  The difference between top- and bottom-performing quantiles in the second year of the 
pair is near zero for corn, positive for soybeans and zero for 50/50 revenue.  All of the average 
differences are insignificantly different from zero.  These results indicate predictability of 
pricing performance for top and bottom advisory programs is short-lived, in the sense that 
performance does not persist long enough to be taken advantage of by farmers. 
 
The predictability results presented so far are all based on individual crop year 
comparisons.  It is possible for performance to be predictable over long time horizons, but 
unpredictable over short horizons due to a large amount of “noise” in performance from year-to-
year (e.g., Summers, 1986).  This is consistent with the argument that over the long-term “cream 
rises to the top” in terms of performance.  To assess long-term predictability, the sample is 
limited to the 15 programs active in all seven crop years of the study.  Next, net advisory prices 
are averaged for each of the 15 programs using two different sample splits: the first three crop 
years (1995-1997) versus the second four crop years (1998-2001) and the first four crop years 
(1995-1998) versus the second three crop years (1999-2001).  The three tests of predictability are 
then applied to the two sets of averages for each sample split.  The results are striking, in that 
virtually no evidence of predictability is found for any of the tests.  Winner-loser counts are quite 
close to what is expected under randomness, rank correlations are all insignificantly different 
from zero and the average difference between top- and bottom-performing programs tends to be 
very small or negative.
63  These results clearly show that advisory program performance is 
unpredictable over longer time horizons. 
 
The test results presented in this section provide little evidence that the pricing 
performance of advisory programs can be usefully predicted from past performance.  This 
conclusion does not mean it is impossible to predict advisory program performance. There may 
be other variables that are useful for predicting performance.  Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study 
whether mutual fund performance is related to characteristics of fund managers that indicate 
ability, knowledge or effort and find that managers who attended higher-SAT undergraduate 
institutions generate systematically higher returns.  Barber and Odean (2000) examine the 
trading records of individual stock investors and report that frequent trading substantially 
depresses investment returns.  Similar factors, such as education of advisors, cash only programs 
versus futures and options programs, frequency of futures and options trading, or storage costs, 
may be useful in predicting the performance of market advisory programs. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
  Surveys suggest that farmers view market advisory services as an important tool in 
managing price and income risk.  As a result, farmers need information on the performance 
“track record” of market advisory services to help them identify successful alternatives for 
marketing and price risk management.  The Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) 
Project was initiated in 1994 with the goal of providing unbiased and rigorous evaluation of 
market advisory services. 
 
  The purpose of this research report is to evaluate the pricing performance of market 
advisory services for the 1995-2001 corn and soybean crops.  No fewer than 23 market advisory 
programs are available for each crop year.  While the sample of advisory services is non-random, 
it is constructed to be generally representative of the majority of advisory services offered to 
farmers.  Further, the sample of advisory services includes all programs tracked by the AgMAS 
Project over the study period, so pricing performance results should not be plagued by 
survivorship bias.  The AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed and 
records recommendations on a real-time basis, which should prevent pricing performance results 
from being subject to hindsight bias. 
 
Certain explicit assumptions are made to produce a consistent and comparable set of 
results across the different advisory programs.  These assumptions are intended to accurately 
depict “real-world” marketing conditions facing a representative central Illinois corn and 
soybean farmer.  Several key assumptions are: i) with a few exceptions, the marketing window 
for a crop year runs from September before harvest through August after harvest, ii) on-farm or 
commercial physical storage costs, as well as interest opportunity costs, are charged to post-
harvest sales, iii) brokerage costs are subtracted for all futures and options transactions and iv) 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) marketing loan recommendations made by advisory 
programs are followed wherever feasible.  Based on these and other assumptions, the net price 
received by a subscriber to a market advisory program is calculated for the 1995-2001 corn and 
soybean crops. 
 
Two different types of benchmarks are developed for the performance evaluations. 
Efficient market theory implies that the return offered by the market is the relevant benchmark.  
In the context of this study, a market benchmark should measure the average price offered by the 
market over the marketing window of a representative farmer who follows advisory program 
recommendations.  Both a 24-month and a 20-month market benchmark are specified in order to 
test the fragility of performance results to different market benchmark assumptions.  Behavioral 
market theory suggests that the average return actually achieved by market participants as an 
appropriate benchmark.  In the context of the present study, a behavioral benchmark should 
measure the average price actually received by farmers for a crop.  A farmer benchmark is 
specified based upon the USDA average price received series for corn and soybeans in Illinois.  
All benchmarks are computed using the same assumptions applied to advisory program track 
records. 
 
  Four basic indicators of performance are applied to advisory program prices and revenues 
over 1995-2001.  The first indicator is the proportion of advisory programs that beat benchmark   57
prices.  Between 49 and 60% of the programs in corn have net advisory prices above market 
benchmarks over 1995-2001, while 73% of the programs have prices above the farmer 
benchmark.  Performance is stronger in soybeans.  Between 63 and 74% of advisory programs in 
soybeans have advisory prices above the market benchmarks over 1995-2001 and 67% are above 
the farmer benchmarks.  Between 56 and 70% of advisory programs have revenue above the 
market benchmarks over 1995-2001, while 71% have revenue above the farmer benchmark.  The 
results provide mixed performance evidence with respect to market benchmarks and consistently 
positive evidence with respect to the farmer benchmark. 
 
The second indicator is the difference between the average price of advisory programs 
and the market or farmer benchmarks.  The results basically tell the same story as those based on 
the proportion beating the benchmarks.  Average differences from market benchmarks for corn 
over 1995-2001 are small, ranging from zero to three cents per bushel.  At 10¢ per bushel, the 
average difference from the farmer benchmark for corn is larger.  Average differences for 
soybeans over 1995-2001 are even larger for both types of benchmarks, ranging from 11 to 18¢ 
per bushel versus market benchmarks and equaling 17¢ per bushel versus the farmer benchmark.  
Average differences for advisory revenue range from three to seven dollars per acre for market 
benchmarks over 1995-2001.  The average revenue difference versus the farmer benchmark is 
$12 per acre. 
 
Statistical test results with respect to market benchmarks indicate no evidence of 
significant average price performance in corn, consistent evidence of significant performance in 
soybeans and mixed evidence for 50/50 advisory revenue.  The test results with respect to the 
farmer benchmark indicate statistically significant performance in corn, marginally significant 
performance in soybeans and significant performance for 50/50 advisory revenue.  Caution 
should be used when considering the results, due to the relatively small sample of crop years 
available for analysis.  In particular, the presence of sharp downward price trends in most crop 
years suggests the possibility that the 1995-2001 sample period may not provide a reliable guide 
to future differences in pricing performance. 
 
The third indicator is the average price and risk of advisory programs relative to 
benchmarks.  Few advisory programs in corn generate a combination of average price and risk 
superior to market benchmarks over 1995-2001.  In contrast, a majority of programs in corn 
generate a combination of average price and risk superior to the farmer benchmark.  A small 
number of programs in soybeans generate a combination of average price and risk superior to 
market benchmarks, while most programs generate a combination superior to the farmer 
benchmark.  Relatively few advisory programs generate a combination of revenue and risk 
superior to market benchmarks.  A moderate number of programs produce a revenue 
combination superior to the farmer benchmark.  The results indicate that consideration of risk 
tends to weaken performance results based only upon average price. 
 
The fourth indicator is the predictability of advisory program performance from year-to-
year.  “Winner” and “loser” predictability results are similar for corn, soybeans and advisory 
revenue.  The conditional probability of winner and loser programs (top half and bottom half) 
repeating are only slighter higher than what would result from flipping a coin (randomness) and 
provide little evidence that pricing performance for all advisory programs can be predicted from   58
past performance.  The performance of top- and bottom-performing programs does not appear to 
be predictable in a useful sense either.  For example, comparisons of non-overlapping crop years 
show that programs in the top quantile beat the bottom quantile only in soybeans and none of the 
average differences are significantly different from zero.  Overall, there is little evidence that 
advisory programs with superior performance can be usefully selected based on past 
performance. 
 
In conclusion, the results of this study provide an interesting picture of the performance 
of market advisory programs in corn and soybeans.  There is limited evidence that advisory 
programs as a group outperform market benchmarks, particularly after considering risk.  This 
supports the view that grain markets (cash, futures and options) are efficient with respect to the 
types of marketing strategies available to farmers (e.g., Zulauf and Irwin, 1998) over the view 
that grain markets are inefficient and provide substantial opportunities for farmers to gain 
additional profits through marketing (e.g., Wisner, Blue and Baldwin, 1998).  In contrast, there is 
more evidence that advisory programs as a group outperform the farmer benchmark, even after 
taking risk into account.  This raises the intriguing possibility that even though advisory services 
do not “beat the market,” they nonetheless provide an opportunity for farmers to improve 
marketing performance because farmers under-perform the market.  Mirroring debates about 
stock investing (e.g., Damato, 2001), the relevant issue is then whether farmers can most 
effectively improve marketing performance by pursuing “active” strategies, like those 
recommended by advisory services, or “passive” strategies, which involve routinely spreading 
sales across the marketing window.  Recently, a number of grain companies began offering 
“averaging” or “indexing” contracts that allow farmers to easily implement a passive approach to 
marketing (Smith, 2001).  The rising interest in these “new generation” marketing contracts 
suggests the potential for historic changes in farmers’ approach to grain marketing.  Future 
research that provides a better understanding of the costs and benefits of active versus passive 
approaches to marketing will be especially valuable.    59
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Ag Alert for Ontario ￿
Included in 1996.  After further review, deemed not directly applicable 
to US producers and dropped.
Ag Financial Strategies ￿ Established service first tracked for the 2001 crop year.
Ag Profit by Hjort ￿￿￿￿￿ Went out of business at the end of August 2000. 
Ag Review ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
AgLine by Doane (cash only) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
AgLine by Doane (hedge) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ New program for corn in 1996 and soybeans in 1998.
AgResource ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Agri-Edge (cash only) ￿￿￿ Went out of business at the end of January 1998. 
Agri-Edge (hedge) ￿￿￿ Went out of business at the end of January 1998. 
Agri-Mark ￿￿￿￿￿￿
Stopped providing specific recommendations regarding cash sales. 
Dropped after 2000 crop year. 
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
AgriVisor (basic cash) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
AgriVisor (basic hedge) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Allendale (futures & options) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ New program for corn only in 1996.
Allendale (futures only) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Brock (cash only) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Brock (hedge) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Cash Grain ￿￿ Went out of business at the end of September 2000. 
Co-Mark ￿￿ Established service first tracked for the 2000 crop year.
Freese-Notis ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Grain Field Marketing ￿ Established service first tracked for the 2001 crop year.
Grain Field Report ￿
Stopped providing specific recommendations regarding cash sales. 
Dropped after 1995 crop year. 
Grain Marketing Plus ￿￿ Established service first tracked for the 2000 crop year.
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory ￿￿
Stopped providing specific recommendations regarding cash sales. 
Dropped after 1996 crop year. 
North American Ag ￿
Stopped providing specific recommendations regarding cash sales. 
Dropped after 1995 crop year. 
Northstar Commodity ￿ Established service first tracked for the 2001 crop year.
Pro Farmer (cash only) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Pro Farmer (hedge) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Progressive Ag ￿￿￿￿￿￿ Established service first tracked for the 1996 crop year.
Prosperous Farmer ￿
Stopped providing specific recommendations regarding cash sales. 
Dropped after 1995 crop year. 
Risk Management Group (cash only) ￿￿￿ Established service first tracked for the 1999 crop year.
Risk Management Group (futures & options) ￿￿￿ Established service first tracked for the 1999 crop year.
Risk Management Group (options only) ￿￿￿ Established service first tracked for the 1999 crop year.
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash ￿￿￿￿￿￿ This Program was discontinued at the end of October 2000. 
Top Farmer Intelligence ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Included for all corn and soybean crop years to date.
Utterback Marketing Services ￿￿￿￿￿
Previous to 1997, did not make clear enough recommendations to be 
tracked. 
Zwicker Cycle Letter ￿￿￿￿ Merged with AgriVisor for the 1999 crop year and no longer included.
Crop Year
Table 1.  Market Advisory Programs Tracked by the AgMAS Project, Corn and Soybeans, 1995-2001 Crop 
Years
Note: A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
 66Harvest Average
Progress LDP LDP
Through on  Through
Date Date Date Date
---%--- ---$ per bushel--- ---$ per bushel---
September 17, 2001 4 0.06 0.06
September 18, 2001 8 0.08 0.07
September 19, 2001 12 0.12 0.09
September 20, 2001 16 0.16 0.11
September 21, 2001 20 0.12 0.11
September 24, 2001 24 0.15 0.12
September 25, 2001 28 0.15 0.12
September 26, 2001 32 0.15 0.12
September 27, 2001 36 0.13 0.12
September 28, 2001 40 0.13 0.13
October 1, 2001 44 0.15 0.13
October 2, 2001 48 0.18 0.13
October 3, 2001 52 0.2 0.14
October 4, 2001 56 0.18 0.14
October 5, 2001 60 0.17 0.14
October 8, 2001 64 0.17 0.14
October 9, 2001 68 0.15 0.14
October 10, 2001 72 0.16 0.15
October 11, 2001 76 0.15 0.15
October 12, 2001 80 0.17 0.15
October 15, 2001 84 0.21 0.15
October 16, 2001 88 0.23 0.15
October 17, 2001 92 0.20 0.16
October 18, 2001 96 0.18 0.16
October 19, 2001 100 0.20 0.16
Table 2. Linear Model of Harvest Progress and Associated Loan Deficiency 
Payment (LDP), Corn, Central Illinois, 2001 Crop Year
67Harvest Average
Progress LDP LDP
Through on  Through
Date Date Date Date
---%--- ---$ per bushel--- ---$ per bushel---
September 14, 2001 4 0.73 0.73
September 17, 2001 8 0.80 0.77
September 18, 2001 12 0.77 0.77
September 19, 2001 16 0.86 0.79
September 20, 2001 20 0.91 0.81
September 21, 2001 24 0.86 0.82
September 24, 2001 28 0.88 0.83
September 25, 2001 32 0.92 0.84
September 26, 2001 36 0.96 0.85
September 27, 2001 40 0.97 0.87
September 28, 2001 44 0.98 0.88
October 1, 2001 48 1.11 0.90
October 2, 2001 52 1.14 0.91
October 3, 2001 56 1.14 0.93
October 4, 2001 60 1.16 0.95
October 5, 2001 64 1.17 0.96
October 8, 2001 68 1.17 0.97
October 9, 2001 72 1.15 0.98
October 10, 2001 76 1.16 0.99
October 11, 2001 80 1.20 1.00
October 12, 2001 84 1.19 1.01
October 15, 2001 88 1.32 1.03
October 16, 2001 92 1.37 1.04
October 17, 2001 96 1.33 1.05
October 18, 2001 100 1.29 1.06
Table 3. Linear Model of Harvest Progress and Associated Loan Deficiency 
Payment (LDP), Soybeans, Central Illinois, 2001 Crop Year
68Ending Date Physical On-Farm On-Farm Physical
for  Storage and Fixed Total Storage and
Storage Shrinkage Interest Total Cost Cost Shrinkage Interest Total
October 31, 2001 8.6 0.4 9.0 14.6 23.6 17.4 0.4 17.8
November 30, 2001 8.8 1.5 10.3 14.6 24.9 17.4 1.5 18.9
December 31, 2001 9.0 2.6 11.6 14.6 26.2 17.4 2.6 20.0
January 31, 2002 9.2 3.8 13.0 14.6 27.6 19.4 3.8 23.2
February 28, 2002 9.4 4.8 14.2 14.6 28.8 21.4 4.8 26.2
March 31, 2002 9.6 6.0 15.5 14.6 30.1 23.4 6.0 29.4
April 30, 2002 9.7 7.1 16.9 14.6 31.5 25.4 7.1 32.5
May 31, 2002 9.9 8.3 18.2 14.6 32.8 27.4 8.3 35.7
June 30, 2002 10.1 9.4 19.6 14.6 34.2 29.4 9.4 38.9
July 31, 2002 10.3 10.6 20.9 14.6 35.5 31.4 10.6 42.1
August 31, 2002 10.5 11.8 22.3 14.6 36.9 33.4 11.8 45.3
Note:  Estimates of the on-farm variable and fixed costs of physical storage are drawn from a study conducted at Kansas State University 
(Dhuyvetter, Hamman and Harner, 2000). The estimates assume storage occurs in a 25,000 bushel round metal bin. The first component of on-farm 
physical storage is a flat charge of 6.7 cents per bushel for conveyance, aeration, insecticide and repairs. The second component of on-farm physical 
storage is shrinkage. Corn shrinkage is assumed in the Kansas State University study to start at one-percent per bushel for the first month of storage 
and increase at a rate of one-tenth of one percent for each month stored thereafter.  The cost of shrink is based on the harvest price. Commercial 
storage costs are drawn from an informal telephone survey of nine central Illinois elevators.   Interest opportunity costs are the same for on-farm and 
commercial storage, and are computed as the harvest price times the interest rate compounded daily from the end of harvest to the date of sale.  The 
interest rate is the average rate for all other farm operating loans for Seventh Federal Reserve District agricultural banks in the fourth quarter of 2001 as reported in the Agricultural Finance Databook. 
Table 4.  On-Farm and Commercial Storage Costs, Corn, 2001 Crop Year
---¢ per bushel---
On-Farm Variable Cost Commercial Cost
 69Ending Date Physical On-Farm On-Farm
for  Storage and Fixed Total Physical
Storage Shrinkage Interest Total Cost Cost Storage Interest Total
October 31, 2001 7.8 1.1 8.9 14.6 23.5 13.0 1.1 14.1
November 30, 2001 7.8 3.7 11.4 14.6 26.0 13.0 3.7 16.7
December 31, 2001 7.8 6.3 14.1 14.6 28.7 13.0 6.3 19.3
January 31, 2002 7.8 9.0 16.8 14.6 31.4 15.0 9.0 24.0
February 28, 2002 7.8 11.4 19.2 14.6 33.8 17.0 11.4 28.4
March 31, 2002 7.8 14.1 21.9 14.6 36.5 19.0 14.1 33.1
April 30, 2002 7.8 16.7 24.5 14.6 39.1 21.0 16.7 37.7
May 31, 2002 7.8 19.5 27.2 14.6 41.8 23.0 19.5 42.5
June 30, 2002 7.8 22.1 29.9 14.6 44.5 25.0 22.1 47.1
July 31, 2002 7.8 24.9 32.7 14.6 47.3 27.0 24.9 51.9
August 31, 2002 7.8 27.7 35.5 14.6 50.1 29.0 27.7 56.7
Note:  Estimates of the on-farm variable and fixed costs of physical storage are drawn from a study conducted at Kansas State University 
(Dhuyvetter, Hamman and Harner, 2000). The estimates assume storage occurs in a 25,000 bushel round metal bin. The first component of on-farm 
physical storage is a flat charge of 6.7 cents per bushel for conveyance, aeration, insecticide and repairs. The second component of on-farm physical 
storage is shrinkage. Since the Kansas State study did not estimate shrinkage costs for soybeans, agricultural engineering specialists at the 
University of Illinois and Purdue University were consulted. The resulting estimate for soybeans is a constant 0.25 percent shrink factor. The cost of 
shrink is based on the harvest price. Commercial storage costs are drawn from an informal telephone survey of nine central Illinois elevators.   
Interest opportunity costs are the same for on-farm and commercial storage, and are computed as the harvest price times the interest rate 
compounded daily from the end of harvest to the date of sale.  The interest rate is the average rate for all other farm operating loans for Seventh 
Federal Reserve District agricultural banks in the fourth quarter of 2001 as reported in the Agricultural Finance Databook. 
Table 5.  On-Farm and Commercial Storage Costs, Soybeans, 2001 Crop Year
---¢ per bushel---
On-Farm Variable Cost Commercial Cost
70(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unadjusted Futures & Net
Cash Sales Physical Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Storage Shrinkage  Interest Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Ag Financial Strategies 1.93 0.07 0.02 0.04 1.80 0.00 0.06 0.17 1.91
Ag Review 2.02 0.07 0.03 0.05 1.88 0.26 0.02 0.16 2.29
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 1.96 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.87 0.00 0.00 0.17 2.04
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 1.98 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.89 0.00 0.00 0.17 2.06
AgResource 1.99 0.07 0.03 0.08 1.81 -0.17 0.05 0.18 1.78
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 2.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.92 0.00 0.00 0.16 2.08
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 2.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.92 0.00 0.00 0.16 2.08
AgriVisor (basic cash) 2.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.91 0.00 0.00 0.15 2.06
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 2.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.91 -0.03 0.00 0.15 2.03
Allendale (futures & options) 1.97 0.07 0.02 0.01 1.87 0.03 0.00 0.18 2.07
Allendale (futures only) 1.97 0.07 0.02 0.01 1.87 0.05 0.00 0.18 2.09
Brock (cash-only) 2.01 0.07 0.03 0.06 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.17 2.02
Brock (hedge) 2.01 0.07 0.03 0.06 1.85 0.02 0.04 0.17 2.01
Co-Mark 2.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.92 0.05 0.01 0.16 2.12
Freese-Notis 1.99 0.07 0.03 0.08 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.98
Grain Field Marketing 2.22 0.06 0.03 0.09 2.04 -0.01 0.01 0.16 2.18
Grain Marketing Plus 2.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.96 0.02 0.01 0.15 2.12
Northstar Commodity 1.96 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.84 0.08 0.01 0.14 2.05
Pro Farmer (cash only) 2.07 0.05 0.02 0.06 1.93 0.00 0.00 0.14 2.08
Pro Farmer (hedge) 1.96 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.85 0.01 0.02 0.14 1.99
Progressive Ag 2.25 0.07 0.03 0.10 2.05 0.46 0.02 0.19 2.68
Risk Management Group (cash only) 2.13 0.06 0.02 0.05 2.00 0.00 0.01 0.16 2.15
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 2.12 0.05 0.02 0.04 2.01 -0.05 0.02 0.16 2.10
Risk Management Group (options only) 2.12 0.05 0.02 0.04 2.01 -0.04 0.02 0.16 2.10
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 2.01 -0.03 0.02 0.15 2.11
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.95 0.19 0.02 0.16 2.27
Utterback Marketing Services 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.14 -0.15 0.05 0.16 2.11
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 2.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.92 0.03 0.01 0.16 2.09
  Median 2.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 1.91 0.00 0.01 0.16 2.08
  Minimum 1.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80 -0.17 0.00 0.14 1.78
  Maximum 2.25 0.07 0.03 0.10 2.14 0.46 0.06 0.19 2.68
  Range 0.32 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.34 0.63 0.06 0.05 0.90
  Standard Deviation 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.15
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 2.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 1.97 0.00 0.00 0.10 2.07
  20-month average 2.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.93 0.00 0.00 0.09 2.02
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 2.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.91 0.00 0.00 0.16 2.07
Table 6. Pricing Results for 27 Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 2001 Crop Year, On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as (1) - (2) - (3) - (4). Net advisory price is calculated as (5) + (6) - (7) + (8), and therefore, is stated on a harvest 
equivalent basis. Market and farmer benchmark prices also are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and MLG 
stands for marketing loan gain. The 2001 crop year is a two-year  marketing window from September 2000 through August 2002.
On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
---$ per bushel---
   71(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unadjusted Futures & Net
Cash Sales Physical Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Storage Shrinkage  Interest Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Ag Financial Strategies 4.24 0.03 0.01 0.02 4.19 -0.09 0.03 1.29 5.36
Ag Review 4.39 0.05 0.01 0.02 4.31 -0.14 0.03 1.26 5.40
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 4.38 0.05 0.01 0.06 4.26 0.00 0.00 1.21 5.47
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 4.38 0.05 0.01 0.06 4.26 -0.06 0.00 1.21 5.41
AgResource 4.20 0.04 0.01 0.02 4.12 0.58 0.08 1.14 5.77
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 4.34 0.07 0.01 0.07 4.19 0.00 0.00 1.36 5.55
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 4.34 0.07 0.01 0.07 4.19 0.00 0.00 1.36 5.55
AgriVisor (basic cash) 4.34 0.07 0.01 0.07 4.19 0.00 0.00 1.34 5.53
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 4.34 0.07 0.01 0.07 4.19 0.00 0.00 1.34 5.53
Allendale (futures only) 4.30 0.07 0.01 0.03 4.19 0.24 0.00 1.33 5.75
Brock (cash only) 4.45 0.07 0.01 0.11 4.26 0.00 0.00 1.37 5.63
Brock (hedge) 4.26 0.07 0.01 0.06 4.12 0.21 0.02 1.37 5.67
Co-Mark 4.30 0.07 0.01 0.05 4.17 0.13 0.01 1.35 5.64
Freese-Notis 4.32 0.07 0.01 0.08 4.16 0.00 0.00 1.37 5.53
Grain Field Marketing 4.36 0.03 0.01 0.05 4.27 -0.11 0.01 1.24 5.39
Grain Marketing Plus 4.33 0.07 0.01 0.03 4.21 -0.09 0.01 1.27 5.39
Northstar Commodity 4.44 0.07 0.01 0.10 4.26 0.00 0.02 1.42 5.66
Pro Farmer (cash only) 4.54 0.05 0.01 0.13 4.35 0.00 0.00 1.24 5.59
Pro Farmer (hedge) 4.20 0.05 0.01 0.07 4.07 0.09 0.02 1.24 5.38
Progressive Ag 4.38 0.04 0.01 0.03 4.30 0.44 0.02 1.13 5.85
Risk Management Group (cash only) 4.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.33 0.00 0.00 1.06 5.39
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 4.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.33 -0.15 0.02 1.06 5.22
Risk Management Group (options only) 4.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.33 -0.16 0.02 1.06 5.21
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 4.47 0.05 0.01 0.04 4.38 0.25 0.03 1.22 5.82
Top Farmer Intelligence 4.45 0.05 0.01 0.05 4.34 -0.22 0.02 1.18 5.28
Utterback Marketing Services 4.36 0.04 0.01 0.03 4.28 -0.39 0.06 1.09 4.92
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 4.35 0.05 0.01 0.05 4.24 0.02 0.02 1.25 5.50
  Median 4.34 0.05 0.01 0.05 4.26 0.00 0.01 1.25 5.53
  Minimum 4.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.07 -0.39 0.00 1.06 4.92
  Maximum 4.54 0.07 0.01 0.13 4.38 0.58 0.08 1.42 5.85
  Range 0.34 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.31 0.97 0.08 0.36 0.93
  Standard Deviation 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.21
Market Benchmarks
  24-Month Average 4.60 0.03 0.00 0.06 4.51 0.00 0.00 0.88 5.38
  20-Month Average 4.53 0.03 0.01 0.07 4.43 0.00 0.00 0.84 5.27
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA Average Price Received 4.56 0.06 0.01 0.09 4.40 0.00 0.00 1.24 5.63
Table 7.  Pricing Results for 26 Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 2001 Crop Year, On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
---$ per bushel---
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as (1) - (2) - (3) - (4). Net advisory price is calculated as (5) + (6) - (7) + (8), and therefore, is stated on a harvest 
equivalent basis. Market and farmer benchmark prices also are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and MLG 
stands for marketing loan gain. The 2001 crop year is a two-year marketing window from September 2000 through August 2002.
On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
  72(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advisory Revenue Annual
Market Advisory Program Corn Soybeans 50/50 Advisory Revenue Cost of Service
---$ per year---
Ag Financial Strategies 300 257 278 600
Ag Review 359 259 309 360
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 320 263 291 300
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 323 260 291 300
AgResource 279 277 278 600
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 326 267 296 299
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 326 267 296 299
AgriVisor (basic cash) 323 266 294 299
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 318 266 292 299
Allendale (futures only) 328 276 302 300
Brock (cash-only) 318 270 294 240
Brock (hedge) 316 272 294 240
Co-Mark 333 271 302 600
Freese-Notis 311 266 288 360
Grain Field Marketing 342 259 301 200
Grain Marketing Plus 333 259 296 295
Northstar Commodity 321 272 297 480
Pro Farmer (cash only) 326 268 297 420
Pro Farmer (hedge) 313 258 285 420
Progressive Ag 421 281 351 140
Risk Management Group (cash only) 338 259 298 500
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 330 251 290 500
Risk Management Group (options only) 330 250 290 500
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 332 279 305 150
Top Farmer Intelligence 357 253 305 180
Utterback Marketing Services 331 236 284 300
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 329 264 296 353
  Median 326 266 295 300
  Minimum 279 236 278 140
  Maximum 421 281 351 600
  Range 142 45 73 460
  Standard Deviation 24 10 13 136
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 325 258 291
  20-month average 317 253 285
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 324 270 297
Table 8.  Revenue Results for 26 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and  Soybeans, 50/50 Advisory Revenue, 
2001 Crop Year, On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
Notes:  Advisory revenue per acre for corn (soybeans) is calculated as net advisory price times 157 (48) bushels. 
Market or farmer benchmark revenue per acre for corn (soybeans) is calculated as the benchmark price times 157 
(48) bushels. 50/50 advisory revenue is calculated as (1) x 0.5 + (2) x 0.5. Advisory revenue per acre and 
benchmark revenue are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. The annual cost of a service is not subtracted from 
advisory revenue per acre. The 2001 crop year is a two-year marketing window from September 2000 through 
August 2002.
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
  73(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unadjusted Futures & Net
Cash Sales Physical Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Storage Shrinkage  Interest Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Ag Financial Strategies 1.93 0.15 0.04 0.04 1.69 0.00 0.06 0.17 1.80
Ag Review 2.02 0.17 0.04 0.05 1.76 0.26 0.02 0.16 2.17
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 1.98 0.11 0.03 0.03 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.98
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 1.96 0.11 0.03 0.03 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.96
AgResource 1.99 0.22 0.04 0.08 1.65 -0.17 0.05 0.18 1.61
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 2.03 0.14 0.03 0.04 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.98
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 2.03 0.14 0.03 0.04 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.98
AgriVisor (basic cash) 2.02 0.14 0.04 0.04 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.96
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 2.02 0.14 0.04 0.04 1.80 -0.03 0.00 0.15 1.92
Allendale (futures & options) 1.97 0.13 0.04 0.01 1.78 0.03 0.00 0.18 1.99
Allendale (futures only) 1.97 0.13 0.04 0.01 1.78 0.05 0.00 0.18 2.01
Brock (cash-only) 2.01 0.20 0.04 0.06 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.88
Brock (hedge) 2.01 0.20 0.04 0.06 1.70 0.02 0.04 0.17 1.87
Co-Mark 2.01 0.10 0.03 0.03 1.85 0.05 0.01 0.16 2.05
Freese-Notis 1.99 0.22 0.04 0.08 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.81
Grain Field Marketing 2.22 0.23 0.04 0.09 1.87 -0.01 0.01 0.16 2.00
Grain Marketing Plus 2.07 0.13 0.03 0.04 1.87 0.02 0.01 0.15 2.03
Northstar Commodity 1.96 0.15 0.03 0.04 1.73 0.08 0.01 0.14 1.93
Pro Farmer (cash only) 2.07 0.18 0.04 0.06 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.94
Pro Farmer (hedge) 1.96 0.12 0.04 0.03 1.77 0.01 0.02 0.14 1.91
Progressive Ag 2.25 0.26 0.04 0.10 1.85 0.46 0.02 0.19 2.48
Risk Management Group (cash only) 2.13 0.17 0.04 0.05 1.88 0.00 0.01 0.16 2.03
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 2.12 0.14 0.03 0.04 1.90 -0.05 0.02 0.16 1.99
Risk Management Group (options only) 2.12 0.14 0.03 0.04 1.90 -0.04 0.02 0.16 2.00
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.09 0.10 0.02 0.03 1.94 -0.03 0.02 0.15 2.04
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.03 0.10 0.02 0.03 1.87 0.19 0.02 0.16 2.20
Utterback Marketing Services 2.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.14 -0.15 0.05 0.16 2.11
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 2.04 0.15 0.04 0.04 1.81 0.03 0.01 0.16 1.99
  Median 2.02 0.14 0.04 0.04 1.80 0.00 0.01 0.16 1.98
  Minimum 1.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 -0.17 0.00 0.14 1.61
  Maximum 2.25 0.26 0.04 0.10 2.14 0.46 0.06 0.19 2.48
  Range 0.32 0.26 0.04 0.10 0.50 0.63 0.06 0.05 0.87
  Standard Deviation 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.15
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 2.03 0.09 0.02 0.03 1.90 0.00 0.00 0.10 2.00
  20-month average 2.01 0.10 0.02 0.03 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.09 1.94
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 2.04 0.16 0.04 0.04 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.95
Table 9.  Pricing Results for 27 Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 2001 Crop Year, Commercial Storage Costs
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as (1) - (2) - (3) - (4). Net advisory price is calculated as (5) + (6) - (7) + (8), and therefore, is stated on a 
harvest equivalent basis. Market and farmer benchmark prices also are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment 
and MLG stands for marketing loan gain. The 2001 crop year is a two-year  marketing window from September 2001 through August 2002.
Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per bushel---
  74(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unadjusted Futures & Net
Cash Sales Physical Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Storage Interest Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Ag Financial Strategies 4.24 0.07 0.02 4.16 -0.09 0.03 1.29 5.33
Ag Review 4.39 0.13 0.02 4.25 -0.14 0.03 1.26 5.34
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 4.38 0.11 0.06 4.21 0.00 0.00 1.21 5.42
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 4.38 0.11 0.06 4.20 -0.06 0.00 1.21 5.35
AgResource 4.20 0.09 0.02 4.09 0.58 0.08 1.14 5.74
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 4.34 0.15 0.07 4.12 0.00 0.00 1.36 5.48
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 4.34 0.15 0.07 4.12 0.00 0.00 1.36 5.48
AgriVisor (basic cash) 4.34 0.15 0.07 4.12 0.00 0.00 1.34 5.46
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 4.34 0.15 0.07 4.12 0.00 0.00 1.34 5.46
Allendale (futures only) 4.30 0.13 0.03 4.14 0.24 0.00 1.33 5.70
Brock (cash only) 4.45 0.17 0.11 4.17 0.00 0.00 1.37 5.54
Brock (hedge) 4.26 0.13 0.06 4.06 0.21 0.02 1.37 5.62
Co-Mark 4.30 0.13 0.05 4.12 0.13 0.01 1.35 5.59
Freese-Notis 4.32 0.15 0.08 4.10 0.00 0.00 1.37 5.47
Grain Field Marketing 4.36 0.08 0.05 4.23 -0.11 0.01 1.24 5.35
Grain Marketing Plus 4.33 0.13 0.03 4.16 -0.09 0.01 1.27 5.34
Northstar Commodity 4.44 0.17 0.10 4.17 0.00 0.02 1.42 5.57
Pro Farmer (cash only) 4.54 0.17 0.13 4.24 0.00 0.00 1.24 5.48
Pro Farmer (hedge) 4.20 0.12 0.07 4.01 0.09 0.02 1.24 5.32
Progressive Ag 4.38 0.09 0.03 4.26 0.44 0.02 1.13 5.82
Risk Management Group (cash only) 4.33 0.00 0.00 4.33 0.00 0.00 1.06 5.39
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 4.33 0.00 0.00 4.33 -0.15 0.02 1.06 5.22
Risk Management Group (options only) 4.33 0.00 0.00 4.33 -0.16 0.02 1.06 5.21
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 4.47 0.10 0.04 4.33 0.25 0.03 1.22 5.77
Top Farmer Intelligence 4.45 0.10 0.05 4.30 -0.22 0.02 1.18 5.23
Utterback Marketing Services 4.36 0.09 0.03 4.25 -0.39 0.06 1.09 4.89
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 4.35 0.11 0.05 4.19 0.02 0.02 1.25 5.45
  Median 4.34 0.12 0.05 4.17 0.00 0.01 1.25 5.46
  Minimum 4.20 0.00 0.00 4.01 -0.39 0.00 1.06 4.89
  Maximum 4.54 0.17 0.13 4.33 0.58 0.08 1.42 5.82
  Range 0.34 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.97 0.08 0.36 0.93
  Standard Deviation 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.20
Market Benchmarks
  24-Month Average 4.60 0.08 0.06 4.46 0.00 0.00 0.88 5.34
  20-Month Average 4.53 0.10 0.07 4.37 0.00 0.00 0.85 5.21
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA Average Price Received 4.56 0.15 0.09 4.31 0.00 0.00 1.24 5.55
Table 10.  Pricing Results for 26 Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 2001 Crop Year, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per bushel---
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as (1) - (2) - (3). Net advisory price is calculated as (4) + (5) - (6) + (7), and therefore, is stated on a harvest 
equivalent basis. Market and farmer benchmark prices also are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and 
MLG stands for marketing loan gain. The 2001 crop year is a two-year marketing window from September 2000 through August 2002.
Commercial Storage Costs
 75(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advisory Revenue Annual
Market Advisory Program Corn Soybeans 50/50 Advisory Revenue Cost of Service
---$ per year---
Ag Financial Strategies 283 256 270 600
Ag Review 340 256 298 360
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 311 260 286 300
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 308 257 282 300
AgResource 253 275 264 600
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 311 263 287 299
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 311 263 287 299
AgriVisor (basic cash) 307 262 285 299
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 302 262 282 299
Allendale (futures only) 315 273 294 300
Brock (cash-only) 295 266 280 240
Brock (hedge) 293 270 281 240
Co-Mark 322 268 295 600
Freese-Notis 285 262 274 360
Grain Field Marketing 314 257 286 200
Grain Marketing Plus 318 256 287 295
Northstar Commodity 304 268 286 480
Pro Farmer (cash only) 304 263 284 420
Pro Farmer (hedge) 300 255 278 420
Progressive Ag 389 279 334 140
Risk Management Group (cash only) 319 259 289 500
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 313 251 282 500
Risk Management Group (options only) 314 250 282 500
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 320 277 299 150
Top Farmer Intelligence 345 251 298 180
Utterback Marketing Services 331 235 283 300
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 312 261 287 353
  Median 311 262 285 300
  Minimum 253 235 264 140
  Maximum 389 279 334 600
  Range 136 45 70 460
  Standard Deviation 24 10 13 136
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 315 256 285
  20-month average 305 250 277
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 306 266 286
Table 11.  Revenue Results for 26 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and Soybeans, 50/50 Advisory Revenue, 
2001 Crop Year, Commercial Storage Costs
Notes:  Advisory revenue per acre for corn (soybeans) is calculated as net advisory price times 157 (48) bushels. 
Market or farmer benchmark revenue per acre for corn (soybeans) is calculated as the benchmark price times 157 (48) 
bushels. 50/50 advisory revenue is calculated as (1) x 0.5 + (2) x 0.5. Advisory revenue per acre and benchmark 
revenue are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. The annual cost of a service is not subtracted from advisory revenue 
per acre. The 2001 crop year is a two-year marketing window from September 2000 through August 2002.




Market Advisory Program Price Price Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A 1.91 N/A
Ag Review 2.14 2.29 2.21
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 2.24 2.04 2.14
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 2.32 2.06 2.19
AgResource 2.90 1.78 2.34
Agri-Edge (cash only) N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 2.19 N/A N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 2.28 2.08 2.18
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 2.28 2.08 2.18
AgriVisor (basic cash) 2.26 2.06 2.16
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 2.26 2.03 2.14
Allendale (futures & options) 2.03 2.07 2.05
Allendale (futures only) 2.29 2.09 2.19
Brock (cash only) 2.10 2.02 2.06
Brock (hedge) 2.38 2.01 2.20
Cash Grain 2.14 N/A N/A
Co-Mark 2.10 2.12 2.11
Freese-Notis 2.21 1.98 2.09
Grain Field Marketing N/A 2.18 N/A
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus 1.91 2.12 2.02
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A 2.05 N/A
Pro Farmer (cash only) 2.06 2.08 2.07
Pro Farmer (hedge) 1.94 1.99 1.96
Progressive Ag 2.20 2.68 2.44
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) 2.28 2.15 2.21
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 2.25 2.10 2.18
Risk Management Group (options only) 2.23 2.10 2.17
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 1.90 2.11 2.01
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 2.05 N/A N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.45 2.27 2.36
Utterback Marketing Services 2.39 2.11 2.25
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 2.21 2.09 2.16
  Median 2.23 2.08 2.17
  Minimum 1.90 1.78 1.96
  Maximum 2.90 2.68 2.44
  Range 1.00 0.90 0.48
  Standard Deviation 0.20 0.15 0.11
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 2.15 2.07 2.11
  20-month average 2.09 2.02 2.05
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 2.06 2.07 2.07
Table 12.  Pricing Results for 36 Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 2000-2001 Crop Years, On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory prices and 
benchmark prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year 
previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
  772000 2001
Net Net 2000-01
Advisory Advisory Two-Year
Market Advisory Program Price Price Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A 5.36 N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort N/A N/A N/A
Ag Review 5.35 5.40 5.38
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 5.50 5.47 5.49
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 5.33 5.41 5.37
AgResource 6.88 5.77 6.33
Agri-Edge (cash only) N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 5.66 N/A N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 5.41 5.55 5.48
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 5.34 5.55 5.45
AgriVisor (basic cash) 5.37 5.53 5.45
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 5.30 5.53 5.42
Allendale (futures only) 5.73 5.75 5.74
Brock (cash-only) 5.32 5.63 5.48
Brock (hedge) 5.47 5.67 5.57
Cash Grain 5.47 N/A N/A
Co-Mark 5.57 5.64 5.61
Freese-Notis 5.60 5.53 5.57
Grain Field Marketing N/A 5.39 N/A
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus 5.30 5.39 5.35
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A 5.66 N/A
Pro Farmer (cash only) 5.33 5.59 5.46
Pro Farmer (hedge) 5.46 5.38 5.42
Progressive Ag 5.05 5.85 5.45
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) 5.58 5.39 5.48
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 5.51 5.22 5.36
Risk Management Group (options only) 5.56 5.21 5.38
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 5.49 5.82 5.66
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 5.34 N/A N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 5.81 5.28 5.54
Utterback Marketing Services 5.28 4.92 5.10
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 5.50 5.50 5.50
  Median 5.47 5.53 5.46
  Minimum 5.05 4.92 5.10
  Maximum 6.88 5.85 6.33
  Range 1.83 0.93 1.23
  Standard Deviation 0.32 0.21 0.22
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 5.47 5.38 5.43
  20-month average 5.40 5.27 5.34
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 5.37 5.63 5.50
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
Table 13.  Pricing Results for 35 Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 2000-2001 Crop Years, On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory prices and benchmark prices 
are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August 




Market Advisory Program Revenue Revenue Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A 278 N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort N/A N/A N/A
Ag Review 296 309 302
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 307 291 299
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 310 291 301
AgResource 393 278 335
Agri-Edge (cash only) N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 307 N/A N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 308 296 302
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 307 296 302
AgriVisor (basic cash) 306 294 300
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 304 292 298
Allendale (futures only) 317 302 310
Brock (cash-only) 292 294 293
Brock (hedge) 318 294 306
Cash Grain 299 N/A N/A
Co-Mark 298 302 300
Freese-Notis 307 288 298
Grain Field Marketing N/A 301 N/A
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus 276 296 286
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A 297 N/A
Pro Farmer (cash only) 289 297 293
Pro Farmer (hedge) 282 285 284
Progressive Ag 294 351 322
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) 312 298 305
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 308 290 299
Risk Management Group (options only) 308 290 299
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 281 305 293
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 289 N/A N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 331 305 318
Utterback Marketing Services 314 284 299
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 306 296 302
  Median 307 295 300
  Minimum 276 278 284
  Maximum 393 351 335
  Range 116 73 52
  Standard Deviation 22 13 11
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 300 291 296
  20-month average 293 285 289
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 290 297 294
Table 14.  Revenue Results for 35 Market Advisory Programs, 2000-2001 Crop Years, On-Farm Variable Storage Costs
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory revenues and 
benchmark revenues are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year 
previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest.
  791995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Net Net Net Net Net Net Net
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Price Price Price
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A 2.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.80
Ag Profit by Hjort 3.08 2.49 2.00 2.05 1.89 N/A N/A
Ag Review 2.59 2.76 2.57 2.25 2.12 2.03 2.17
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 3.15 2.65 2.33 2.22 2.08 2.18 1.98
AgLine by Doane (hedge) N/A 2.61 2.29 2.32 2.13 2.26 1.96
AgResource 3.90 3.12 2.07 2.21 2.49 2.78 1.61
Agri-Edge (cash only) 3.07 2.62 2.15 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 3.15 3.10 2.35 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 3.62 2.73 2.13 1.97 2.03 2.06 N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 3.30 2.83 2.43 2.25 2.12 2.23 1.98
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 3.10 2.58 2.41 2.05 1.99 2.23 1.98
AgriVisor (basic cash) 2.72 2.65 2.34 2.16 2.10 2.21 1.96
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 2.90 2.63 2.33 2.03 2.07 2.21 1.92
Allendale (futures & options) N/A 2.75 2.38 2.09 2.10 1.91 1.99
Allendale (futures only) 2.46 2.08 2.55 2.36 2.20 2.17 2.01
Brock (cash only) 2.74 2.70 2.34 2.10 2.09 1.98 1.88
Brock (hedge) 2.29 2.39 2.64 2.40 2.03 2.29 1.87
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.06 2.06 N/A
Co-Mark N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.03 2.05
Freese-Notis 2.95 2.87 2.22 2.23 1.78 2.07 1.81
Grain Field Marketing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.00
Grain Field Report 3.19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.79 2.03
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 3.16 2.28 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag 3.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.93
Pro Farmer (cash only) 3.16 2.64 2.19 2.09 1.66 1.91 1.94
Pro Farmer (hedge) 3.05 2.67 2.28 2.19 1.69 1.83 1.91
Progressive Ag N/A 2.53 2.26 1.93 1.93 2.12 2.48
Prosperous Farmer 2.91 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.10 2.20 2.03
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.97 2.19 1.99
Risk Management Group (options only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.98 2.16 2.00
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.90 2.46 2.09 2.02 1.90 1.81 2.04
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 2.92 2.68 2.32 2.28 1.95 1.94 N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 3.17 2.44 2.15 2.12 2.10 2.38 2.20
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 2.74 2.51 2.08 2.39 2.11
Zwicker Cycle Letter 3.15 2.56 2.40 2.03 N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 3.03 2.63 2.32 2.17 2.02 2.13 1.99
  Median 3.08 2.64 2.33 2.16 2.07 2.16 1.98
  Minimum 2.29 2.08 2.00 1.93 1.66 1.79 1.61
  Maximum 3.90 3.12 2.74 2.51 2.49 2.78 2.48
  Range 1.61 1.04 0.74 0.58 0.83 0.99 0.87
  Standard Deviation 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.15
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 2.90 2.65 2.33 2.24 2.05 2.09 2.00
  20-month average 3.07 2.66 2.27 2.12 1.97 2.01 1.94
Farmer Benchmarks
  USDA average price received 3.06 2.50 2.23 1.97 1.93 1.95 1.95
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory prices and benchmark prices are 
stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the 
year after harvest.
Table 15.  Pricing Results for 39 Market Advisory Programs, Corn, 1995-2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
  801995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Net Net Net Net Net Net Net
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Price Price Price
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A 7.37 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.33
Ag Profit by Hjort 6.77 7.13 6.16 5.26 5.34 N/A N/A
Ag Review 6.59 7.37 6.19 5.11 4.68 5.23 5.34
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 6.59 7.40 6.32 5.65 5.45 5.46 5.42
AgLine by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A 5.60 5.45 5.32 5.35
AgResource 6.92 7.29 6.47 6.17 7.10 6.83 5.74
Agri-Edge (cash only) 6.70 7.28 6.06 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 6.62 7.18 6.25 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 7.94 7.18 6.68 5.71 5.60 5.60 N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 6.38 7.28 6.33 5.55 5.48 5.35 5.48
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 6.97 7.40 6.14 5.77 5.40 5.29 5.48
AgriVisor (basic cash) 6.42 7.06 6.35 5.55 5.48 5.31 5.46
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 6.78 7.46 6.14 5.79 5.40 5.25 5.46
Allendale (futures only) 6.21 7.30 6.67 5.90 5.64 5.68 5.70
Brock (cash-only) 6.27 7.20 6.31 5.65 5.68 5.23 5.54
Brock (hedge) 5.66 6.99 6.93 6.58 6.33 5.41 5.62
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.99 5.40 N/A
Co-Mark N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.53 5.59
Freese-Notis 6.40 7.13 6.15 5.81 5.32 5.46 5.47
Grain Field Marketing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.35
Grain Field Report 6.84 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.23 5.34
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 6.85 6.80 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag 6.44 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.57
Pro Farmer (cash only) 6.69 7.31 6.29 5.74 5.51 5.28 5.48
Pro Farmer (hedge) 6.78 7.49 6.47 5.85 5.81 5.41 5.32
Progressive Ag N/A 7.80 6.65 5.71 5.68 5.00 5.82
Prosperous Farmer 6.51 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.51 5.53 5.39
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.70 5.46 5.22
Risk Management Group (options only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.51 5.51 5.21
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 6.09 7.37 6.22 6.36 6.00 5.45 5.77
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 6.28 7.13 6.33 5.96 5.42 5.24 N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 6.20 6.84 6.08 6.32 6.23 5.76 5.23
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 6.99 6.13 6.14 5.27 4.89
Zwicker Cycle Letter 6.89 7.67 6.59 5.76 N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 6.59 7.27 6.38 5.82 5.67 5.44 5.45
  Median 6.59 7.28 6.32 5.77 5.51 5.40 5.46
  Minimum 5.66 6.80 6.06 5.11 4.68 5.00 4.89
  Maximum 7.94 7.80 6.99 6.58 7.10 6.83 5.82
  Range 2.28 1.00 0.93 1.47 2.42 1.83 0.93
  Standard Deviation 0.42 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.45 0.33 0.20
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 6.26 7.08 6.30 5.86 5.50 5.42 5.34
  20-month average 6.39 7.21 6.22 5.64 5.30 5.38 5.21
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 6.59 7.17 6.17 5.18 5.39 5.29 5.55
Table 16. Pricing Results for 38 Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 1995-2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory prices and benchmark prices 
are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August 
of the year after harvest.
 811995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
50/50 50/50 50/50 50/50 50/50 50/50 50/50
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory
Market Advisory Program Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A 359 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 270
Ag Profit by Hjort 326 355 283 282 280 N/A N/A
Ag Review 292 382 324 293 282 285 298
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 326 374 310 304 298 301 286
AgLine by Doane (hedge) N/A N/A N/A 310 302 305 282
AgResource 377 407 295 316 371 381 264
Agri-Edge (cash only) 323 369 291 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) 327 403 310 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark 382 375 304 287 297 295 N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 330 385 317 304 302 303 287
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 331 369 311 294 289 301 287
AgriVisor (basic cash) 297 366 311 297 300 300 285
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 315 374 306 293 296 299 282
Allendale (futures only) 277 327 334 320 312 306 294
Brock (cash-only) 295 373 311 295 304 281 280
Brock (hedge) 255 344 346 340 315 309 281
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A 310 290 N/A
Co-Mark N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 291 295
Freese-Notis 310 385 298 308 271 293 274
Grain Field Marketing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 286
Grain Field Report 333 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 265 287
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory 332 331 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag 327 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 286
Pro Farmer (cash only) 329 371 300 296 266 276 284
Pro Farmer (hedge) 324 377 310 306 276 273 278
Progressive Ag N/A 374 313 284 292 286 334
Prosperous Farmer 310 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 301 305 289
Risk Management Group (futures & options) N/A N/A N/A N/A 295 302 282
Risk Management Group (options only) N/A N/A N/A N/A 291 301 282
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 300 358 291 306 297 272 299
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash 306 370 310 316 287 277 N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 319 345 292 313 318 325 298
Utterback Marketing Services N/A N/A 354 337 315 314 283
Zwicker Cycle Letter 332 373 321 292 N/A N/A N/A
Descriptive Statistics:
  Average 319 369 311 304 299 298 287
  Median 324 372 310 304 297 299 285
  Minimum 255 327 283 282 266 265 264
  Maximum 382 407 354 340 371 381 334
  Range 128 80 71 58 105 116 70
  Standard Deviation 27 19 17 15 20 22 13
Market Benchmarks
  24-month average 304 366 310 311 297 293 285
  20-month average 317 371 304 296 286 286 277
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA average price received 320 357 300 274 285 279 286
Table 17.  Revenue Results for 38 Market Advisory Programs, 1995-2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory revenues and benchmark revenues 
are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the 
year after harvest.
 822000-01 1999-01 1998-01 1997-01 1996-01 1995-01
Two-Year Three-Year Four-Year Five-Year Six-Year Seven-Year
Market Advisory Program Average Average Average Average Average Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Review 2.10 2.11 2.14 2.23 2.32 2.36
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 2.08 2.08 2.11 2.16 2.24 2.37
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 2.11 2.12 2.17 2.19 2.26 N/A
AgResource 2.20 2.29 2.27 2.23 2.38 2.60
Agri-Edge (cash only) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 2.10 2.11 2.14 2.20 2.31 2.45
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 2.10 2.06 2.06 2.13 2.21 2.33
AgriVisor (basic cash) 2.08 2.09 2.11 2.15 2.24 2.30
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 2.06 2.07 2.06 2.11 2.20 2.30
Allendale (futures & options) 1.95 2.00 2.02 2.09 2.20 N/A
Allendale (futures only) 2.09 2.13 2.18 2.26 2.23 2.26
Brock (cash only) 1.93 1.98 2.01 2.08 2.18 2.26
Brock (hedge) 2.08 2.06 2.14 2.24 2.27 2.27
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Co-Mark 2.04 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Freese-Notis 1.94 1.89 1.97 2.02 2.16 2.28
Grain Field Marketing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus 1.91 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash only) 1.93 1.84 1.90 1.96 2.07 2.23
Pro Farmer (hedge) 1.87 1.81 1.90 1.98 2.09 2.23
Progressive Ag 2.30 2.18 2.11 2.14 2.21 N/A
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) 2.11 2.11 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 2.09 2.05 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options only) 2.08 2.05 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 1.92 1.92 1.94 1.97 2.05 2.17
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.29 2.23 2.20 2.19 2.23 2.37
Utterback Marketing Services 2.25 2.19 2.27 2.37 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
  Average 2.07 2.06 2.09 2.14 2.21 2.32
  Minimum 1.87 1.81 1.90 1.96 2.05 2.17
  Maximum 2.30 2.29 2.27 2.37 2.38 2.60
  Range 0.43 0.48 0.37 0.30 0.33 0.42
Market Benchmarks
  24-Month Average 2.05 2.05 2.10 2.14 2.23 2.32
  20-Month Average 1.98 1.98 2.01 2.06 2.16 2.29
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA Average Price Received 1.95 1.94 1.95 2.01 2.09 2.23
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory prices and benchmark 
prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest 
through August of the year after harvest. The average, minimum, maximum and range are computed across the advisory program averages in 
the indicated column. As a result, the statistics reflect performance only for those advisory programs active during each of the indicated crop 
years.   
Table 18. Pricing Results for 39 Market Advisory Programs, Corn, Two-Year, Three-Year, Four-Year, Five-Year, Six-Year and Seve-
Year Averages, 1995-2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
 832000-01 1999-01 1998-01 1997-01 1996-01 1995-01
Two-Year Three-Year Four-Year Five-Year Six-Year Seven-Year
Market Advisory Program Average Average Average Average Average Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Review 5.29 5.09 5.09 5.31 5.65 5.79
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 5.44 5.44 5.49 5.66 5.95 6.04
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 5.34 5.38 5.43 N/A N/A N/A
AgResource 6.28 6.56 6.46 6.46 6.60 6.65
Agri-Edge (cash only) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 5.42 5.44 5.47 5.64 5.91 5.98
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 5.39 5.39 5.49 5.62 5.91 6.06
AgriVisor (basic cash) 5.39 5.42 5.45 5.63 5.87 5.95
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 5.35 5.37 5.48 5.61 5.92 6.04
Allendale (futures only) 5.69 5.67 5.73 5.92 6.15 6.16
Brock (cash-only) 5.39 5.49 5.53 5.68 5.94 5.98
Brock (hedge) 5.51 5.78 5.98 6.17 6.31 6.22
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Co-Mark 5.56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Freese-Notis 5.46 5.42 5.51 5.64 5.89 5.96
Grain Field Marketing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus 5.28 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash only) 5.38 5.42 5.50 5.66 5.93 6.04
Pro Farmer (hedge) 5.36 5.51 5.60 5.77 6.06 6.16
Progressive Ag 5.41 5.50 5.55 5.77 6.11 N/A
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) 5.46 5.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 5.34 5.46 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options only) 5.36 5.41 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 5.61 5.74 5.89 5.96 6.19 6.18
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 5.50 5.74 5.89 5.93 6.08 6.10
Utterback Marketing Services 5.08 5.43 5.61 5.88 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
  Average 5.45 5.53 5.62 5.78 6.03 6.09
  Minimum 5.08 5.09 5.09 5.31 5.65 5.79
  Maximum 6.28 6.56 6.46 6.46 6.60 6.65
  Range 1.21 1.47 1.37 1.15 0.94 0.86
Market Benchmarks
  24-Month Average 5.38 5.42 5.53 5.68 5.92 5.96
  20-Month Average 5.30 5.30 5.38 5.55 5.83 5.91
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA Average Price Received 5.42 5.41 5.35 5.52 5.79 5.91
Table 19.  Pricing Results for 38 Market Advisory Programs, Soybeans, Two-Year, Three-Year, Four-Year, Five-
Year, Six-Year and Seven-Year Averages, 1995-2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory prices 
and benchmark prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of 
the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest. The average, minimum, maximum and range are 
computed across the advisory program averages in the indicated column. As a result, the statistics reflect performance only for 
those advisory programs active during each of the indicated crop years.   
  842000-01 1999-01 1998-01 1997-01 1996-01 1995-01
Two-Year Three-Year Four-Year Five-Year Six-Year Seven-Year
Market Advisory Program Average Average Average Average Average Average
Ag Alert for Ontario N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Financial Strategies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Profit by Hjort N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Ag Review 291 288 289 296 311 308
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 293 295 297 300 312 314
AgLine by Doane (hedge) 294 296 300 N/A N/A N/A
AgResource 323 339 333 326 339 345
Agri-Edge (cash only) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Edge (hedge) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Agri-Mark N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 295 297 299 303 316 318
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 294 293 293 297 309 312
AgriVisor (basic cash) 292 295 296 299 310 308
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 290 292 292 295 308 309
Allendale (futures only) 300 304 308 313 316 310
Brock (cash-only) 280 288 290 294 307 306
Brock (hedge) 295 302 311 318 323 313
Cash Grain N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Co-Mark 293 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Freese-Notis 283 279 286 289 305 306
Grain Field Marketing N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Field Report N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Grain Marketing Plus 276 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Harris Weather/Elliott Advisory N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
North American Ag N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Northstar Commodity N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pro Farmer (cash only) 280 275 280 284 299 303
Pro Farmer (hedge) 275 275 283 288 303 306
Progressive Ag 310 304 299 302 314 N/A
Prosperous Farmer N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (cash only) 297 298 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (futures & options) 292 293 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risk Management Group (options only) 292 292 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 285 289 293 293 304 303
Stewart-Peterson Strictly Cash N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Top Farmer Intelligence 312 314 314 309 315 316
Utterback Marketing Services 298 304 312 321 N/A N/A
Zwicker Cycle Letter N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
  Average 293 296 299 302 312 312
  Minimum 275 275 280 284 299 303
  Maximum 323 339 333 326 339 345
  Range 48 64 53 41 40 42
Market Benchmarks
  24-Month Average 289 292 297 299 310 309
  20-Month Average 282 283 286 290 303 305
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA Average Price Received 283 283 281 285 297 300
Table 20.  Revenue Results for 38 Market Advisory Programs, Two-Year, Three-Year, Four-Year, Five-Year, Six-
Year and Seve-Year Averages, 1995-2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  N/A denotes "not applicable" -- program did not exist or was not evaluated for that marketing year. Net advisory 
revenues and benchmark revenues are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from 
September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year after harvest. The average, minimum, maximum and 
range are computed across the advisory program averages in the indicated column. As a result, the statistics reflect 
performance only for those advisory programs active during each of the indicated crop years.   
  85Unadjusted Futures & Net
Commodity/Advisory Program Cash Sales Physical Net Cash Options Brokerage LDP / Advisory
and Benchmark Price Storage Shrinkage  Interest Sales Price Gain Costs MLG Price
Panel A: Average Price Components
Corn
    Advisory Programs 2.39 0.11 0.03 0.05 2.20 0.01 0.02 0.13 2.32
    24-Month Market Benchmark 2.36 0.08 0.02 0.04 2.22 0.00 0.00 0.10 2.32
    20-Month Market Benchmark 2.37 0.10 0.03 0.04 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.10 2.29
    Farmer Benchmark 2.36 0.15 0.04 0.06 2.10 0.00 0.00 0.13 2.23
Soybeans
    Advisory Programs 5.73 0.11 0.00 0.11 5.52 0.05 0.02 0.53 6.08
    24-Month Market Benchmark 5.70 0.08 0.00 0.09 5.53 0.00 0.00 0.44 5.96
    20-Month Market Benchmark 5.68 0.10 0.00 0.11 5.47 0.00 0.00 0.43 5.91
    Farmer Benchmark 5.70 0.14 0.00 0.16 5.40 0.00 0.00 0.50 5.91
Panel B: Average Difference in Price Components
Corn
  Advisory Programs - 24-Month Benchmark 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
  Advisory Programs - 20-Month Benchmark 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
  Advisory Programs - Farmer Benchmark 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09
Soybeans
  Advisory Programs - 24-Month Benchmark 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.11
  Advisory Programs - 20-Month Benchmark 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.17
  Advisory Programs - Farmer Benchmark 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.17
Commercial Storage Costs
Table 21.  Average Pricing Performance Results for Market Advisory Programs by Underlying Components, Corn 
and Soybeans, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Notes:  Net cash sales price is calculated as unadjusted cash sales price minus commercial storage costs. Net advisory price is calculated as net cash sales price plus 
futures and options gains minus brokerage costs plus LDP/MLG, and therefore, is stated on a harvest equivalent basis. Market and farmer benchmark prices also are 
stated on a harvest equivalent basis. LDP stands for loan deficiency payment and MLG stands for marketing loan gain. LDP/MLGs were not paid for the 1995 - 1997 
crop years.
1995 - 2001 Average
---$ per bushel---
 86Proportion of Programs Above
Farmer Benchmark
Central Illinois Central Illinois USDA Average
Number of 24-Month 20-Month Price Received
Crop Year Programs Average Average for Illinois
---%---
Panel A: Corn
1995 25 76 56 56
1996 26 38 38 73
1997 25 52 64 68
1998 23 30 52 91
1999 26 54 69 77
2000 27 56 74 78
2001 27 33 67 67
 1995-2001 Average 49 60 73
Panel B: Soybeans
1995 25 84 72 52
1996 24 83 58 71
1997 23 57 65 74
1998 22 32 77 95
1999 25 60 96 88
2000 26 46 54 65
2001 26 77 92 27
 1995-2001 Average 63 74 67
Panel C: 50/50 Revenue
1995 25 76 60 56
1996 24 67 54 79
1997 23 57 70 70
1998 22 27 64 100
1999 25 52 80 80
2000 26 58 69 81
2001 26 50 88 38
 1995-2001 Average 56 70 71
Notes: A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August 
of the year after harvest. Average proportions for 1995-2001 are computed over the full set of advisory programs. 
As a result, averages of individual crop year proportions may not equal the average proportions reported for 1995-
2001.
Table 22. Proportion of Advisory Programs above Benchmarks for Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 Advisory 
Revenue, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs




Average Benchmark and Farmer Benchmark
Net Central Illinois Central Illinois USDA Average Central Illinois Central Illinois USDA Average
Number of Advisory 24-Month 20-Month Price Received 24-Month 20-Month Price Received
Crop Year Programs Price Average Average for Illinois Average Average for Illinois
Panel A: Corn
1995 25 3.03 2.90 3.07 3.06 14 -4 -3
1996 26 2.63 2.65 2.66 2.50 -2 -4 12
1997 25 2.32 2.33 2.27 2.23 -1 5 9
1998 23 2.17 2.24 2.12 1.97 -8 5 20
1999 26 2.02 2.05 1.97 1.93 -3 5 9
2000 27 2.13 2.09 2.01 1.95 4 11 18
2001 27 1.99 2.00 1.94 1.95 -2 5 4
 1995-2001 Average 2.32 2.32 2.29 2.23 0 3 10
Panel B: Soybeans
1995 25 6.59 6.26 6.39 6.59 33 20 1
1996 24 7.27 7.08 7.21 7.17 19 6 10
1997 23 6.38 6.30 6.22 6.17 9 16 21
1998 22 5.82 5.86 5.64 5.18 -4 18 64
1999 25 5.67 5.50 5.30 5.39 18 37 28
2000 26 5.44 5.42 5.38 5.29 2 7 15
2001 26 5.45 5.34 5.21 5.55 11 23 -10
 1995-2001 Average 6.08 5.96 5.91 5.91 11 18 17
---¢ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
Notes:  Net advisory prices and benchmark prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the year 
after harvest. Averages for 1995-2001 are computed over the full set of advisory programs. As a result, averages of individual crop year prices or differences may not equal the averages reported for 1995-2001.
Table 23. Comparison of Average Net Advisory Prices and Benchmark Prices for Corn and Soybeans, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage 
Costs
Difference Between Advisors




 88Farmer Difference Between Advisors
Average Benchmark and Farmer Benchmark
50/50 Central Illinois Central Illinois USDA Average Central Illinois Central Illinois USDA Average
Number of Advisory 24-Month 20-Month Price Received 24-Month 20-Month Price Received
Crop Year Programs Revenue Average Average for Illinois Average Average for Illinois
1995 25 319 304 317 320 15 2 -1
1996 24 369 366 371 357 2 -2 11
1997 23 311 310 304 300 1 7 11
1998 22 304 311 296 274 -6 8 30
1999 25 299 297 286 285 2 13 14
2000 26 298 293 286 279 4 11 18
2001 26 287 285 277 286 1 9 1
  1995-2001 Average 312 309 305 300 3 7 12
Notes:  Net advisory revenues and benchmark revenues are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year marketing window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the 
year after harvest. Averages for 1995-2001 are computed over the full set of advisory programs. As a result, averages of individual crop year revenues or differences may not equal the averages reported for 1995-
2001.
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
Table 24. Comparison of Average 50/50 Advisory Revenue and Benchmark Revenues, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Difference Between Advisors
 and Market Benchmark
Market
Benchmark
 89Commodity/ Average  Standard Two-tail
Benchmark 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Difference Error t-statistic p-value
Corn
  Market Benchmarks:
    24-Month Average  14 -2 -1 -8 -3 4 -2 0 3 0.11 0.92
    20-Month Average  -4 -4 5 5 5 11 5 3 2 1.61 0.16
  Farmer Benchmark:
    USDA Average Price Received -3 12 9 20 9 18 4 10 3 3.36 0.02
Soybeans
  Market Benchmarks:
    24-Month Average  33 19 9 -4 18 2 11 12 5 2.71 0.04
    20-Month Average  20 6 16 18 37 7 23 18 4 4.46 0.00
  Farmer Benchmark:
    USDA Average Price Received 1 10 21 64 28 15 -10 18 9 2.04 0.09
50/50 Revenue
  Market Benchmarks:
    24-Month Average  15 2 1 -6 2 4 1 3 2 1.12 0.30
    20-Month Average  2 -2 7 8 13 11 9 7 2 3.51 0.01
  Farmer Benchmark:
    USDA Average Price Received -1 11 11 30 14 18 1 12 4 2.94 0.03
Difference Between Average Advisory Program and Benchmark
Table 25.  Significance Tests of the Difference Between the Average Price for Market Advisory Programs and the Average Benchmark Price, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 
Advisory Revenue, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Notes:  Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level.
---¢ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---¢ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
---¢ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---
---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
---¢ per bushel (harvest equivalent)---







Average Deviation Average Deviation Standard
Net  of Net Net  of Net Deviation 
Advisory Advisory Advisory Advisory Average of
Market Advisory Program Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
Ag Review 2.36 0.28 5.79 0.96 308 35
AgLine by Doane (cash only) 2.37 0.41 6.04 0.76 314 29
AgResource 2.60 0.75 6.65 0.55 345 53
AgriVisor (aggressive cash) 2.45 0.46 5.98 0.71 318 33
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 2.33 0.41 6.06 0.83 312 29
AgriVisor (basic cash) 2.30 0.28 5.95 0.66 308 27
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 2.30 0.35 6.04 0.82 309 30
Allendale (futures only) 2.26 0.20 6.16 0.63 310 20
Brock (cash only) 2.26 0.34 5.98 0.66 306 32
Brock (hedge) 2.27 0.26 6.22 0.66 313 35
Freese-Notis 2.28 0.47 5.96 0.65 306 38
Pro Farmer (cash only) 2.23 0.51 6.04 0.75 303 36
Pro Farmer (hedge) 2.23 0.49 6.16 0.79 306 37
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 2.17 0.38 6.18 0.60 303 26
Top Farmer Intelligence 2.37 0.38 6.10 0.50 316 17
  Average 2.32 0.40 6.09 0.70 312 32
  Minimum 2.17 0.20 5.79 0.50 303 17
  Maximum 2.60 0.75 6.65 0.96 345 53
  Range 0.42 0.55 0.86 0.46 42 35
Market Benchmarks
  24-Month Average 2.32 0.33 5.96 0.63 309 27
  20-Month Average 2.29 0.42 5.91 0.73 305 32
Farmer Benchmark
  USDA Average Price Received 2.23 0.42 5.91 0.76 300 29
Table 26.  Seven-Year Average and Standard Deviation for 15 Market Advisory Programs, Corn and Soybean Net Advisory Price and 50/50 Advisory 
Revenue, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Note: Results are shown only for the 17 advisory programs included in all six years of the AgMAS corn and soybean evaluations. Net advisory prices and 
benchmark prices are stated on a harvest equivalent basis. A crop year is a two-year window from September of the year previous to harvest through August of the 
year after harvest. 
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Advisory Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
 91Two-tail  Two-tail  Two-tail 
p-value p-value p-value
Year  Year  Winner  Loser for Fisher's  Winner  Loser for Fisher's  Winner  Loser for Fisher's 
    t   t+1 t+1 t+1 Exact Test t+1 t+1 Exact Test t+1 t+1 Exact Test
1995 1996 Winner t 5 6 Winner t 6 5 Winner t 7 4
Loser t 6 5 1.00 Loser t 5 6 1.00 Loser t 4 7 0.39
1996 1997 Winner t 7 5 Winner t 6 5 Winner t 6 5
Loser t 5 7 0.68 Loser t 5 6 1.00 Loser t 5 6 1.00
1997 1998 Winner t 6 5 Winner t 6 4 Winner t 3 7
Loser t 5 7 0.68 Loser t 4 7 0.39 Loser t 7 4 0.20
1998 1999 Winner t 7 4 Winner t 7 3 Winner t 6 4
Loser t 4 7 0.39 Loser t 3 8 0.09 Loser t 4 7 0.39
1999 2000 Winner t 8 4 Winner t 8 4 Winner t 9 3
Loser t 4 9 0.12 Loser t 4 8 0.22 Loser t 3 9 0.04
2000 2001 Winner t 4 7 Winner t 5 6 Winner t 5 6
Loser t 7 6 0.44 Loser t 6 6 1.00 Loser t 6 6 1.00
Table 27.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Performance by Winner and Loser Categories Between Pairs of Adjacent Crop Years, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 Revenue, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years
Soybeans
Note: The selection strategy consists of ranking programs by net advisory price in the first year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and then forming two groups of programs: "winners" are those services in the top half of the 
rankings and "losers" are services in the bottom half.  Next, the same programs are ranked by net advisory price for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1 = 1996), and again divided into "winners" and "losers."  For a 
given comparison, advisory programs must fall in one of the following categories: winner t-winner t+1, winner t-loser t+1, loser t-winner t+1, loser t-loser t+1.  If advisory program performance is unpredictable, 
approximately the same counts will be found in each of the four combinations.  Fisher’s Exact Test is the appropriate statistical test because both row and column totals are pre-determined in the 2 x 2 contingency 
table formed on the basis of winner and loser counts. Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level.
Corn 50/50 Revenue
---number of programs--- ---number of programs--- ---number of programs---
*
 92Year  Year 
t t+1 Corn Soybeans 50/50 Revenue
1995 1996 Correlation Coefficient 0.28 0.36 0.36
Z-statistic 1.30 1.70 1.68
Two-tail p-value 0.19 0.09 0.09
1996 1997 Correlation Coefficient 0.01 0.10 0.00
Z-statistic 0.06 0.48 -0.01
Two-tail p-value 0.96 0.63 0.99
1997 1998 Correlation Coefficient 0.53 0.18 0.16
Z-statistic 2.56 0.85 0.73
Two-tail p-value 0.01 0.40 0.46
1998 1999 Correlation Coefficient 0.42 0.65 0.53
Z-statistic 1.95 2.99 2.42
Two-tail p-value 0.05 0.00 0.02
1999 2000 Correlation Coefficient 0.50 0.35 0.72
Z-statistic 2.52 1.74 3.54
Two-tail p-value 0.01 0.08 0.00
2000 2001 Correlation Coefficient -0.12 0.03 -0.17
Z-statistic -0.59 0.14 -0.83
Two-tail p-value 0.55 0.89 0.41
Correlation Coefficient 0.27 0.28 0.27
Note: Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level. 
Table 28.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Ranks Between Adjacent Pairs of Crop Years, Corn, 









 93Average Average Average Average Average Average
Performance Quantile Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
 in Year t in year t in year t+1 in year t in year t+1 in year t in year t+1
Top Third 2.60 2.26 6.55 6.15 337 318
Middle Third 2.41 2.23 6.16 5.95 318 308
Bottom Third 2.18 2.15 5.91 5.90 298 307
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average 0.42 0.11 0.65 0.25 39 11
          t-statistic N/A 2.59 N/A 2.25 N/A 1.82
         Two-tail p-value N/A 0.05 N/A 0.07 N/A 0.13
Top Fourth 2.65 2.29 6.65 6.20 342 320
Second Fourth 2.45 2.22 6.25 5.99 321 310
Third Fourth 2.36 2.22 6.09 5.95 313 310
Bottom Fourth 2.14 2.13 5.87 5.88 295 305
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average 0.51 0.16 0.77 0.32 47 15
          t-statistic N/A 3.09 N/A 2.03 N/A 2.35
        Two-tail  p-value N/A 0.03 N/A 0.10 N/A 0.07
Note: The selection strategy consists of sorting programs by net advisory price in the first  year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping programs by quantiles (thirds and 
fourths).  Next, the average net advisory price for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average net advisory price of the quantiles formed in 
the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+1 = 1996).  Next, the average net advisory price for the second year is averaged across the comparisons. 
There are a total of six comparisons (1995 vs. 1996, 1996 vs. 1997, 1997 vs. 1998, 1998 vs. 1999, 1999 vs. 2000, and 2000 vs. 2001), so there are five degrees of 
freedom for the t-test.. Some average differences of the top and bottom quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the quantiles due to rounding. N/A 
denotes not applicable. Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level.
Table 29.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Performance by Quantiles Between Pairs of Adjacent Crop Years, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 Revenue, 
1995 - 2001 Crop Years
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
**
**
 94Average Average Average Average Average Average
Performance Quantile Price Price Price Price Revenue Revenue
 in Year t in year t in year t+2 in year t in year t+2 in year t in year t+2
Top Third 2.65 2.12 6.72 5.83 339 302
Middle Third 2.45 2.13 6.30 5.71 321 293
Bottom Third 2.22 2.11 6.04 5.69 301 302
  Top Third minus Bottom Third
          Average 0.42 0.01 0.69 0.14 39 0
          t-statistic N/A 0.24 N/A 0.85 N/A 0.02
         Two-tail p-value N/A 0.83 N/A 0.44 N/A 0.99
Top Fourth 2.69 2.13 6.82 5.86 345 304
Second Fourth 2.50 2.16 6.40 5.75 324 294
Third Fourth 2.40 2.06 6.23 5.63 316 294
Bottom Fourth 2.18 2.15 6.01 5.75 298 304
  Top Fourth minus Bottom Fourth
          Average 0.52 -0.02 0.82 0.12 47 0
          t-statistic N/A -0.24 N/A 0.91 N/A 0.02
        Two-tail  p-value N/A 0.82 N/A 0.41 N/A 0.98
Note: The selection strategy consists of sorting programs by net advisory price in the first  year of the pair (e.g., t = 1995) and grouping programs by quantiles (thirds and 
fourths).  Next, the average net advisory price for each quantile is computed for the first year of the pair. Then, the average net advisory price of the quantiles formed in 
the first year is computed for the second year of the pair (e.g., t+2 = 1997).  Next, the average net advisory price for the second year is averaged across the comparisons. 
There are a total of five comparisons (1995 vs. 1997, 1996 vs. 1998, 1997 vs. 1999, 1998 vs. 2000, and 1999 vs. 2001), so there are four degrees of freedom for the t-test. 
Some average differences of the top and bottom quantiles may not equal the difference of the averages for the quantiles due to rounding.  N/A denotes not applicable. Two 
stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the five percent level.
Table 30.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Performance by Quantiles Between Pairs of Non-Overlapping Crop Years, Corn, Soybeans and 50/50 
Revenue, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years
Corn Soybeans 50/50 Revenue
---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per bushel (harvest equivalent)--- ---$ per acre (harvest equivalent)---
 95Figure 1.  Central Illinois Crop Reporting District
 96Panel A: Corn
Panel B: Soybeans


































































































































































































































































































































 97Figure 3. Central Illinois Price Reporting District
 98Panel A: Corn
Panel B: Soybeans
Figure 4.  Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP) and Marketing Loan Gain (MLG) Rates for Corn and Soybeans, Central 
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Panel B: Soybeans
Figure 6. Average Marketing Profiles for Advisory Programs and Market Benchmarks, Corn and 
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 106Panel A: Corn
Panel B: Soybeans
Figure 12.  Average Monthly Prices of Corn and Soybeans, Central Illinois, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, 








































































































































































































































































































































































 107Panel A: Corn
Panel B: Soybeans
Figure 13. Marketing Profiles for Market Benchmarks, Advisory Programs and Farmers, Corn and 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































 108Panel A:  Quadrants Based on 24-Month Market Benchmark
Panel B:  Quadrants Based on Farmer Benchmark
Figure 14.  Average Net Advisory Price and Standard Deviation for 15 Advisory Programs, Corn, 
1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Note:  The following legend applies to both charts: filled triangles = individual market advisory programs, solid circle = 24-
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 109Panel A:  Quadrants Based on 24-Month Market Benchmark
Panel B:  Quadrants Based on Farmer Benchmark
Figure 15.  Average Net Advisory Price and Standard Deviation for 15 Advisory Programs, Soybeans, 
1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Note:  The following legend applies to both charts: filled triangles = individual market advisory programs, solid circle = 24-
month market benchmark, unfilled circle = 20-month market benchmark, solid square = USDA average price received 
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 110Panel A:  Quadrants Based on 24-Month Market Benchmark
Panel B:  Quadrants Based on Farmer Benchmark
Figure 16.  Average Advisory Revenue and Standard Deviation for 15 Advisory Programs, 50/50 Corn 
and Soybean Revenue, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years, Commercial Storage Costs
Note:  The following legend applies to both charts: filled triangles = individual market advisory programs, solid circle = 24-
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 111Crop Year Expected Yield Actual Yield Expected Yield Actual Yield
1995 140.0 119 44.0 43.0
1996 138.0 155 46.0 45.5
1997 141.5 140 46.5 46.5
1998 143.2 149 47.0 49.0
1999 145.6 158 47.8 49.0
2000 149.0 159 48.5 47.0
2001 152.4 157 48.8 48.0
Harvest Mid- Harvest Harvest Mid- Harvest
Crop Year Point "Window" Point "Window"
1995 10/15 10/01 - 10/31 10/15 10/01 - 10/31
1996 10/15 10/01 - 10/31 10/15 10/01 - 10/31
1997 10/15 09/29 - 10/31 10/03 09/17 - 10/21
1998 10/12 09/24 - 10/28 10/05 09/17 - 10/21
1999 10/04 09/16 - 10/20 10/11 09/23 - 10/27
2000 09/26 09/08 - 10/12 10/06 09/20 - 10/24
2001 10/03 09/17 - 10/19 10/02 09/14 - 10/18
Appendix A:  Summary of Assumed Values for Key Variables Used in Simulation of Advisory 
Program Performance, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years
Table A1. Expected and Actual Central Illinois Corn and Soybeans Yields, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years
Table A2. Harvest Definition for Central Illinois, Corn and Soybeans, 1995 - 2001 Crop Years
Corn Soybeans
Corn Soybeans










Crop Year Harvest Price Loan Rate Harvest Price Loan Rate
1995 3.22 1.95 6.40 5.08
1996 2.81 1.95 6.95 5.13
1997 2.65 1.95 6.57 5.42
1998 1.91 1.95 5.14 5.42
1999 1.74 1.95 4.54 5.42
2000 1.64 1.95 4.56 5.41
2001 1.87 1.95 4.33 5.41
---$ per bushel--- ---$ per bushel---
10.00
7.40
Table A4. Harvest Price and CCC Loan Rate for Central Illinois, Corn and Soybeans, 1995 - 2001 
Crop Years
Corn Soybeans








113Appendix B: A Cautionary Note on the Use of AgMAS Net Advisory Prices and 
Benchmarks 
 
The net advisory prices and benchmarks computed by the AgMAS Project are designed 
to reflect “real-world” marketing conditions and assure that net advisory service prices and 
benchmarks are computed on a rigorously comparable basis.  This latter point is especially 
important, as performance evaluations must compare “apples to apples” and not “apples to 
oranges.”  Comparison problems may arise if prices computed by an individual farmer or another 
market advisory service are compared to AgMAS net advisory prices and benchmarks.   
 
First, and foremost, AgMAS net advisory prices and benchmarks are stated on a harvest 
equivalent basis.  This means that spot cash prices for post-harvest sales are adjusted for storage 
costs, which include physical storage charges, shrinkage charges and interest opportunity costs.  
The impact of this assumption is illustrated in the top panel of Figure B1 for corn and the bottom 
panel for soybeans.  The top line in each chart shows the 2001 harvest cash price for each crop 
(corn: $1.87 per bushel; soybeans: $4.33 per bushel).  The bottom line reflects a cash sale at the 
same harvest price one to eleven months after harvest, with the cash price adjusted for 
commercial costs of storage.  As a specific example, consider a six-month storage horizon for 
corn.  In this case, the cash price of the sale six-months after harvest is assumed to be $1.87 per 
bushel, the same as the harvest cash price (equivalent to saying cash prices do not change over 
the six-month storage period).  However, the harvest equivalent price for the sale six months 
after harvest is only $1.58 per bushel after adjusting for commercial storage costs.  Thus, the 
difference between unadjusted and adjusted post-harvest prices in this example is 29¢ per bushel, 
a substantial difference by any standard.  The magnitude of the difference is larger for longer 
storage horizons and for soybeans relative to corn.  Note also that the difference will not be as 
large if on-farm variable costs of storage are assumed instead of commercial costs. 
 
This discussion should make clear the potential pitfalls in comparing the unadjusted 
average cash price for an individual farmer or another market advisory service to the harvest 
equivalent advisory prices and benchmarks computed by the AgMAS Project.  If such a 
comparison is made, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario where it is mistakenly concluded that 
the performance of the farmer or market advisory service is superior to the advisory services, 
market benchmarks and farmer benchmarks included in the AgMAS Project.   
 
Second, AgMAS evaluations assume a particular geographic location.  Specifically, the 
evaluation is designed to reflect conditions facing a representative central Illinois corn and 
soybean farmer.  This means comparisons made by farmers or advisory services in other areas of 
the US may not be valid, because yields and basis patterns may be quite different.  The 
differences in yields and basis patterns could have a substantial impact on prices computed for 
farmers or advisory services in another area.  The resulting bias could be either up or down 
relative to AgMAS advisory prices and benchmarks, depending on local conditions.  
 
Third, wherever feasible, marketing loan recommendations from advisory programs are 
followed by the AgMAS Project.  Consequently, marketing loan payments or benefits are 
incorporated into net advisory prices.  Market and farmer benchmark prices also include 
114marketing loan payments or benefits.  Hence, it would not be appropriate to compare prices for 
individual farmers or another market advisory service if marketing loan payments or benefits are 
not included in the prices or included in some other way. 
  
In sum, it is inappropriate to directly compare prices for individual farmers or 
another market advisory service to AgMAS net advisory prices or benchmarks unless the 
same assumptions are used.  To make valid comparisons, AgMAS assumptions regarding 
storage costs, yield, basis, and marketing loans have to be applied.  
115Panel A: Corn
Panel B: Soybeans
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 116Appendix C: Statistical Model 
 
For a given commodity and benchmark the statistical model underlying the average price 
performance tests can be stated as, 
 
ittit NAPBPe b -=+ 
 
where  it NAP  is the net price for the i
th advisory program in the t
th crop year,  t BP is the 
benchmark price in the t
th crop year, b is the expected value (mean) of the difference between 
the net price for the i
th advisory program and the benchmark price and  it e  is the error term for the 
i
th advisory program in the t
th crop year.  Note that the model assumes the expected value of the 
difference between net advisory prices and the benchmark is the same for all programs and crop 
years. The statistical assumptions about the error term are,  
 
2 ~(0,) it eN s , 
 
cov(,)0, itis eets =", 
  
and cov(,)0, itjt eeij =" . 
 
The first assumption, 
2 ~(0,) it eN s , implies that errors are normally distributed with an 
expected value of zero and constant variance equal to 
2 s .  The next assumption, 
cov(,)0, itis eets =", implies that errors for the same advisory program are not correlated 
through time.  The last assumption, cov(,)0, itjt eeij =" , implies that errors for the same crop 
year are not correlated across advisory programs.  The discussion in the section on average price 
performance focuses on correlation across advisory programs because this is considered the most 
serious problem.  As shown in the section on predictability of performance, there is, at best, 
limited evidence that net prices for advisory programs are positively correlated through time. 
 
117